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THE ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
DIVERSITY AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF NATION-BUILDING:
SPACE AND TIME IN THE THOUGHT OF YANAGITA KUNIO
by
Takehiko Kojima
Florida International University, 2011
Miami, Florida
Professor John F. Stack, Major Professor
The study examines the thought of Yanagita Kunio (1875-1962), an influential
Japanese nationalist thinker and a founder of an academic discipline named minzokugaku.
The purpose of the study is to bring into light an unredeemed potential of his intellectual
and political project as a critique of the way in which modern politics and knowledge
systematically suppresses global diversity. The study reads his texts against the backdrop
of the modern understanding of space and time and its political and moral implications
and traces the historical evolution of his thought that culminates in the establishment of
minzokugaku.
My reading of Yanagita’s texts draws on three interpretive hypotheses. First, his
thought can be interpreted as a critical engagement with John Stuart Mill’s philosophy of
history, as he turns Mill’s defense of diversity against Mill’s justification of enlightened
despotism in non-Western societies. Second, to counter Mill’s individualistic notion of
progressive agency, he turns to a Marxian notion of anthropological space, in which a
laboring class makes history by continuously transforming nature, and rehabilitates the
common people (jōmin) as progressive agents. Third, in addition to the common people,
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Yanagita integrates wandering people as a countervailing force to the innate parochialism
and conservatism of agrarian civilization. To excavate the unrecorded history of ordinary
farmers and wandering people and promote the formation of national consciousness, his
minzokugaku adopts travel as an alternative method for knowledge production and
political education.
In light of this interpretation, the aim of Yanagita’s intellectual and political project
can be understood as defense and critique of the Enlightenment tradition. Intellectually,
he attempts to navigate between spurious universalism and reactionary particularism by
revaluing diversity as a necessary condition for universal knowledge and human progress.
Politically, his minzokugaku aims at nation-building/globalization from below by tracing
back the history of a migratory process cutting across the existing boundaries. His project
is opposed to nation-building from above that aims to integrate the world population into
international society at the expense of global diversity.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: SPACE, TIME, AND GLOBAL DIVERSITY

The fact that supposedly common humanity has diverse historical expressions has
long constituted a puzzle for any social or political theory that claims universal validity,
but the early twenty-first century witnesses a renewed consciousness of the limitation of
modern theoretical knowledge in dealing with the intellectual challenge. What is more,
the modern methods of knowledge production have been accused of being positively
hostile to diversity and too eagerly lendingd a hand in the suppression of it. Critics
contend that instead of directly counting diversity as a fundamental condition of
humanity and a potentially beneficial common stock for enriching existing knowledge,
they tend to belittle its significance for theorization by arbitrarily drawing a line between
what is and is not relevant to universal knowledge. This demarcation is carried out by the
conceptual manipulation of space and time. Spatially, persistent difference within tends to
be externalized and banished into rigidly confined places, either physically or
metaphorically, so that the fiction of internal homogeneity and unity is created and
maintained. Temporally, any difference, or deviation from the established standards, is
distanced as a sign of imperfection or immaturity, which is supposed to disappear in time.
In the context of the global hegemony of the West, the combination of those
practices is often translated into the apotheosis of the nation-state as the most advanced
stage of human progress with which any other form of social organization is unfavorably
compared in most, if not all, aspects. In this way, diverse experiences in non-Western
space are arbitrarily sifted out and are reduced to the expressions of imperfect conditions
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to be overcome in the course of time. As time goes by, it has been thought, diversity
gradually gives way to unity, as human conditions approach its perfection. As critical
scholarship from various disciplines documents, knowledge informed by such a
conceptual manipulation of space and time plays an active role in justifying imperialism,
the discrimination and forced assimilation of minorities, or other forms of suppression of
diversity (e.g., Said 1979; Said 1993; Tully 1995: Mehta 1999; Fabian 2002; Inayatullah
and Blaney 2004; Bowden 2009). Moreover, when a difference proves to be too
persistent, the essentialist notion of race, ethnicity, or culture is invoked to contain it
within timeless space. In this sense, racism, ethnic nationalism, or other forms of
exclusionary thoughts or practices make strange bedfellows with the inclusionary thrust
of cosmopolitanism in either explaining away persistent diversity as a recalcitrant residue
of the past or justifying it as permanent reality to live with. In this vicious circle of
spurious universalism and reactionary particularism feeding on each other, modern
theoretical knowledge find it increasingly difficult to maintain its claim that it is a neutral
arbiter between contenting parties.
Diverse historical expressions of common humanity are by no means a new
challenge for modern theoretical knowledge. Rather, theorizing activities in the modern
period were, to a substantial degree, motivated by the recognition of such diversity.
Especially, the discovery by the Europeans of the New World and the inhabitants thereof,
whose existence had been totally unexpected by the former, provided direct incentives
and materials for theorizing, laying foundations of modern disciplinary fields, such as
political theory, international law, economics, history, sociology, and anthropology (Meek
1976; Jahn 2000; Blaney and Inayatullah 2004: 47-92). In a sense, modern knowledge’s
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claim for universal validity drives from the fact that, unlike premodern knowledge, it
does account for the empirical fact of global diversity. However, the way modern
knowledge incorporate diversity into its fold can be called, at least with hindsight,
imperialistic in a double sense of the term: It unilaterally incorporates the unfamiliar into
a preconceived spatial or temporal order and it has intimate connections with
imperialistic practices exercised by coercive power.
What went wrong with those pioneers of modern knowledge and what alternatives
could have been available to them are the questions that motivate this study. The point
here is not that Hobbes, Locke, Adam Smith, or other Western thinkers, who pioneered
the idea that unfamiliar peoples they found in unfamiliar lands were comparable to their
own past, should be held responsible for subsequent imperialism because they neglected
or suppressed the voice of unfamiliar others. The voice was not there even if those
thinkers had been disposed to hear it, and even if they had had opportunities to hear it,
they would have had difficulty in understanding it. Probably, they were no more
concerned with understanding unfamiliar peoples than with understanding and changing
their own societies. Why they were so prejudiced against unfamiliar peoples, which
without doubt they were, is an important question, but there are even more important
questions: What was the appropriate attitude that they could have adopted in front of such
opacity and uncertainty created by encounters with radical others? What kind of
alternative methods could have been available to them to produce theoretical knowledge
on the basis of bewildering diversity? And what consequences such alternative methods
would have had on the substance of knowledge, especially on our understanding of
diversity, history, and political order?
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I believe that addressing those questions not only retains relevance but also has
become a matter of some urgency today, especially after September 11, 2001, because, if
those great minds of the Western intellectual tradition did not know answers, neither do
we—i.e., the contemporary scholars, Western or non-Western—seem to know any better.
Moreover, given the intimate relations between knowledge and political power, the
questions do not remain purely academic. Regardless of the extent to which theoretical
knowledge scholars and intellectuals produce actually matters in legitimating or
delegitimating certain institutions or practices, at least there must be decent efforts on the
part of the members of the intellectual community to reflect on what we are doing and
what implications our activities could possibly carry in a larger historical context.
To addresses those questions, this study turns to a somewhat unlikely place: The
intellectual biography of Yanagita Kunio (柳田國男,1875-1962),1 a Japanese nationalist
thinker best known as a founder of Japanese folklore (minzokugaku 民俗学).2 His long

1

All Japanese names in this study are written in the Japanese customary order. That is, a
family name comes first, and a given name second.
2

Minzokugaku (民俗学) is composed of three Chinese ideographs. Min (民) stands for
people or folk, zoku (俗) customs or traditions, and gaku (学) study. The standard
understanding is that minzokugaku is the Japanese counterpart of the European discipline
of folklore, but that interpretation fails to capture the ideological aspect of minzokugaku.
Some scholars attach importance to the influence of Japanese nativist thought (kokugaku
国学) of the late Edo period on minzokugaku (e.g., Harootunian 1988: 407-439), and the
best translation of minzokugaku is perhaps Marilyn Ivy’s “nativist ethnology” (Ivy 1995).
Yanagita’s own understanding of minzokugaku is that it is the application of the methods
of ethnology to the questions of folklore, but he invests it with a very unique mission of
being a national political science (Teihon 25: 248-259). He had tried various names, such
as kyōdo kenkyū (郷土研究 hometown studies), nōmin seikatushi (農民生活誌 the
ethnography of rural life), minkan denshō ron (民間伝承論 the study of popular oral
traditions), or simply fokuroa (フォクロア folklore) to refer to the academic discipline
he tried to establish, but reluctantly accepted minzokugaku after his colleagues christened
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intellectual career can be summarized as an inquiry into the basis of the historical
diversity of common humanity and its implications for knowledge and politics. The
major premise of my study is that Yanagita’s intellectual project can be interpreted as
both defense and critique of the Enlightenment tradition and, as such, suggests a possible
path the latter could have taken but did not take. On the one hand, he firmly believed that
there is but one world history retrievable by means of scientific methods and vehemently
opposed cultural exceptionalism that tried to isolate Japan or any other spatial unit from
world history. On the other hand, he was equally wary of spurious universalism that tends
to assimilate the world into Western civilization. The attempt to navigate between the
Scylla of cultural exceptionalism and the Charybdis of spurious universalism led him into
the question of space and time that runs through the ideological and disciplinary divides.
Against the tide of the specialization and professionalization of knowledge production, he
proposed minzokugaku as a synthesizing science that directly responds to the neglected
social and political needs of the silent majority in his own nation and the world.
My study, therefore, offers an intellectual biography of Yanagita, reconstructed on
the basis of an unconventional interpretation of his texts against the backdrop of the
political and intellectual contexts in which they were written, with an emphasis on his
conception of space and time. My purpose here is not to present Yanagita as an

their association minzokugakkai in the mid-1930s. His reluctance was partly explained by
the fact that ethnology was also translated into minzokugaku (民族学) with another
Chinese ideograph zoku (族), standing for tribe or clan, and he feared that the general
public might confound them. He tried to distance his minzokugaku from ethnology partly
because he was aware of ethnology’s association with colonialism. In this study, I
decided to use minzokugaku to emphasize the unique nature of Yanagita’s intellectual
project.
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intellectual gem hidden in the obscure corner of the Far East, but to rehabilitate him as a
contemporary participant in global debates on world order by situating his intellectual
project in a larger historical context, whereby the following three questions have become
important for any theory of human society. The first question is, “What is the basis of
cultural diversity?” The question is not new and various answers have been proposed,
such as race, ethnicity, economic structures, relative moral and intellectual maturity of
different peoples, and so on. The second question is, “Is diversity worth preserving or
even promoting?” There can be two extreme positions with respect to the question. On
the one hand, universalism posits that common human history is that of emancipation
from particularistic cultures that has long divided humanity and the world is treading on a
common path toward universal civilization. From the universalist point of view, therefore,
the decline of diversity is a welcome sign indicating the progress of humanity. On the
other, particularism claims that humanity actually consists of essentially distinct peoples
and that any existing culture is complete on its own right. Diversity, in the particularist
view, is good and worth preserving for its own sake. Because answers to those questions
have implications for what we think and do, the third question is, “How are we doing in
dealing with diversity?” Especially, the study focuses on how the idea and institution of
international society and the sovereign state deal with the question of diversity.
Even though Yanagita did not directly address those questions, it is possible to
reconstruct his possible answers to them from his texts, and not only the answers
themselves but also how he arrived at them are interesting and significant to students of
contemporary world politics. The interpretation offered in this study not only sheds light
on an aspect of Yanagita’s thought that has not received enough attention, but also

6

illuminates possible blind spots in the modern mode of knowledge production concerning
the question of diversity. Even though the intellectual biography itself does not
necessarily provide a definitive answer to the question of global diversity, it surely
provides an occasion for self-reflection on the part of intellectual heirs, either conscious
or unconscious, to the unfulfilled promise of the Enlightenment project. That is the raison
d'être of my study.

Theses and Methods of the Study
Although Yanagita repeatedly claims that his intellectual project has enormous
relevance to contemporary politics and many scholars and intellectuals recognize such
relevance, precisely how it is relevant is a matter of substantial controversy. The
difficulty in pinning down the political relevance of his project is not least because most
his writings are neither political nor theoretical in any conventional sense. They are
typically written in the form of essays, consisting of not so much expository presentations
of clear thesis and supporting arguments as meandering narratives that thread together
seemingly unrelated anecdotes by dint of his literary intuition.3 The contents of his texts
largely concern the history of the everyday life of the ordinary Japanese, which seems to
have no relations to contemporary world politics. To make matters worse, he is
characteristically reticent about many crucial political issues of his time, such as the
Emperor system, the annexation of Korea, or war against China and the United States,
3

Yoshimoto Takaaki, who calls Yanagita’s style “methodless methods (muhōhō no hōhō
無方法の方法),” describes it in the following terms: “No matter how far we follow
Yanagita Kunio’s methods, we never get to the essential meaning of the term ‘abstract.’ It
is a infinite space of beads threaded by ‘intuition’” (Yoshimoto 1973: 192).
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and his remarks on issues of public concern often come in an extremely roundabout form.
As a result, it is difficult to pin down his positions vis-à-vis specific political issues, let
alone theoretical underpinning of his positions, from texts. Therefore, any attempt to read
Yanagita’s texts in search of a political or social theory is destined to be frustrating. If
there is any theoretical engagement behind his writings, it is hidden in literary plots
underlying his historical narratives.4 Inevitably, those who seek a theory in Yanagita’s
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As Hashikawa Bunzō (1985b) points out, selective reticence on his life and
contemporary political issues is one of the major characteristics of Yanagita. Although
Hashikawa does not elaborate, there are several possible reasons for his reticence. First,
as an elite government official, he acquired a keen sense to protect himself from
unnecessary troubles. After resigning from the government in 1919, he became more
openly critical of the foreign policy of the government and the delay in domestic reforms.
Nevertheless, he generally wrapped his criticism with nuanced or sometimes obfuscating
language, possibly to avoid provoking the government and increasingly nationalistic
public opinion. Especially, as official censorship made it increasingly risky to openly
challenge certain political institutions or government policies, he seemed to prefer silence
to lying. It is even arguable that his oblique engagement with contemporary politics
through the apparently politically innocuous historiography of rural society is partly
explained by his disinclination toward direct confrontation. Second, however, he also
self-censored his own writings out of concern that the publication of sensitive facts might
have undesirable political repercussions. An example of his self-censorship is his refusal
to republish some early writings on wandering priests and priestesses because, according
to him, those writings had implications for the Imperial Household. Yanagita did not
elaborate on the reason, but, as Akasaka (1994: 134-135) speculates, Yanagita possibly
feared that his thesis that the established clergy of Shintō and wandering priests and
priestesses shared the same origin might reveal a historical connection between the
Imperial House and much denigrated wandering and discriminated peoples. These
examples indicate his readiness to turn a blind eye to inconvenient truth. However, his
selective reticence on his own political views also reveals the political side of his
intellectual project. As will be discussed in the second chapter, he had an instrumentalist
notion of knowledge and repeatedly criticized the production knowledge for the sake of
knowledge. In Kokushi to minzokugaku (国史と民俗学 National History and
Minzokugaku, 1944) (Teihon 24: 11-14), he claims that historiography always had
important political functions and historical knowledge has always been a source of
political authority. In this context, his selective reticence can be interpreted as his
readiness to privilege political objectives over historical truth, and for him, the ultimate
objective of politics is the preservation of spatial order to prevent the reversal of human
progress. Arguably, selective memory—i.e., remembering something while forgetting
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writings are forced to comb his voluminous and diverse texts, biographical information,
and intellectual and political contexts in which they are written for relevant clues and to
assemble them into what would be Yanagita’s theoretical perspective he himself never
fully articulated. Any study of his political thought requires a positive interpretive device
to distill theoretical contents from his non-theoretical texts, with all the risk of reading
too much from too little.
The strategy this study adopts is to read his texts through three interpretive
hypotheses, which serve as a sort of conscious prejudice. The first hypothesis is that his
intellectual project can be described as a critical engagement with John Stuart Mill’s
philosophy of history, especially the one expressed in his influential essay On Liberty.
While Mill’s text is the quintessential defense of diversity as a basis for social progress, it
refuses to extend the same logic to less developed societies on the ground that diversity
outside Western civilization is a sign of immaturity and not conducive to progress. I will
argue that Yanagita embraces Mill’s defense of diversity as the basis for social progress
but turns it against the latter’s justification for enlightened despotism in less developed
societies. The second hypothesis is that, in order to counter Mill’s individualistic notion
of progressive agency, he turns to a Marxian notion of anthropological space underneath
the superstructure of civilization as a true site of progress, where human life is
reproduced by incessant labor to subordinate nature to human will. He identifies rural
folks who directly work in and on nature, instead of the urban literate class specializing in
mental labor, as primary progressive agents. However, he rejects Marxian universalism

others—is at the heart of his minzokugaku project.
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by allowing natural conditions, human choice, and memory to play a greater role in
producing diversity and claims that each civilization has its own path to modernity.
A few caveats are necessary before we proceed to the third hypothesis. My claim is
not that Yanagita consciously engaged with Marx and Mill’s texts in the course of
establishing minzokugaku. Both Mill and Marx were widely read in Japan during his
lifetime, and judging from his educational background and occasional references to their
names in texts, he was most certainly familiar with some of their texts. However, there is
little direct evidence that indicates the influence of On Liberty and Marx’s historical
materialism on Yanagita’s intellectual project. Yanagita’s direct contacts with Mill’s texts
seem to be limited to his formative years and all the reference to Mill in his earlier texts
concerns a Mill the economist, not the political theorist. Although his engagement with
Marx may have been extended well into the1930s or later through his Marxist disciples
and friends, he discussed neither Marx nor Marxism in his texts. Neither do I claim that
Mill and Marx are the only, or even primary, source of theoretical inspiration for his
intellectual project that culminates in the establishment of minzokugaku. As an academic
discipline, it was more directly inspired by European ethnology and folklore and,
probably, the sociology of Durkheim. Yet his turn from political economy into ethnology
and folklore seemed to be motivated by deeper theoretical concern. In fact, it is not
difficult to detect the influence, either direct or indirect, of British and French
Enlightenment thinkers in his texts, such as Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Adam Smith,
just to name a few. However, as Tsurumi Kazuko points out, Yanagita weaves an
assortment of thoughts, from European literary works, folklore, and ethnography to
Japanese classics such as works of Motoori Norinaga (本居宣長 1730-1801) and Hirata
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Atsutane (平田篤胤 1776-1843) into “a seamless patchwork” with “fuzzy boundaries”
(Tsurumi 1998: 35). It is, therefore, risky, if not utterly preposterous, to assert Mill and
Marx’s direct influence on Yanagita’s thought.
In light of comparison between Mill’s and Yanagita’s texts, I am inclined to think
that the influence of Mill on Yanagita’s thought is vastly underappreciated with respect
not only to the question of diversity but also to reformism in his political economy, the
rejection of paternalism and the ideal of self-reliance, the importance attached to public
debates, ambivalence toward civilization, the commitment to “inductive” methods, and
possibly attention to the plight of women. However, I doubt that Yanagita himself
understood his project as a lifelong engagement with Mill’s philosophy of history. It is
more probable that Mill’s defense of liberty and diversity left an indelible impression on
the sensitive and absorbent mind of young Yanagita and the Millian spirit became
internalized through his subsequent struggles against the paternalistic state. As for Marx,
the direct influence is even less obvious and probably one can make a stronger case for
the affinity between Yanagita and Adam Smith—not so much a Smith the father of liberal
economics as a Smith the moral philosopher who was concerned with the moral and
political implications of the transition from agrarian to commercial society—as long as
the ideological orientation is concerned. Again, my educated guess is that Marx’s
influence on Yanagita is substantial, but I do not insist that the influence is direct and
unmistakable.
My study concentrates on Mill and Marx, not because their influence is obvious or
greater, but because the focus is useful for the purpose of this study: i.e., shedding light
on Yanagita’s unique but by no means idiosyncratic conception of space and time and its
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epistemological and political implications. The claim of this study does not necessarily
depend on whether his intellectual project is a conscious theoretical engagement with
those thinkers. As a matter of fact, Yanagita was never a theorist and was not interested in
theoretical debates at all. The major target audience of his writings and speeches,
especially in later years, were not professional scholars or ideologues but the general
public. However, because his original understanding of space and time, on the one hand,
and history and political community, on the other, was largely shaped by the absorption
of the Enlightenment thought, his revisionist historiography by means of minzokugaku
inevitably carries critical potential vis-à-vis the Enlightenment thought. Even if Yanagita
himself did not recognize the influence of Mill and Marx on his project, comparison
between Mill and Marx, arguably two greatest heirs to and critics of the Enlightenment
tradition in the nineteenth century, and Yanagita still makes sense in this broader
intellectual context.
As for the third hypothesis, I will argue that Yanagita complement the history of the
common people with that of wandering people. The implicit grand narrative of his
hypothetical world history is underscored by Malthusian wariness, which has two
important ramifications for his conception of space and time. First, his concern with
spatial limits to the possibility of progress moves him away from a linear to a cyclical
notion of time, on the one hand, and from progressivism to conservatism, on the other.
Second, it also directs his eyes to the existence of landless people who have lived on the
margin of agrarian civilization. In his minzokugaku, he transcends his initial Romantic
inclination by combining his wanderlust and Malthusian wariness into a theory of cultural
transmission across spatial divisions. In this theory, the presence of wandering people are
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no longer an object of Romantic yearning, as their status as the internal other of
civilization is explicitly recognized and their role in history as the countervailing force to
the innate parochialism and conservatism of civilization is incorporated into his theory of
civilization. In a parallel move, travel, or temporary wandering, is no longer an act of
rebellion against civilization or escapism, and is redefined as a method of knowledge
production and a means of political education.
Combined, the three hypotheses make it possible to reconstruct a more or less
coherent theoretical core from Yanagita’s writings, whose implications easily transcend
various disciplinary and ideological boundaries, including the one between Political
Theory and International Relations.5

Significance of the Study
A folklorist, little known outside his native country and whose writings do not
directly deal with either political theory or international relations, is certainly an odd
choice for a study of world politics. Nevertheless, there are several reasons Yanagita’s
thought ought to interest students of politics outside Japan. The significance of this study
is two-fold. First, it sheds new light on the thought of an important non-Western thinker
in a way that rehabilitates him as a relevant participant, different from but coeval with

5

Throughout this study, Political Theory and International Relations refers to the current
division of labor in knowledge production based on the allegedly qualitative difference
between politics within each political community and relations between them. As such,
Political Theory includes theoretical activities in the subfields of Comparative Politics
and American Politics as well as Political Theory narrowly defined. Furthermore, as
Walker (1993) suggests, International Relations itself is built upon Political Theory
broadly defined, and one cannot stand independently from the other.
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Western critics of modernity, in the formation of discourses on world order. Second, his
critique of the modern spatiotemporal order and the methods of knowledge production
predicated on it provide new materials for self-reflection on the part of those of us who
works within the conventional frameworks of Political Theory and International
Relations. For the remainder of this section, I elaborate on each of these two points.

Non-Western Thinker as Coeval Contestant
Yanagita is a complex thinker. His ambivalent attitude toward modernity haunts
both his career and writings, which verge precariously upon the boundaries between
literature and science, Romanticism and rationalism, aesthetics and politics, obscurantism
and enlightenment, and poetic imagination and scientific rigor. Therefore, it is difficult to
classify his thought into any preexisting category. The complexity, much appreciated by
admirers of Yanagita, becomes a liability when it is necessary to represent his thought to
those who are not familiar with his writings. For not only international audiences but also
many Japanese contemporaries, the historical significance of his writings is far from
self-evident.
The major claim of this study is that Yanagita’s intellectual project can be
understood as a critical engagement with the modern spatiotemporal order that informed
the dominant understanding of what was happening in the world in the early twentieth
century. As discussed in the previous section, he, on the one hand, heavily draws on the
Western political and economic thought. On the other, that does not mean that he blindly
accepts Western theoretical knowledge and uncritically applies it to the case of Japan.
Instead, in engaging critically with Western conceptions of space and time, he radically
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transforms the conception of political community and progress. A result is a more
conservative and nationalist theory of world politics with ingrained wariness toward
industrialization and urbanization, but in line with the Enlightenment tradition and more
sensitive to the question of diversity. The advantage of the approach of this study can be
illustrated by contrasting it to two conventional understanding of the meaning of
Yanagita’s work in intellectual history.
First, a most popular narrative of Yanagita’s legacy is that of a nationalist thinker
who tried to preserve Japanese cultural distinctiveness against the tide of
modernization-cum-Westernization. Both admirers and critics often characterize him as a
spokesperson of a distinctive Japanese perspective, genuine or false, and a defender of
Japanese traditions. In this narrative, his intellectual project is understood as an attempt to
counter Western influences with allegedly Japanese indigenous culture and the goal of his
minzokugaku is the self-affirmation of cultural distinctiveness. Thus, his writings
themselves become expressions of this distinct cultural ethos, almost impenetrable to
those who do not share it. Although there is a grain of truth to this interpretation, it has an
unintended effect of severing Yanagita’s thought from the global public sphere and
contributing to the idolization of him as a national intellectual hero. The major dilemma
of this interpretation is that the more one emphasizes his role as a representative of the
Japanese unique perspective, the less relevant his thought becomes to international
audiences.
In a sense, an enormous gap between Japanese and Western reception of Yanagita’s
writings illustrates the problem. He is not only an enormously popular figure in Japan,
almost a cultural icon himself, but also has been touted by many Japanese intellectuals
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and scholars as a “world-class intellectual,” or one of the few “exportable” thinkers Japan
has ever produced (e.g. Hashikawa 1985a; Umesao 1973). Yet, international audiences
remain unimpressed. The scholarly interest in him abroad has been largely limited to
folklorists and cultural anthropologists who simply see his minzokugaku as the Japanese
counterpart of their own disciplines. For many others, he is simply a “very Japanese”
(Ōiwa 1985: vii) writer, to the effect that his texts may be enjoyed and evaluated as
Japanese literary works, but not treatises with theoretical values. It is arguable that the
varying reception of Yanagita in Japanese and international audiences itself is an
extension of the problem he grappled with one century ago: the privileged position of
“universal” knowledge as the standard for relevance. Although there is no indication that
Yanagita considered his own writings impenetrable to non-Japanese readers, some
Japanese scholars suggest that this is precisely what happens when Western scholars are
too quick to dismiss him as a literary genius fraying into the field of positivist science, at
best, or an nationalist ideologue in guise of a positivist scientists or historian, at worst.6
Without any doubt, a problem is the notorious difficulty of translating his writings
into foreign languages, and, not surprisingly, his writings largely remain to be translated.7
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Compare, for example, essays, written by both Japanese supporters and Western critics,
in the volume edited by Koschmann et al (1985).
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Yanagita published more than ninety books and countless articles throughout his life,
but, according to Morse’s (1990: 208-209) bibliography, only ten articles and seven
books have been translated into English. Of the seven translated books, one is a
dictionary of Japanese folklore and other two are the reports of major fieldwork that his
disciples conducted in Japanese mountain and seaside villages and cannot be properly
called his own works. Other two is a collection of Japanese folktales and its revised
edition. None of translated books and articles directly concerns theoretical and the
methodological aspects of his minzokugaku.
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Yet the issue goes deeper than the problem of translatability. One of the editors of the
volume titled International Perspectives on Yanagita Kunio and Japanese Folklore
Studies frames the question of the limited international appeal of Yanagita as follows:
[The limited appeal of Yanagita to the international audience] might have been
because the great bulk of Yanagita’s writings remain to be translated, and hardly
mentioned in foreign languages. It thus has remained unknown even to those who
often hear Japanese reference to it. At the same time, one could not help wondering
if it would be worthwhile to spend the great time and effort translating Yanagita’s
work when many seemed already to have passed judgment on it: “it’s very
Japanese,” they would say with a smile. Could Yanagita be at all meaningful when
detached from the Japanese context? (Ōiwa 1985: vi-vii).
By giving a vehement “no” to the question above, some Japanese admirers of Yanagita
have unwarrantedly contributed to the exoticization of his voice and have deprived his
thought of global relevance.
A more sensible and fruitful approach is to reckon him as a thinker who reacted to
the advent of modernity like many others in modernizing societies. As industrialization,
urbanization, administrative centralization, democratization, or other forms of social
changes engulfed the Japanese society, there emerged the intellectual challenge of how to
interpret these developments. In this sense, Yanagita is no different from modern Western
thinkers who grappled with the same kind of questions. Thus, it is not nationality but the
ideological orientation of Yanagita that should be emphasized. According to this view,
Yanagita can be most plausibly characterized as a Burkean conservative who viewed
rapid social changes with skeptical eyes and favored gradual and moderate reform over
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radical and revolutionary paths to progress (Nakamura 1974; Hashikawa 1985a;
Koschmann 1985; Satō 2004). An alternative view, represented by recent critical
scholarship on Yanagita, suggests that his intellectual project was a misplaced effort to
resist modernity—“misplaced” because it actually takes part of it by concealing the
reality of capitalist modernity underneath the false sense of cultural permanence (e.g., Ivy
1995; Figal 1999; Harootunian 2000).
The second approach is more amenable to the fact that Yanagita’s thought was in
fact nurtured in close conversations with the Western intellectual tradition. As discussed
in the previous section, although his reticence about intellectual debt makes it difficult to
gauge the precise form in and the extent to which his intellectual project was shaped by
Western thought, one cannot help noticing the shadows of various Western thought in his
writings. With or without any direct influence from these thinkers, his unarticulated
political theory seems to belong to the same discursive space of modernity. As such, his
intellectual relevance can be evaluated with the same standards as those used in the
Western intellectual history.
However, I find the second approach wanting as well. According to the view,
Yanagita, or any other non-Western thinker for that matter, is placed on the receiving end
of knowledge production and dissemination. Commonalities or affinities found between
Yanagita and various Western thinkers are usually interpreted as either direct or indirect
influences from them or interesting parallels attributable to comparable structural
conditions between nineteenth-century Western societies and twentieth-century Japan.
Accordingly, his thought may be considered a variation of the conservative ideology and
its commonalities with and differences from the paradigmatic models may become
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worthy objects of historical inquiry. What is missing in this view, however, is that the
major object of Yanagita’s criticism is precisely the one-way flow of knowledge across
boundaries that divide humanity into the subjects and objects of knowledge, depending
on where they are located in the global spatiotemporal order. True, Yanagita’s thought is
substantially shaped by Western discourses he absorbed during his formative years, but
he is far from being a passive and unconscious taker of received knowledge.
The novelty of the approach adopted in this study lies in the characterization of
Yanagita’s intellectual project as an attempt to bring down the spatiotemporal boundary
between the subjects and objects of knowledge. As such, it has the advantage of
rehabilitating Yanagita as a serious critic of modern theoretical knowledge without
compartmentalizing his thought into a particular cultural matrix. On the one hand, it
argues that his political thought is by no means incommensurable with the tradition of
Western political thought. Instead of claiming that he is a cultural essentialist and a
proponent of Japanese exceptionalism, it suggests that his ultimate objective is not to
divide the world into mutually incommensurable cultural spaces but to reground
universal knowledge on the empirical fact of global diversity. On the other hand, his
thought is unmistakably shaped by his own personal experience as a Japanese urban
intellectual whose ambivalence toward modernity is rooted in a particular historical
context of Japanese modernization. That does not mean that the experience of Japan is
idiosyncratic or that his thought is representative or paradigmatic of Japanese
nationalism.8 What distinguishes him from many other Western theorists and Japanese
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By the 1930s, he was a prominent public intellectual, but was perhaps considered a
“dilettante” historian with encyclopedic knowledge of traditional rural life, not a serious
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nationalists is the fact that he consciously took advantage of the position to view the
world from the standpoint of the culturally denigrated.
In this context, it is worth emphasizing the fact that Yanagita was a traveler, in both
the literal and metaphorical senses, who went back and forth between different cultural
spaces—between rural and urban on the one hand, and national and global space on the
other. Roxanne Euben (1999: 10-11) points out that there is an etymological and
methodological connection between theory and journey. One of the etymological origins
of the term “theory” is theoros, a Greek word that referred to “a public emissary
dispatched by his city to attend the religious festivals of other Greek cities” (Wolin 1968:
319). In the passage of time, theoria “acquired the connotation of a long journey
undertaken to see (theorein) different lands and to observe their diverse institutions and
values” (Wolin 1968: 319). Traveling means stepping outside of a familiar place and
meeting an unfamiliar world. An encounter with others produces an opportunity to learn
not only about them but also about the self. Euben suggests that political theory was and
still is an inherently comparative enterprise, at least in part because it is through
comparisons that we are led to question the ‘naturalness’ of our own perspective (Euben
1999: 11).
In spite of his apparent atheoretical or even anti-theoretical inclinations, Yanagita’s
disposition closely parallels that of the traveling theorist. He was a legendary traveler
who is said to have walked the length of the Japanese archipelago, not only the densely

nationalist thinker or ideologue. His nationalist thought is more resonant with postwar
pacifist nationalism, but it can hardly be said that the complexity of his thought is widely
understood and appreciated even in the postwar period.
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populated coastal regions but also remote areas deep in mountains and in isolated islands,
which newly constructed railways, modern highways, or steamship lines did not reach.
His physical travel abroad is relatively limited, but he was always in the privileged
position to absorb Western knowledge and played a significant role in introducing the
Western literature into Japan. His minzokugaku was built upon what he observed in
person during his innumerable journeys as much as it was by what he read.
Metaphorically, it is arguable that his life itself is a sort of a long journey. Unlike the
theoros who belonged to particular poleis, Yanagita’s spatiotemporal affiliation is always
ambiguous, neither completely urban or rural, modern or traditional, nor completely
Japanese or Western, making him an outsider wherever he went.
Yanagita’s Romanticism partly derives from this rootlessness, but at the same time
he was well aware of the advantage that the status of being outsider accords to him in the
production of theoretical knowledge. In the preface to Kainan shōki (海南小記 Brief
Writings on the South Sea), a collection of essays about a journey to Southern Japan he
made in the winter of 1920/1921, he wrote:
Because I was a traveler, I did not observe the way of life in this archipelago [of
southern Japan] exclusively from the standpoint of a particular island. Without
using as the standards the historical distinctions created during the last few
centuries [that divided the archipelago into centers and peripheries], I sought to
clarify a law of life that is universal to both large and small islands of southern
Japan. I believe that good scholars in the future, adopting this attitude, will repent of
unnecessary human conflicts [in the past] and, following this path, will not fail to
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move gradually toward a bright future, a world of racial equality.9 (Teihon Yanagita
Kunio shū [Teihon, hereafter] 1: 221)
With this advantage in mind, he self-consciously assumes the role of mediator between
different spatial divisions, first between rural and urban within Japan and later between
the global East/West and the North/South. What is more, he further claims that the
effectiveness of his mediation rests on the fact that in-betweenness is the common
experience of the silent majority of humanity underneath conceptual spatial divisions. For
example, he writes in the preface to Toshi to nōson (都市と農村 City and Village, 1929):
Quite fortunately, however, here is a person like me, a most typical city dweller,
who, having long lived in a city without being completely urbanized, still
cherishing villages as much as he did when he was a boy, and, what is more,
standing apart from any special [urban or rural] interest at the present time, happens
to be in a position of observing discords between city and village. My common
sense probably represents [the sentiment of] the majority. Even those who happen
to be indifferent [to the plight of peasants] shall eventually come to share this same
feeling if they give the matter continual thought. (“Toshi to nōson.” Teihon 16: 240)
Yanagita believes that the act of travelling is indispensable to share the common
sentiment of the silent majority that runs deeper beneath the conceptual spatial divisions
on the surface and to make knowledge more universal.
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All the translations quoted in this study are mine, except indicated otherwise.
Yanagita’s writings are notoriously difficult to translate, not least because of their literary
quality. I try to strike a balance between clarity and literary quality, but, given the
objective of the study, prioritize clarity over literary authenticity whenever I have to
choose one.
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If the notion of travel as part of theoretical activity in its own right is accepted, the
experience of many modern non-Western thinkers must be appreciated as that of theoros
who travels back and forth between the West and their own native places. Of course, the
experience of such theoros does not necessarily lend itself to a common conclusion and it
is debatable whether they did better than their Western counterpart in navigating between
the Scylla of universalism and the Charybdis of particularism. However, dismissing them
outright as either imitators/followers of secondary importance or absolute others, Western
theorists may have missed important opportunities to cross-examine their own findings
from forays into unfamiliar places. The experience of Yanagita, who self-consciously
tries to exploit his epistemological advantage of being an in-between, is a good starting
point for redeeming the possibility.

Critique of Political Theory and International Relations
Interpreted as a critique of the modern spatiotemporal order, Yanagita’s thought
directly cuts into a deeper layer of Political Theory and International Relations. In other
words, in spite of the oblique way in which he approaches the question of world political
order, his intellectual project is political in a more than trivial sense, because it penetrates
into philosophical issues concerning the meaning of political community, on the one hand,
and history and human agency, on the other. What motivates his intellectual project is the
desire to explore the possibility of political community other than the impersonal modern
state and progress other than the history of Western civilization, which possibility
cotemporary Political Theory and International Relations are often unable or unwilling to
recognize. In light of his critique of the modern spatiotemporal order, the major flaw of
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Political Theory and International Relations can be said to be its failure to bear the full
weight of empirical global diversity upon their own theories. The division of humanity
into the subjects and objects of knowledge production filters out the most radical
otherness as irrelevant and immaterial to theoretical knowledge, and as a result what is
potentially a mutually enriching learning process was perverted into a dogmatic
imposition of particular standards of civilization over the world population. The act of
exclusion in guise of scientific objectivity not only is unjust to the excluded, but also
vitiates Political Theory and International Relations, as it undercuts their ability to
understand the persistence of radical difference in the midst of modernity.
For Yanagita, the failure of Western “universal” knowledge to embrace diversity is
far from accidental. His awareness that knowledge and power are inseparably wedded to
each other through the spatiotemporal order leads him to conclude that in order to change
political order, first it is necessary to develop a alternative method of knowledge
production, predicated on a different conception of space and time. By passively
accepting imported knowledge, political and intellectual leaders of non-Western societies
inevitably reproduce international hierarchy at the national level, by dividing the national
space into progressive and stagnant spheres. Then, domestic diversity is redefined as a
deviation from the universal course of political and economic development and thus is
confined to the supposedly time-resistant cultural realm. Thus, diversity is doubly
removed from world politics: first, it is removed from international politics, which is
conceived as cultureless or only thinly cultural; and second, internally, it is removed from
the public sphere and is confined to the private realm. Western civilization now can rely
on modernizing elites in non-Western societies as the first guards against the dangerous

24

intrusion of diversity into world politics. At the same time, modernizing elites in
non-Western societies depends on the superiority of the Western model for the
legitimation of their internal authority. As a result, the international and domestic
hierarchies reinforce each other, and oppositions to domestic hierarchy inevitably carry
international implications. This mutual penetration of international and domestic politics
is the basis for Yanagita’s claim that minzokugaku, in spite of its exclusive focus on
national culture, has global political significance.
The domestic opposition to the paternalistic and authoritarian state inevitably
challenges the monopolization of knowledge by the latter on the ground that the West
represents a common destiny for entire humanity. That is why he believes that intellectual
autonomy must come first before genuine political autonomy. In minzokugaku, both
subjects and objects of knowledge is the common people and its purpose is to “know the
self “(Teihon 25: 327-328, 337). In other words, minzokugaku is designed for culturally
denigrated peoples to acquire self-knowledge, in opposition to imposed knowledge by
professional scholars and bureaucrats who are more familiar with the theoretical
knowledge of and from the West than with the historical experience of their own country.
In this sense, his minzokugaku is not merely the Japanese counterpart of the European
disciplines of ethnology and folklore, but also deemed to be a national intellectual
movement aimed at nation-building from below.
Although Yanagita himself never directly engaged with Political Theory and
International Relations, his intellectual biography offers a promising site in which the
way contemporary world politics is perceived and studied is critically reexamined.
Particularly, his views of global diversity and progress raise the question whether it is
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possible for Political Theory and International Relations to make contribution to the
creation of a more inclusive and democratic progressive world order without
fundamentally rethinking the current practice of knowledge production.

Space, Time, and Political Order
For the past two decades, the question of space and time has become one of the
focal point in debates on world politics and global order. The renewed interest in space
and time is partly because the link between two important and interrelated coordinates of
the global spatiotemporal order—the nation-state and progress—has been brought into
question on both empirical and normative grounds. On the one hand, the nation-state,
which used to be regarded as a site of economic, political, and cultural development, can
no longer contain, if it ever did, either politics, economy, or culture within it. Thus, once
seen as the endpoint of human progress, it is today more likely to be regarded as an
obsolete artifice impeding the further advancement of humanity. Instead, progressive time,
often perceived as a force of political, economic, and cultural convergence into a
preordained destiny, seems to be spilling out of the container of the nation-state and
threatening to sweep it away. On the other hand, there is a persistent fear that
uncontrolled time is a threat to order and the ascendance of time over space does not go
unchecked, as many attempts have been made, in both theoretical and practical fields, to
freeze the flow of time into space. Especially, as will be discussed below, essentialist
notions of culture are often invoked to justify those attempts. In those attempts, it is the
idea of universal progress that is put aside, if temporarily, in favor of some other spatial
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order. Either way, the marriage between the nation-state and human progress is no longer
taken for granted.
The dissolution of the link between the nation-state and progress has profound
implications for political and social theories, because the latter is, to a substantial degree,
predicated on the former. And Political Theory and International Relations are not
exceptions to this trend. In fact, it is arguable that the crisis should be particularly acute in
these academic fields because the ideas of the nation-state and progress have been the
major focuses of these disciplines, either as implicit theoretical assumptions or explicit
goals. Moreover, it has been asked whether the practical objective for which these
disciplines are put in use is often the advancement and defense of “Western” civilization
that privileges the nation-state and progress.10 In other words, those disciplines are a part
and expression of the political project to make the world safe and, if possible, exploitable
for a particular form of civilization, either by the assimilation or exclusion of potentially
threatening others.
The ideas of the nation-state and progress have constituted the main grids of the
modern world order that emerged from a historically specific experience of the West. Not
surprisingly, such order is repeatedly challenged, both politically or intellectually, by
repeated encounters with unknown others whose existence cannot be easily located
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I should have desisted from using such a spatiotemporal category as “Western” or
“non-Western” because there is a risk of reifying the spatial opposition of West/non-West.
Needless to say, the West or any other spatiotemporal categories are neither uniform nor
closed ones. However, I found it impossible to avoid them entirely to make my sentences
less cumbersome and awkward. For the remainder of the study, the spatiotemporal
categories, such as the West, the non-West, or the East, should be read as “what is
conventionally considered as the West,” etc.
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within it. Instead of revising ethnocentric knowledge, however, the challenge posed by
the existence of others has repeatedly been handled by distancing them away from the
present time as well as confining them to safely remote spaces, so that Western
civilization can continue to occupy a privileged place in human history with minimum
efforts for self-reflection and accommodation.
Although the postwar global spatiotemporal order largely eschewed overt racist
categories such as “barbarian” or “savage,” the main structure of the order survived
almost intact with apparently race-neutral but similarly hierarchical spatiotemporal
categories—the North/South, the East/West, the modern/traditional, the
advanced/developing, etc. Furthermore, even attempts to revise the spatiotemporal order
that privileges the nation-state and progress are often dominated by the same reflexes.
Two of the most popular books written about the post-Cold War world order—Francis
Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man and Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of
Civilizations—offer an illustrative example of such reflexes. Fukuyama resurrects the
Hegelian history of universal human progress and notes that Kantian peace is attained at
least among consolidated liberal democracies. On the basis of this assessment, he
suggests that as progressive time in domestic space spills over into the international arena,
the relations among democratic states is fundamentally transformed from anarchy into a
community. As democracy overtakes the last citadel of false ideologies, as it seemed at
the time he was writing, the world will be more homogeneous and peaceful (Fukuyama
1992: 245-284). Although he retains the nation-state as the end-point of history, not least
because he inherits the Hegelian notion of the modern state as the culmination of human
progress, he subordinates them to the inexorable force of convergence exercised by the
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flow of time over spatial diversity. Partially in response to Fukuyama’s optimism,
Huntington suggests that Fukuyama’s history of universal civilization is actually the
history of Western civilization proper. According to the former, there is more than one
civilization and what matters to the post-Cold War world order are not civilization in the
singular but civilizations in the plural (Huntington 1997: 40-41). For him, “a civilization
is a culture writ large” (p. 41), and the cultural is much more resistant, if not immune, to
change than the political or the economic. Thus, he contends that nine civilizations are
replacing nation-states as major units in the post-Cold War world order (pp. 33-35). In
this way, Huntington counters Fukuyama’s theory of temporal transcendence with a new
theory of spatial segmentation on the basis of allegedly essential cultural differences.
Fukuyama and Huntington’s provocative theses, although far from exhausting the
possible alternatives available, represent two influential spatiotemporal frameworks that
have been recycled in both popular speech and scholarly texts. Instead of being mutually
exclusive, they often work together to enhance the either/or notion of human
progress—that is, either Western civilization survives intact or progress perishes with it.
What is missing from this limited framing of the debate is the possibility of a
cross-cultural dialogue that is mutually enriching for the West and the Rest. Therefore,
the alternatives offered by Fukuyama and Huntington turn out to be not so much
alternatives as the recycled discourses emanating from the persistent desire and fear of
Western civilization.
One of the major intellectual tasks today, therefore, is to navigate between spurious
universalism and reactionary particularism by rethinking obscure but consequential
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connections among spatiotemporal order, world politics, and knowledge as an active
instrument of politics.
The question of space and time is not new for political theory. Rather, it has been
an essential, if often implicit, component of political theory in the Western intellectual
tradition. Gunnell (1968) traces back the birth of political philosophy in ancient Greece to
the collapse of a cosmological order that completely assimilated human existence into the
universe. Cosmological time is ever recurrent and in spite of the coming and going of
particular elements therein, the cosmos itself is permanent, just as a river remains even if
water flowing in it never stays still. It was understood that human beings partook in this
recurrent order, and cosmic and human space/times were not differentiated. As a result,
there was no need for a separate body of knowledge about human history and space,
simply because such things did not existed. Instead, an “integral myth” representing the
atemporal working of the entire cosmos was the symbolic system representing the
cosmological order (Gunnell 1968: 25-28).
However, the realization that cosmic and human times were not necessarily aligned
with each other led to the alienation of humanity from nature and, with it, a challenge of
making sense of human existence. Gunnell identifies two answers to such a challenge:
Hebrew teleological history and Greek political philosophy. On the one hand, the
Hebrews’ experience of displacement from their native land produced a theology that
understood human historical existence as a temporal journey from the beginning to a
destined end. As a result, Hebrew thought rejects confinement into a fixed spatial order
and sought the meaning of human historical existence in preordained history (Gunnell
1968: 54-71). On the other hand, the sudden collapse of the Mycenaean civilization
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resulted in the similar estrangement of human society from the cosmological order. Greek
myth contrasted the transitoriness of the mortal humans with the permanence of the
immortal gods, but unlike the Hebrews, the Greek philosophers developed “the notion of
an imperishable space as a victory over time” (Gunnell 1968: 115). In the wake of the
Peloponnesian War that devastated Hellenic civilization and led to the breakdown of the
Athenian empire, Plato attempted to replace the Homeric myth, in which the hubristic
attempts by mortal heroes to approximate to the immortal was met with tragic ends, with
political philosophy that could reorder polis as a microcosm, a conscious recreation of the
lost cosmological order (Gunnell 1968: 125ff.).
It is arguable that the two answers to the problem of human estrangement from the
cosmic order are precursors to the notions of history and political space in modern
political thought. Scholars disagree as to whether modernity should be characterized as
the supremacy of time over space or space over time (Walker 1993: 9-11). Yet, as Henri
Lefebvre puts it (1991: 175), “[p]henomena which an analytical intelligence associates
solely with ‘temporality’, such as growth, maturation and aging, cannot in fact be
dissociated from ‘spatiality’” because time can be experienced only through movements
registered in space. We know that time has passed when something that was not there is
there now, or when something that was there is no longer there. That means that any
human agency in history entails the conscious creation and maintenance of spatial order,
and progress, a secular version of teleological history, demands a particular type of
spatial order—the sovereign state. Therefore, modernity, from the very beginning, has
been characterized by a duality: the acceptance of the temporality of human existence and
the search for a permanent spatial order on the basis of eternal and immutable principles.
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Baudelaire’s formulation, quoted by Harvey (1989: 10), nicely captures this duality:
“Modernity is the transient, the fleeting, the contingent; it is the one half of art, the other
being the eternal and the immutable.”
It was Machiavelli who reintroduced the flux of time, personified in Fortuna, as a
crucial problem for political order. His new science of politics was an attempt to find a
way to subdue contingent time by means of the maintenance of political order, the state.
In Hobbes’ Leviathan, human history was radically reduced to the transition between two
starkly contrasting spatial orders—the state of nature and the state presided by the
absolute sovereign. Although neither Machiavelli nor Hobbes conceptualized history in
terms of teleological progress, it is arguable that, in both cases, the accumulation of time
in well-maintained political space was defended as a necessary precondition for good life.
Yet, the search for eternal and immutable principles upon which political order should be
built culminated in Hegel’s theory of the modern state in which, according to Lefebvre,
the subordination of time to space was complete:
According to Hegelianism, historical time gives birth to that space which the state
occupies and rules over. History does not realize the archetype of the reasonable
being in the individual, but rather in a coherent ensemble comprised of partial
institutions, groups and systems (law, morality, family, city, trade, etc.). Time is thus
solidified and fixed within the rationality immanent to space. The Hegelian end of
history does not imply the disappearance of the product of historicity. On the
contrary, this product of a process of production which is animated by knowledge
(the concept) and oriented by consciousness (language, the Logos)—this necessary
product—asserts its own self-sufficiency. It persists in being through its own
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strength. What disappears is history, which is transformed from action to memory,
from production to contemplation. As for time, dominated by repetition and
circularity, overwhelmed by the establishment of an immobile space which is the
locus and environment of realized Reason, it loses all meaning. (Lefebvre 1991: 21)
Post-Hegelian thinkers—Marx among others—responded critically to the “fetishization
of space in the service of the state” (Lefebvre 1992: 21) and tried to shift the emphasis
from the space of the modern state to historical time. Yet, Hegelian statism somehow
survived the demise of his metaphysics and continues to be influential to this day. The
notion that the modern state is simultaneously the precondition for, the container of, and
the result of human progressive history has persisted until today.
Even today, political order is understood as a conscious arrangement of different
elements in space so that fleeting time can be frozen and accumulated into a particular
place. It aims to identify distinctive elements in society and organize them into a
harmonious and self-sustaining whole, a microcosm of the universe insulated from the
force of contingent time. Political order thus organized is expected to defy temporal
transitoriness, associated with decay, corruption, degeneration, and, ultimately, death. As
a result of the separation of the political as an autonomous sphere, time is now associated
with the social realm, which can be both the driving force of history and the major spring
of chaos, while the political is considered a question of order, stability, and uniformity.
Gunnell describes the common thread that runs through ancient and modern political
theories as follows:
For much of political philosophy from Plato to Rousseau society or the subpolitical
realm appeared as the great beast to be tamed by the imposition of political order.
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Society was the realm of anxiety, instability, uniqueness, and temporality; it was the
scene of necessity, the arena of the passions, and the root of human disorder.
Despite the intellectual gulf which separates Plato and Rousseau, both ultimately
understood the political as a means of containing society and abolishing history.
(Gunnell 1968: 249)
The original mission of political philosophy to subdue time by means of political order,
for the purpose of securing human existence, can be easily extended to contemporary
political scientists, as attested by the title and contents of Samuel Huntington’s modern
classic, Political Order in Changing Societies (1968). Perhaps, Gunnell overstates his
case by citing the names of Plato and Rousseau, two manifestly unprogressive theorists of
political space, as representative of political philosophy, but even if all modern political
theorists do not intend to entirely abolish history, their wariness of the social and desire to
tame it by means of political order are discernible even in the thought of progressive
thinkers such as John Stuart Mill. Generally, in modern political theory, the task of
politics is understood as channeling the dynamics of the social into a desirable direction
by actively rearranging spatial order in a way that is conducive to the accumulation of
time in a particular space. Political Theory and International Relations are expected to
provide the administrators of political order with a practical conceptual map according to
which the social is domesticated under political order.
The interpretation of Yanagita’s texts offered in this study allows us to connect his
minzokugaku to Political Theory and International Relations by pointing to the fact that
the question of political space and history occupies a central place in his thought. The
connection between Yanagita and Political Theory/International Relations is not a mere
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coincidence. His lifetime coincided with the period when Japan was undergoing the
radical transformation of its spatial and temporal consciousness.11 As Ronald Morse
aptly puts it, “[t]he changes that occurred during those eighty-eight years [of Yanagita’s
lifetime] were so profound and the results so far reaching that it is hard to imagine that
one man’s life could have spanned them all. Born in an era of the rickshaw, he lived to
see the use of jet airplanes. During his youth he witnessed famine and infanticide, yet
before he died Japan was the most advanced nation in Asia” (Morse 1990: xvi). Those
visible technological and socioeconomic changes are only part of a larger process known
by the name of “modernization,” or a movement from the “traditional” to the “modern”
era. It demanded no less than a radical redrawing of the country’s political, economic,
and cultural maps and the makeover of people’s spatial and temporal consciousness. The
new Japanese political and intellectual leaders understood too well that modernization
and Westernization were interrelated, as suggested by an official slogan of modernization
efforts during the Meiji period: “Exit Asia, Enter Europe (datsu-a nyū-ō 脱亜入欧).”
That is, Japan would become “modern” only by reordering national space after the
Western model and inserting itself into the Eurocentric international society. As a result,
the organization of spatiotemporal categories in Japanese was radically changed, as the
Western/Japanese opposition was added to the existing spatial divides between the rural
11

In spite of Gunnell’s somewhat evolutionary history of human consciousness from
cosmological to political and teleologico-historical orders, cosmological order is not
necessarily limited to ancient times or entirely lacking the consciousness of human
historical existence. At least, in light of Yanagita’s historiography, myth has been the
major mode of understanding the world for the Japanese rural population well into the
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century. Moreover, he reinterprets the cosmological
order in the Japanese countryside by claiming that it is a product of the more or less
conscious collective will to maintain spatial order in the midst of temporal change.
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and the urban. Needless to say, the urban and the Western was now equated with the new
and the better, whereas the rural and the Japanese or Eastern with the old and the worse.
In the course of the transformation, the cosmological order that had underpinned the
preexisting spatial order in the countryside was relegated to the category of superstitious
beliefs.
Yanagita belonged to the generation who experienced the acute sense of
disorientation because of the breakdown of the prior cosmological order with no clear
alternative in sight. It is not surprising, therefore, that the question of space and time
occupies a central place in his thought. In this sense, his experience is not radically
different from those of many Western modern thinkers. Hope and enthusiasm for a better
future, on one hand, and a sense of loss and nostalgia, on the other, is the hallmark of his
ambivalence toward modernity as well. He shared with progressive nationalists the notion
that the creation of national political order was the precondition for and the immediate
goal of progress. However, his ambiguous spatial affiliations—being born in a
agricultural community but not part of it, being an urban elite from a semi-peripheral
nation, being both at the center and the periphery—made him keenly aware of the
arbitrariness of the existing boundaries, internal or international. In consequence, he
refuses to assimilate himself into any of the existing spatiotemporal categories—neither
modern nor traditional, neither rural nor urban, or neither Western nor Eastern.
The ambiguity of Yanagita’s spatial affiliation allows him to approach the problem
of the modern spatiotemporal order from the perspective of not only those at the center
but also those whose voice is systematically suppressed and misrepresented—that is, the
other of the modern, the urban, and the Western. The characteristic makes his critical
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engagement with the question of space and time somewhat inaccessible, but on closer
inspection, enormously insightful to the modern, urban, and Western/Westernized
students of world politics.

Spatiotemporal Order and the Question of Others
With the global expansion of the West, the idea of the nation-state as the
precondition for as well as the culmination of human progress has become the central
grid of the modern spatiotemporal order. By the modern spatiotemporal order, I mean an
order that, in the most basic form, divides global space into “progressive” and “stagnant”
spheres. It is a product of the West’s efforts to organize, both in theory and in practice, the
global space, and it has both material and ideational aspects: the organization of
institutionalized practices and symbolic representation of such a organization. Without
doubt, the modern spatiotemporal order reflects the interests of powerful social classes or
states. However, it is a hegemonic order in the sense that it aspires to be a complete and
universal order, but falls short of being so. It has had a far-reaching influence on how
people think and act by legitimating certain ideas and practices in exclusion of others.
Like any other order, it is also self-reproductive to some degree in the sense that it
simultaneously legitimates and is legitimated by the imposition of itself upon different
spatiotemporal orders. That is not to say that the inscription of a uniform global space
over diverse local ones completely annihilated the latter, but tensions between new and
old orders remain and have given impetus to the dynamics of modern world politics.
What Anthony Giddens calls “disembedding”— “‛the lifting out’ of social relations from
local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space
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(Giddens 1990: 21)”—is countered by various attempts to rein in its fleeting process of
“lifting out.”12
The full exposition of the modern spatiotemporal order is a formidable task by
itself, because there have been various conceptual expressions and has been in a state of
constant flux. Although a complex process through which this spatiotemporal order has
evolved is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to note that its origin can be
traced to two parallel but interrelated events at the roots of modern international relations,
in which the question of cultural diversity became an explicit concern for European
theorists. The first was an intra-European process in which sovereign states gradually
emerged out of the disintegrating feudal order. The Peace of Westphalia of 1648, where
the concept of territorial sovereignty was officially accepted as the organizing principle
of the European political system, is conventionally deemed to be a milestone for modern
international relations. The space of the sovereign state was originally conceptualized as a

12

In this regard, Henri Lefebvre’s distinction of three aspects of space seems relevant.
He argues that social space has three dimensions: social practice, representation of space,
and representational space, corresponding, respectively, to the perceived, the conceived,
and the lived experiences (Lefebvre 1991: 38-42). It is worth emphasizing why Lefebvre
makes it a triad, not a dyad of mental representation and social practice. The triad is
intended to go beyond the conventional binary opposition between idea and matter, the
mind and the body. (Lefebvre 1991: 40). What differentiates “representational space”
from “representations of space” is that the latter is conceived space, that is, conceived by
the minds of intellectuals, scientists, or artists who stands outside of the space they are
creating. The latter is space sensed not only mentally but also as a bodily experience of
those who live there. In other words, the former is the abstract, the latter the concrete.
Lefebvre argues that representational spaces survive the superscription of representations
of space, often in the form of “more or less coherent system of non-verbal symbols and
signs” (Lefebvre 1991: 39). It can be argued that a major object of Yanagita’s
minzokugaku is to verbalize such systems of symbols and signs that persisted in rural
communities in order to use it as a mirror upon which the modern conceptual
representation of space is reflected.
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realm of order insulated from a chaotic or decaying world. As Inayatullah and Blaney
(2004: 21-45) argue, however, it was partly because of the problem of cultural difference,
in the form of religious conflicts between Roman Catholics and Protestants descending
into the devastating Thirty Years’ War, that the principle of state sovereignty was
accepted. Nevertheless, Inayatullah and Blaney suggest, it is just a “deferral,” not a
solution, of the problem of difference because whereas the principle of sovereignty
allows mutual toleration of cultural others beyond state borders, it externalized difference
in the form of foreign threats and justified the assimilation of internal others.
The second origin, which has long been neglected in International Relations theory,
is the Europeans’ encounter with and subsequent subjugation of others, especially the
conquest of America (Todorov 1999; Jahn 2000; Inayatullah and Blaney 2004: 47-91).
The “discovery” and subjugation by the Spaniards of the Amerindians, whose existence
had been completely unknown to the European and therefore had no place in European
theoretical knowledge, posed a formidable intellectual challenge. The Spaniards’
response to this challenge would later become a template with which they incorporated
otherness into their own knowledge in the course of the further global expansion
(Inayatullah and Blaney 2004: 47-91).
According to Tzvetan Todorov, contacts between two different cultures tend to
produce two apparently conflicting but mutually reinforcing movements: equalization
through assimilation and establishment of hierarchical relations on the basis of difference.
This “double movement” (Todorov 1999: 50) was present in the fateful first encounter
between the European and the Amerindian:
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Either [Columbus] conceives the Indians (though without using these words) as
human beings altogether, having the same rights as himself; but then he sees them
not only as equals but also as identical, and this behavior leads to assimilationism,
the projection of his own values on the others. Or else he starts from the difference,
but the latter is immediately translated into terms of superiority and inferiority (in
his case, obviously, it is the Indians who are inferior). What is denied is the
existence of a human substance truly other, something capable of being not merely
an imperfect state of oneself. These two elementary figures of the experience of
alterity are both grounded in egocentrism, in the identification of our own values
with values in general, of our I with the universe—in the conviction that the world
is one. (Todorov 1999: 42-43)
From the standpoint of the conquered, the double movement presents itself as a choice
between two bleak options: Either to seek equality at the price of assimilation, or to be
stigmatized as inferior and subjected to the conqueror’s paternalistic protection.
The Peace of Westphalia and the Conquest of America were connected events,
because the latter gave rise to the notion of the state of nature, which, in turn, modern
political theorists used to justify the sovereign state (Jahn 2000). The association of the
Native Americans with the state of nature led to the temporalization of spatial difference,
whereby cultural others the European encountered in the course of their global expansion
were ranked according to their location in a linear developmental sequence from the state
of nature to the establishment of the nation-state. At the top of the hierarchy are the
European nation-states, and at the bottom “stateless” or “nationless” peoples—that is,
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“primitive tribes” living in the state of nature—and each stage is associated with a
distinct spatial order or the absence of it.
Such an understanding of world space and time has far-reaching ramifications for
the development of Western social sciences and political theory. According to Ronald
Meek (1976), the encounter with the American Indians gave inspirations and materials to
what he calls “four stages theory.” The theory, perfected by Adam Smith and
Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot around 1750s, formulated social progress in terms of the
succession of four modes of subsistence–hunting, pasturage, agriculture, and
commerce—with each stage having its corresponding institutions and ideas. The idea that
the mode of subsistence is the base upon which a particular mode of politics and culture
is built laid the groundwork for the development of modern anthropology and sociology
and became a direct precursor of Marx’s historical materialism (Meek 1976: 229).
Equally, Uday Singh Mehta (1999) emphasizes the influence of British India on the
development of liberal thought. In his assessment, the self-understanding of liberalism is
substantially shaped by its engagement with the question of India. Liberal thinkers
thought India to be “the promised land of liberal ideas—a kind of test case laboratory” (p.
9), and, in contrast to Edmund Burke, eagerly took part in the civilizing project.
The impact of the modern spatiotemporal order is widely recognized in the case of
international colonialism, but even those countries that maintained its nominal
independence did not escape it. The new Japanese leadership understood the logic of the
modern spatiotemporal order too well and embarked on the mission of “civilizing” the
inhabitants of the Japanese archipelago by nation-building from above. In Bunmeiron no
gairyaku (文明論の概略 An Outline of a Theory of Civilization, 1875), for example,
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Fukuzawa Yukichi (福沢諭吉), a leading intellectual in the early Meiji period, accepts
the tripartite division of the world into civilization (bunmei 文明), barbarism (hankai 半
開, literally half-enlightened), and savagery (yaban 野蛮), which was in wide use in
Western discourses at the time, and characterizes it as the three stages of human progress.
(Fukuzawa 1995: 26-27). According to him, Japan, along with China, Turkey, and other
Asian countries, is in the stage of hankai (p. 25). Based on this assessment, Fukuzawa, to
whom the coining of the slogan “Exist Asia, Enter Europe” is attributed wrongly but not
unreasonably, exhorts the Japanese people to emulate not only the material but also the
spiritual aspects of Western civilization.13
The superimposition of the abstract space of the sovereign state upon preexisting
social space, however, had much more extensive and profound political ramifications
than is usually recognized. Ironically, to the extent that national space was successfully
reorganized according to the modern spatiotemporal order, the nation found itself more
split between the urban, Westernized elite and rural people who continued to live in their
own respective space and time. However, the urban elite tended to react to the problem of
internal others with the reflexes of a “double movement,” thus reproducing the global
cultural hierarchy at the national level. As a result, the bulk of the national population

13

It is known that Bunmeiron no gairyaku draws heavily on François Guizot’s General
History of Civilization in Europe and Henry Thomas Buckle’s History of Civilization in
England, along with John Stuart Mill’s Consideration on Representative Government, On
Liberty, and Principles of Political Economy (Matsuzawa 1995: 368-369). In previous
works, such as Shōchū bankoku ichiran (掌中万国一覧) or Sekai kunizukushi (世界国
尽), Fukuzawa used the four-stage theory, placing konton (混沌 chaos or anarchy) before
the three stages of yaban, hankai, and bunmei. See the endnote to the page 25 by the
editor of the Iwanami edition of the text (Fukuzawa 1995: 311)
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was denigrated as “traditional” or “backward” other, in spite of formal equality granted to
all Japanese nationals, and became the object, rather than the subject, of knowledge
production and the politics of nation-building.

Yanagita and Minzokugaku
Although Yanagita was interested in folklore and ethnology from early on, the
institutionalization of minzokugaku as an academic discipline came late in his lifetime
and perhaps not in a completely satisfying form for him. It is difficult to pinpoint the
specific date of the establishment of minzokugaku, but the history of the Folklore Society
of Japan traces its origin to minkan denshō no kai (民間伝承の会) established at a
seminar commemorating his sixtieth birthday in the summer of 1935.14 The object of this
study is not to examine the discipline of minzokugaku per se, but the evolution of
Yanagita’s thought that culminated in minzokugaku and mainly covers the period
spanning from 1900 to 1935. The section offers a brief biography of Yanagita up to the
point of the establishment of minzokugaku.15

14

Nihon Minzokugakkai, Gakkai ni tsuite, http://www.fsjnet.jp/about_us/about_us.html
(accessed September 21, 2011).
15

The information offered here draws on the chronological record of Yanagita’s career in
Teihon (sup. 5: 619-661), his autobiography, Furusato nanajūnen (故郷七十年 Teihon
sup. 3), and several other biographical works by others, including Yanagita Kunio
Kenkyū Kai (1988), Okaya (1985; 1991; 1996), and Fujii (1995). For the reader who is
not familiar with Japanese, the best biographical information of Yanagita’s life can be
found in Morse (1990).
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Yanagita was born on July 31, 1875, as the sixth son of Matsuoka Misao (松岡操)
and Take (たけ).16 Tsujikawa, Hyōgo Prefecture, where Yanagita was born and spent his
early childhood, was a small agrarian community, a kind that he himself would later
make the object of his study. However, the household of Matsuoka had abandoned
agriculture several generations ago and his father was a village intellectual steeped in
Confucianism and nativist thought (kokugaku). The fact that the Matsuoka family was
non-farmer seems to have kept the relations of the Matsuoka family with other villagers
somewhat at arm’s length. At age eleven, because of the financial hardship of the family
and his own health problem, he left Tsujikawa to live in Fukawa village, Ibaraki
Prefecture, where his eldest brother had opened a clinic. Later, his parents and younger
brothers followed him, and the Matsuoka family was completely uprooted from their
native place. In 1890, Yanagita moved to Tokyo to prepare for the university entrance
exam, and, from then on, Tokyo became his permanent base.
During his youth, he put his heart into literature, both Japanese and Western. In
1890, with the introduction of Inoue Michiyasu (井上通泰), his biological brother and a
politically well-connected ophthalmologist, he became a pupil of Matsuura Tatsuo (松浦
辰男), the master of the Keien School (桂園派) of waka, or the 31-syllable Japanese
poem. Also under his tutelage was Tayama Katai (田山花袋), who would later become a

16

Yanagita was born as Matsuoka Kunio (松岡國男) and became Yanagita Kunio when
he was adopted by the Yanagita family as heir successor to the headship of the household
in 1901, to marry one of the Yanagita daughters three years later. The practice was not
uncommon in prewar Japan as a means to preserve family lineage when a household had
no male child. To avoid confusion, the subject of this inquiry is referred to as Yanagita,
regardless of the period in question, unless explicitly indicated.

44

leading figure of the so-called naturalist novel. Yanagita and Tayama became lifetime
friends, although their relations became strained later because of Yanagita’s critical
attitude toward Tayama’s self-confessional novels, in which characters modeled after
Yanagita made frequent appearances. Also, he acquainted himself with Mori Ōgai (森鴎
外), a military doctor educated in Germany and a pioneer of the Japanese modern
literature. Even after entering the Department of Law of Tokyo Imperial University, a
training ground for future high-ranking government officials, in 1897 and majoring in
agricultural policy science, his passion continued to be literature, and especially
non-Anglo-American Western literature grew on him. Yanagita, Tayama, and other young
writers published a collection of prose poems, Jojōshi (抒情詩 Lyric Poetry), in 1897. It
was the first kind of a free-style poetry, called shintaishi (新体詩 new-style poetry) in
opposition to the Chinese and Japanese style poetries with rigid rules of syllables.
Yanagita’s poems, which showed the influence of the Keien school and European
Romanticism, were acclaimed as a best representative of the new form.
However, Yanagita suddenly lost interest in poetry and abandoned it for good in
1900. Instead, he turned his passion to agricultural policy science. After graduating, he
entered the Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture and started a professional career as an
elite bureaucrat. In 1901, to the surprise of his friends in the literary circle, he accepted an
offer of being adopted into the household of Yanagita Naohira (柳田直平), a Supreme
Court Justice, as his heir successor. Some old friends of his, who once admired him as a
handsome Romantic poet, regarded the adoptive marriage as a sellout to careerism.17 Yet,

17

Throughout his life, Yanagita kept reticent on the reason for his abandonment of
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he continued to play a leading role in the development of the modern Japanese literature,
hosting various literary societies into which many promising young writers were attracted.
Although he himself did not produce any novel, he provided Tayama Katai with
inspirations and ideas, until he became upset with the latter’s naturalist novels. Yanagita’s
classic, Tōno monogatari (遠野物語 The Tales of Tōno, 1910), a collection of folktales
from northern Japan, was written partly as an implicit criticism of the triviality and lack
of social contents of naturalist self-confessional novels in which the interiority of urban
individuals were obsessive concerns.
Yanagita’s intellectual career covered in this study can be divided into four periods,
some of which are partially overlapping. The first period spans the years 1900 to 1910,
when he started a promising professional career as an elite bureaucrat-intellectual
specializing in agricultural policy and was actively involved in policy debates on agrarian
problems. Under the heavy influence of the German Young Historical School of
Economics, his political and economic vision during this period was largely progressive
and reformist with a strongly statist proclivity. Well acquainted with the experience of
Western societies, he believed that appropriate government policies could rationalize
poetry and the adoptive marriage, but it seems that the death of loved ones loomed large
in the mind of the sensitive youth at this period. He had lost his mother and father
successively in the summer of 1896. And, the deterioration of his own health forced him
to spend some time in a sanatorium. Yet, Tayama Katai’s self-confessional novels indicate
that a love affair with a girl from Fukawa, which seems to have ended tragically with her
death from tuberculosis, was the major factor for his ultimate disillusionment with
Romantic poetry. From that point on, his early Romanticist infatuation with death gave
way to the pragmatic study of the real life of the common people. However, the question
of death continued to follow him in the form of his interest in the strange and unfamiliar
from the invisible world and, then, the role of religion in rural life. Okaya (1991; 1996),
who documented the biographies of poet Matsuoka Kunio (i.e. young Yanagita),
emphasizes the lifelong impact of the tragic love affair on his thought.
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Japanese national economic space better than the free market system. He seemed to
accept the elitist claim that in determining the public good, the intellectual elite, who was
deemed the possessor of impartial knowledge, rather than self-interested private actors in
the market, should be accorded a privileged position. Based on this confidence, Yanagita
did not shy away from proposing various measures that aimed to rationalize, both at the
macro- and micro-level, the use of national space, even at the cost of antagonizing
powerful rural and urban interests. It was partly because of his aloofness from powerful
special interests that his proposals largely fell on deaf ears. However, what troubled him
even more, his vision was equally rejected by small farmers, whose interests he was
trying to protect. He partly attributed this reaction to the ignorance of rural folks, as many
other progressive intellectuals had done. However, he was humble enough to admit the
inadequacy of his own knowledge, and knowledge possessed by state bureaucracy and
academia in general. Accepting the partiality of modern knowledge, in both senses of the
word, opened a possibility that those rural folks were possessors of partial knowledge as
well.
In the second intellectual period between 1910 and 1919, Yanagita’s growing
dissatisfaction with the bureaucracy-academia complex led him away from agricultural
policy science to an unrecorded history of rural life and the shadowy presence of
wandering peoples behind it. During this period, Yanagita’s understanding of space and
time took an anthropological turn. As he became disillusioned with partisan politics and a
bureaucratic career, his public engagement with agricultural political economy became
sporadic. Instead, he was increasingly absorbed into his “hobby,” that is, the study of
folktales and traditional customs, especially those related with religious beliefs, in rural
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Japan. As a result, his attention was diverted from the contemporary condition of rural
life to those who have lived on the margin of agrarian society, such as yamabito (山人
mountain people), wandering priest and priestesses, hunters, entertainers, prostitutes, and
crafters of wood tableware. Even after being appointed fourth Secretary General of the
House of Peers in 1914, he continued to travel extensively to the interior of Japan and
was surprised by the fact that the “barbarous” elements stubbornly remained in the midst
of civilization. As a result, he became increasingly critical of the notion of the Japanese
national space as a homogeneous container where time simply flowed from the past to the
future. In contrast to the notion of empty space implicit in Western theoretical knowledge
and flat urban social landscapes depicted in highly individualistic “modern” novels of his
friends, he found that the life and death of rural folks were embedded in rich textures of
ecological, cultural, and even a hint of ethnic diversity. During this period, he started to
explore anthropological space as the true basis for cultural differences.
The third period was brief but was an important turning point in Yanagita’s thought.
The shift was catalyzed by a series of journeys he undertook after resigning from the
bureaucracy in December 1919 as a result of a personal feud with Tokugawa Iesato (徳川
家達), a scion of Tokugawa family and then President of the House of Peers. The first leg
of journey consisted of journeys to the Northeast, which was popularly considered the
most backward and barbarous region in the mainland. The second leg is a journey to
Okinawa and other southern islands, another periphery within Japan. The third is his
voyage to Europe and stay in Geneva, where he served the League of Nations Permanent
Mandate Commission from 1921 to 1923. His excursion into the internal and global
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centers and peripheries expanded Yanagita’s spatial horizon. Subsequently, he came to
perceive the world order as a set of multiple layers of hierarchical relations. As a result,
he situated the predicament of the Japanese people in a global context, in which urban
centers, with the help of foreign technology and knowledge, established political,
economic, and cultural hegemony over the rural population. In a surprising move, he
identified Japan with the South Pacific islands, rather than Western nation-states, on the
basis that both were islands susceptible to internal strife and external intervention.
The fourth intellectual period began in 1923, when, on the news of the Great Kantō
Earthquake, Yanagita hastily resigned his post on the Permanent Mandate Commission
and returned from Europe. He had been invited to join the editorial board of Tokyo Asahi
(東京朝日), a liberal newspaper, and became one of its editorial writers until 1929, when
he quit the board. As a journalist, he was an unwavering supporter of universal suffrage
and other democratic reforms introduced during the last stage of the period known as
Taishō democracy (approximately 1905-1925). At the same time, he vigorously worked
for the establishment of minzokugaku. During this period, he shifted his attention back
from wandering peoples on the margin of agrarian society to the inhabitants of
agricultural communities. The concept of jōmin (常民 the common people) gained
prominence during this period, as minzokugaku could be defined as the study of jōmin, by
jōmin, for jōmin. Jōmin, one of the rare abstract concepts Yanagita used in his writings,
refers to denizens of anthropological space, where history is made through culturally
distinct social institutions and practices. The purpose of minzokugaku was to excavate the
history of anthropological space, the world of jōmin, in the service of nation-building
from below.
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Plan of the Dissertation
The main body of the dissertation consists of three chapters, each of which
addresses one of the three hypotheses presented in this chapter. Organizing the study in
this way allows us to follow the evolution of Yanagita’s thought in a more or less
chronological order. The second chapter examines the intellectual and political contexts
in which Yanagita confronted with John Stuart Mill’s philosophy of history, and interprets
his texts against the backdrop of those contexts. The third chapter focuses on his turn to a
Marxian notion of anthropological space in an attempt to offset Mill’s individualistic
notion of progressive agency and explores the theoretical connections and major
differences between Yanagita and Marx’s thought. The philosophical foundation of his
agrarianism and concept of jōmin are the major topics of this chapter. The fourth chapter
examines the notion of travel as a method of knowledge production by tracing it back to
his Malthusian wariness toward the possibility of progress and his interest in wandering
people during the second intellectual period. The concluding chapter recaps the major
points of previous chapters and explores its implications for contemporary debates on
diversity and world politics and the theoretical framework and methods of Political
Theory and International Relations.
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CHAPTER II
DIVERSITY AND ENLIGHTENED DESPOTISM

One of the interpretive hypotheses of the study is that Yanagita’s intellectual
project can partly be understood as a critical engagement with John Stuart Mill’s
philosophy of history, especially the one expressed in his most primed text, On Liberty.
This interpretation runs counter to the conventional understanding of his ideological
orientation, which depicts him as a Burkean conservative (Hashikawa 1985; Nakamura
1974; Satō 2004) or a representative of “conservatism always willing to converse with
progressivism” (Tsurumi 1973: 154). Although this characterization is not totally off the
mark, as Yanagita sometimes characterizes himself as conservative, it does not capture
the entire picture of his intellectual project. Rather, it is more plausible to think that it is
through a critical engagement with Mill’s philosophy of history that he became
appreciative of Burkean conservatism.
Mill’s influence is of special importance for this study because it seems to have
been through his On Liberty that Yanagita confronted the problem of the global
spatiotemporal order and the question of diversity. The relationship between the text and
his thought is far from straightforward, however, partly because On Liberty is a text with
an equivocal meaning for any non-Western progressive. On the one hand, the text
justifies non-democratic governments in less developed societies. On the other, Mill’s
defense of diversity as a necessary condition for knowledge production and social
progress has a critical potential to challenge the political and intellectual hegemony of the
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West and the Westernized. While troubled by Mill’s ethnocentrism, Yanagita must have
taken the following passage from On Liberty to heart:
What is it that has hitherto preserved Europe from this lot [of stagnation]? What has
made the European family of nations an improving, instead of a stationary portion
of mankind? Not any superior excellence in them, which, when it exists, exists as
the effect, not as the cause; but their remarkable diversity of character and culture.
Individuals, classes, nations, [and, Yanagita would have added, regions within a
nation] have been extremely unlike one another: they have struck out a great variety
of paths, each leading to something valuable; and although at every period those
who traveled in different paths have been intolerant of one another, and each would
have thought it an excellent thing if all the rest could have been compelled to travel
his road, their attempts to thwart each other’s development have rarely had any
permanent success, and each has in time endured to receive the good which the
others have offered. Europe is, in my judgment, wholly indebted to this plurality of
paths for its progressive and many-sided development. (Mill 1991: 80)
However, in this passage Mill is explaining the secret of European superiority, and his
tolerance toward diversity stops at the border of Western civilization. Beyond that border,
differences or deviance from the standards set by the Western example are translated into
the sign of immaturity caused by either infantile impulsiveness or submissiveness of
people.18 Such kind of diversity is not conducive to progress and must be reduced to a

18

Mill uses the term barbarian at least in two senses in his texts. The term is simply
used as a synonym of savage—that is, the pre-agricultural and pre-political state of
society composed of highly independent individuals or groups of individuals,
conventionally associated with the American Indians. He also calls barbarian those old,
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tolerable level. In other words, diversity should be tolerated and encouraged in domestic
and international relations within Europe, but in non-Western societies, governments
should be granted the despotic power to bring people into line.
The apparent contradiction—diversity and pluralism for Western societies and
homogeneity and hierarchy for non-Western societies—turns out to be no contradiction if
one takes Mill’s analogy between children and “immature races” seriously. In fact, the
analogy is not Mill’s invention. The idea that human race, just like an individual, has its
own age and the existing differences among the world population actually reflects the
stages of development through which human race matures was widely accepted in
Western discourse when Mill wrote the passage. Two types of diversity—one expressed
by mature Western individuals and nations and the other expressed by immature
non-Western peoples—characterize Mill’s distinction. The limited tolerance toward
diversity, made contingent on the spatial location in which diversity has manifested itself,
agricultural civilizations of the East, such as India and China, where, according to his
assessment, paternalistic government suppressed individuality and stifled social progress.
Therefore, there are at least two kinds of barbarians in Mill’s thought, one with excessive
individuality and the other with little or no individuality. Although Mill was more
interested in the contrast between the civilized and the barbarian (i.e. non-civilized) than
in variance among barbarians, Beate Jahn (2005: 615) identifies four stages of social
development in Mill’s philosophy of history: savagism, slavery, barbarism, and
civilization. Mill suggests in Considerations on Representative Government that slavery
is a necessary stage to raise the savages out of savagism by disciplining them for
collective life (Mill 1991: 232). It is possible that Mill thought the prolonged state of
slavery under excessively paternalistic government perpetuates the state of dependence,
resulting in barbarism. If this interpretation is correct, civilization and barbarianism are
two alternative outcomes as well as two consecutive stages of social development.
According to Mill, only Europe managed to transit from barbarism to civilization because
of pluralist and decentralized social organizations. This interpretation is partially
corroborated by Mill’s belief that civilization can be reverted to barbarism (e.g. Mill
1991: 103) and his fear that Western civilization is confronting such a prospect with the
advent of mass democracy.
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places a severe limit on the possibility of democracy in non-Western societies. In so far as
non-Western people exhibit immaturity, or, to put it more blatantly, in so far as
non-Western people remains non-Westernized morally and politically, the government is
justly granted the wider discretion to intervene society and individual life, though the
purpose of such intervention is limited to lifting them out of immaturity.
Although Japan escaped the fate of being directly colonized by foreigners
throughout its known history, the political and intellectual elites influenced by foreign
cultures often looked down on the internal diversity of their own country with the same
kind of arrogance, apprehension, and intolerance as those harbored by foreign rulers.
They had limited knowledge about the space outside urban areas, but that did not deter
them from claiming that they knew better about Japan than anybody else. The division of
society into the knowing subjects and known objects of knowledge/politics had happened
in the sixth century, if not before, when the Yamato Dynasty tried to reorganize society
according to conceptual space imported from China. Then, in the wake of the Meiji
Restoration of 1868, new political leaders, using abstract spatiotemporal categories
imported from the West, tried to give forms to the opaque and seemingly disorderly space
by drawing and redrawing boundaries, giving a name to each spatial unit, and assigning
each of them a proper place and function in the national political, economic, and cultural
system. Whatever escaped from this new political, economic, and cultural map was
deemed irrelevant to knowledge production and undesirable for the integrity of the nation.
Internal differences might be accepted and even appreciated as folk “traditions” and
“customs,” as long as they did not threaten the legitimacy of the central government, but
beyond that point, they had to be neutralized.
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The gaze of those political and intellectual elites was that of the modern state. As
James Scott’s (1998) examination of various devastating development projects indicates,
the state, in an “attempt to make a society legible, to arrange the population in ways that
simplified the classic state functions of taxation, conscription, and prevention of rebellion”
(Scott 1998: 2), ignores local perspectives and has given rise to hubristic interventions in
nature and society. Particularly, agriculture emerged as a main target of bureaucratic
intervention, because “[a]griculture is, after all, a radical reorganization and
simplification of flora to suit man’s goals. Whatever their other purposes, the designs of
scientific forestry and agriculture and the layouts of plantations, collective farms, ujamaa
villages, and strategic hamlets all seemed calculated to make the terrain, its products, and
its working force more legible—and hence manipulable—from above and from the center”
(Scott 1998: 2). The bureaucratic state that was emerging in Japan in the early twentieth
century shared a similar penchant for hubristic intervention, and, in spite of his sympathy
with the plight of farmers, it is not difficult to recognize in Yanagita’s early writings an
expression of the state’s desire to make complex and opaque nature and society
transparent, intelligible, and manipulable.
Yanagita, however, soon became an internal critic of this “progressive” alliance of
administrative power and academic knowledge. In so doing, he turned the Millian
defense of diversity against the Millian justification of enlightened despotism.
Enlightened bureaucrats and scholars, instead of lifting immature peoples from the
despotism of custom, were leading them into another kind of despotism—namely, that of
authoritative knowledge imported from abroad. His subsequent intellectual project
culminating in the establishment of minzokugaku can be interpreted as efforts to extend a
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democratic potential in Mill’s defense of diversity to non-Western space. Thus, his
minzokugaku is a Millian project only in a paradoxical sense—paradoxical because in an
attempt to carry Mill’s defense of diversity to a logical conclusion, he turned Mill’s
political theory into a very different thing.
The remainder of this chapter examines how and why Yanagita became critical of
enlightened despotism that emerged in Japan, of which he was once part, by examining
his early writings on agricultural policy science and the intellectual and political contexts
in which they were written.

Two Faces of On Liberty
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty has two faces. It offers at once a sweeping defense of
freedom in Western societies and an equally sweeping justification for non-democratic
governments in non-Western societies. It is easy to dismiss Mill’s discrimination against
“immature races” as an unfortunate but ultimately dispensable expression of
ethnocentrism common in his time and to read his defense of liberty separately from his
defense of colonialism. By doing so, however, we risk overlooking the fact that his
defense of liberal democracy and his theory of international relations are internally
connected through a philosophy of history based on the global spatiotemporal order.
Although blatant racism exhibited by Mill is certainly discredited as a public discourse
today, the same cannot be said about his philosophy of history because the contemporary
world order is still informed by the same spatiotemporal order that informed Mill’s
philosophy of history (Jahn 2005).
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In On Liberty, Mill attempts to defend freedom of speech and action on a ground
other than natural rights theory. He offers a utilitarian defense of liberty by linking free
and open discussion with social progress. His defense of diversity is in turn based on the
epistemological claim that absolute truth is unreachable to the fallible human intellect and
the best humans can do is to subject any received opinion to constant public scrutiny.
Only those opinions that survive such scrutiny gain the temporary status of true
knowledge or knowledge of truth until a new challenge is posed against them. A passage
from On Liberty reads:
There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true, because,
with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its
truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation. Complete liberty of
contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which justifies us in
assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with
human faculties have any rational assurance of being right. (Mill 1991: 24)
Thus, for Mill, even a true opinion, if not repeatedly tested in free and open discussion,
become “a dead dogma, not a living truth” (p. 40). If this happens, he suggests, opinions
will be accepted not because they are true or just but because it is customary to do so, and
the exercise of reason will be replaced by blind deference to what is already established
as true or just. Resulting from this is what he calls “the despotism of custom” (p. 78).
Progress, as understood by Mill, results from the accumulation of knowledge and the
decrease of false beliefs and would be jeopardized unless dissenting minorities are
allowed to challenge the truthfulness of conventional wisdom as well as majority
opinions. For Mill, this is not merely a hypothetical problem. His underlying concern is
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that democratization, instead of improving the intellect and tastes of the masses
constituting the majority in a democratic system, eventually drags down the better part of
humanity into conformism, mediocrity, and complacency. According to Mill, there exist
concrete precedents for this danger: The East. He particularly singles out China as an
example of the despotism of custom. Once a great civilization, China slid into stagnation
precisely because of the despotism of custom (p. 78). On the basis of this observation,
Mill draws a striking parallel between Chinese civilization and burgeoning democracy in
the United Kingdom: “The modern régime of public opinion is, in an unorganized form,
what Chinese educational and political systems are in an organized; and unless
individuality shall be assert itself against this yoke, Europe, notwithstanding its noble
antecedents and its professed Christianity, will tend to become another China” (p. 80). In
other words, democracy without a room for diversity is as antithetical to social progress
as the rule by a paternalistic government.
At the center of Mill’s defense of progress against the despotism of custom is the
protection of individuality from the tyranny of the majority. He gives the Romantic ideal
of the individual’s unique and distinctive character as the goal of life a utilitarian
justification on the ground that individuality is not only good for individuals but is also
beneficial for entire society. Given the fallibility of human knowledge, the
homogenization of opinion amounts to the premature foreclosing of further experiments
with new ideas and practices, resulting in a stagnant social state. Like Alexis de
Tocqueville in Democracy in America, Mill sees in democracy a tyrannical potential that
suppresses individuality by leveling out the social landscape to the lowest common
denominator. His fear is that the preponderant majority in democracy, if left unchecked,
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would not hesitate to reduce social diversity and unwarrantedly forestall further social
improvement. To prevent that from happening, the diversity of opinion should be
deliberately promoted. This, in turn, requires the preservation of aristocratic islands, so to
speak, in the middle of the flattened landscape of democracy. Mill names two requisites
for the development of individuality —“freedom” and “variety of situations” (p. 64)—
and suggests that such aristocratic islands can be preserved only if the private sphere of
the individual is respected by the members of society. These considerations lead him to
develop his famous harm principle: “[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted,
individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any their number, is
self-protection. …[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (p.
63).
However, Mill refuses to extend the same principle to “immature races” and, instead,
designates enlightened despotism to be an appropriate form of government for them—at
least until they advance to the point that they can handle the responsibilities of freedom.
An infamous passage from On Liberty reads:
For the same reason [that unrestricted freedom is not applicable to children], we
may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race
itself may be considered as in its nonage. The early difficulties in the way of
spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of means for
overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the
use of any expedients that will attain an end perhaps otherwise unattainable.
Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided
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the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end.
Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time
when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal
discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar
or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. (Mill [1854] 1991: 14-15)
Needless to say, the immature races referred to here include the Indians, the Chinese, and
all those who live in the global East and the South at that time. Thus, his exception of
immature races from the principle of freedom amounts to a justification of Western
colonialism in non-Western societies. (Mehta 1999: 77-114).
As Uday Singh Mehta’s (1999) study of the impact of India on British liberal
thought demonstrates, Mill simply follows the predominant discourse of the time in
justifying the colonial rule by means of the metaphor of family. Rejected by Locke in
Two Treatises of Government as a basis of political authority in the domestic arena,
parental authority is reintroduced into international relations, or more specifically
relations between mature and immature peoples, by later liberal thinkers. In the liberal
conception, therefore, the political sphere, where free and equal individuals relate to each
other, is a space artificially constructed between the purely private sphere of family
relations and the sphere of international relations outside civilizational boundaries, and
freedom is possible only in this privileged space. The authority of colonial government,
British liberals contended, is something analogous to the authority of parents, especially
that of the father, over the child. The metaphor is strategically employed to skirt the
question of uncertain knowledge by equating the colonizer with the knowing figure of
father and the colonized with the known child. “The child/deviant,” Mehta explains,
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“whose difference threatens the legitimacy of the father by placing a limit on the reach of
his authority by straining his understanding, must therefore be assimilated in a power that
‘knows’ or offers a progressive future in which the ambivalence of ‘not-being-one-of-us’
and being ‘one-of-us’ will assuredly get resolved.” Although children may serve as a
mirror through which interesting insights about mature persons can be drawn, few expect
from children themselves any contribution to the discovery of scientific, political, or
moral truth. It is the task of mature persons to retrieve meaningful knowledge from the
observed behavior of children. Likewise, diversity exhibited by immature races may be
relevant for the understanding of human nature, but it is hardly expected that immature
people can know something about mature persons hitherto unknown to the latter or that
self-reflection by immature people produce new knowledge about themselves. Children’s
behavior may become an object of some scientific or moral inquiry, but they are never
recognized as the subjects of knowledge production. They are little more than data whose
behavioral patterns are to be classified and whose substance is to be subjected to analysis
and judgment according to some standards set by the fatherly figure. In short, they can be
known but can never know anything other than what mature peoples already know.
Therefore, the diversity that is found outside the West is not worth preserving or
promoting. Rather, it may be quite dangerous and must be reduced to the point that it no
longer threatens the authority of the knowing subject.
From the vantage point of immature people, therefore, there are but two options:
either the despotism of customs, which will keep them mired in a backward state, or
enlightened despotism, which, supposedly, will put them on the path of progress. The first
option condemns them to eternal childhood. The second option leads to the rule by
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“foreigners,” unless, in rare circumstances, they have domestic despots energetic enough
to embark on “a civilizade” (p. 102) of their own against the despotism of custom.
Arguably, Japan was fortunate enough, if we borrow Mill’s terminology, to have its
own Akbar and Charlemagne in the form of an enlightened bureaucratic state, of which
Yanagita was part during his early professional life. However, he soon came to question
the wisdom of Japanese enlightened bureaucracy. His major concern was that, to draws
on Mill’s distinction, the enlightened Meiji bureaucrat-intellectuals were “full of the spirit
of improvement” (p. 78), but actively undermined “the spirit of liberty” (p. 78) among the
Japanese population. They also depreciated internal diversity of the nation and tried to
convert the people into a mere object of knowledge and social engineering. Instead of
guiding an “immature” people into the age of reason and enlightenment, Yanagita feared,
it was producing in a bureaucratic developmental state, which not only relegates the
majority of the Japanese population into the status of second-class citizens, but also
actively loathes diversity as a hindrance to progress.

Despotism of Enlightened Bureaucracy in Japan
The enlightened despotism that emerged in Japan around the turn of the twentieth
century took a form of the bureaucratic developmental state. The principal agents for this
transformation were a new generation of bureaucrats-intellectuals well immersed in the
Western experience and knowledge. They were the product of the rationalization and
professionalization of the civil service, which had made it possible for the best and
brightest to be recruited from all over the country, regardless of their social statuses,
regional origins, or political connections. The new public education system served as a
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pyramid-like monopoly network that absorbed local talents and sifted them out through a
uniform competitive process (Silberman 1982: 236-238). At the top of the hierarchical
network was the Department of Law of the Imperial University of Tokyo, a training
ground for future high-ranking government officials. Throughout this preparatory process,
they acquired new historical and spatial consciousness well ahead of the rest of the
Japanese population.
Kenneth Pyle calls the new generation of well-educated government officials
“bureaucrat-intellectuals” to avoid the connotation that they are little more than the
executors of clerical tasks decided elsewhere (Pyle 1974: 149-150). Indeed, those
bureaucrat-intellectuals and their academic mentors became the major intellectual
masterminds of a wide range of social and economic reforms carried out in prewar Japan.
They despised partisan politics and regarded themselves as genuine defenders of the
public interest and, hence, above politics. They were generally progressive nationalist and
were intent to transform Japan into a formidable economic and military machine on par
with the Western nation-states. Their ideal was an autonomous state independent of
parochial societal interests and equipped with universal scientific knowledge. Their
prestige and power was largely owed to their privileged access to knowledge of and from
the West. However, unlike the previous generation of the Westernizing elite, they were
well aware that the Western experience of industrial development was neither uniform
nor without internal critics. They were progressive in the sense that they were determined
to eliminate any traditions and customs that stood in the way of national modernization,
but at the same time were deeply concerned with the potential negative impacts of
industrialization on the social fabric. The determination to take a more orderly path to

63

modernity led them to advocate active state intervention in society. It is not a coincidence
that their rise took place exactly when the Japanese government was abandoning laissez
faire principles in favor of more proactive social policy, in which the countryside became
the main target of state intervention (Waswo 1988: 569-576).
The major intellectual inspiration for bureaucrat-intellectuals was German political
economy, especially the so-called Social Policy School and the Young Historical School
of Economics. The Social Policy School is an intellectual movement led by German
economists, such as Gustav Schmoller, Lujo Brentano, or Adolf Wagner, who challenged
the orthodox economic doctrine of the Manchester School associated with the British
hegemony.19 They rejected the existence of universal economic laws and the principle of
laissez faire and advocated active state intervention in social issues such as poverty, labor
conditions, or housing problems.20 By the 1870s, the Social Policy School had become
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The label of the Social Policy School derives from Verein für Sozialpolitik, an
association of reform-minded scholars. Although the labels the Social Policy School
(Sozialpolitiker) and the Young Historical School of Economics are vaguely defined and
are often used interchangeably, it seems appropriate to distinguish two rival camps within
the Social Policy Association: the state socialist camp represented by Adolf Wagner and
the Young Historical School represented by Gustav Schmoller, Lujo Brentano, and others
who were sympathetic with British reformist movements and were opposed to Wagner’s
state socialism as well as laissez faire (Grimmer-Solem 2003). Yanagita’s position is
closer to that of Schmoller and Brentano.
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Kenneth Pyle (1974: 135-7; 1989: 704-705) enumerates seven basic tenets of the
Young Historical School of Economics: (1) the rejection of the abstract theory and
deductive methods of classical economics and the need for empirical and historical
research; (2) the need for interdisciplinary approaches to economic issues because of
organic connections between economic and other social phenomena; (3) the conviction
that economic issues should be approached from ethical points of views; (4) the belief
that the modern nation-state is a moral achievement, in which social justice was
guaranteed by an impartial bureaucracy; (5) the support for active state intervention in
economic and social affairs; (6) skepticism toward socialism as well as laissez faire; and
(7) the acceptance of the supremacy of national interest and the support for imperialist
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particularly influential in Germany, partly because its counterrevolutionary reformism
and support for active state intervention in society fit well into the Bismarckean politics
of preemptive social legislation.21
By the time Yanagita entered the Imperial University of Tokyo, German political
economy became very influential among the Japanese bureaucracy-academia complex,
and the reformist and pro-interventionist Social Policy School was gaining a foothold in
various academic institutions and the government.22 The popularity was partly because
of an analogy drawn between Germany and Japan in terms of their position in the modern
expansion. All these tenets of the Young Historical School can be easily detected in
Yanagita’s early writings on agrarian policy, with the notable exception of his reticence
about the question of imperialism.
21

Recent scholarship has challenged the conventional images of the Young Historical
School of Economics as little more than an apologist ideology for Bismarckean
conservative reformism or an expression of German economic nationalism. See, for
example, Grimmer-Solem (2003).
22

It is useful to situate the Germanphilia of bureaucrat-intellectuals in the general
intellectual context of the time. Itō Hirobumi (伊藤博文), a leading statesman and the
chief architect of the Meiji Constitution of 1889, recalls the intellectual atmosphere in the
pre-Constitution period in the following terms:
We were just then in an age of transition. The opinions prevailing in the country were
extremely heterogeneous, and often diametrically opposed to each other. We had
survivors of former generations who were still full of theocratic ideas, and who
believed that any attempt to restrict an imperial prerogative amounted to something
like high treason. On the one hand there was a large and powerful body of the
younger generation educated at the time when the Manchester theory was in vogue,
and who in consequence were ultra-radical in their ideas of freedom. Members of the
bureaucracy were prone to lend willing ears to the German doctrinaires of the
reactionary period, while, on the other hand, the educated politicians among the
people having not yet tasted the bitter significance of administrative responsibility,
were liable to be more influenced by the dazzling words and lucid theories of
Montesquieu, Rousseau, and other similar French writers. (Tsunoda et al 1954: 675)
It should be pointed out that Yanagita was familiar with all of those diverse opinions,
including what Itō calls “theocratic ideas” and did not completely identify himself with
any of them.
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spatiotemporal order. It was believed that Japan could learn more from Germany’s efforts
to take advantages of its own backwardness, as late-industrializing countries could learn
from both successes and failures of pioneering countries (Pyle 1974: 128-129).
Specifically, for both Germany and Japan, the experience of the United Kingdom, where
the cost, as well as benefit, of market-driven development and thorough
industrialization/commercialization of the economy had become visible, was supposed to
serve as both a successful model to be followed and a negative example to be avoided.
What alarmed Japanese bureaucrat-intellectuals particularly was the negative impact of
industrialization on social integration and growing class conflicts. To borrow Marx’s
words in the preface to the Capital, the West showed Japan the image of their future. Yet,
Japanese bureaucrats and scholars did not necessarily share Marx’s belief that class
antagonism was an unavoidable outcome of capitalist development. They believed that
the timely intervention of human agency, embodied by the rational state bureaucracy, was
able to prevent social polarization and class conflicts.
In the course of the history of prewar Japan, the new class of bureaucratintellectuals came to yield immense power over politics. They accepted the claim that the
Japanese people were “immature” and eagerly undertook the task of guiding them into
maturity. However, their “success” in this task brought about consequences quite
unexpected by Mill and other liberal thinkers. The acceptance of the modern
spatiotemporal order on the part of modernizing elites in a non-Western society opened a
door to a new political economy of catching-up industrialization whose implications
transcended the boundary between international and domestic politics. Internationally, the
division of labor between industrial and non-industrial economies was no longer
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determined by naturally endowed comparative advantage, because the latter could be
altered by human intervention. Concretely, the United Kingdom’s position as the
industrial and commercial center and principal producer of manufactured goods in the
world economy was no longer justified as part of natural order. Germany, Japan, or other
followers could challenge and take over its position if they managed to take a shortcut to
industrialization. As a result, the static international division of labor, justified by the
Ricardian theory of international trade, gave way to much more dynamic international
competition in which various nation-states compete with each other over the location of
strategically important industries and access to cheap raw materials. All depended on the
state’s capacity to compensate or substitute the deficiency of the market system.
Internally, the new political economy endowed the state with missions and
authority that the liberal theories of political economy did not. Equipped with knowledge
of the predecessor’s experience and projecting that image onto its own society’s future,
the state was believed to be capable of advancing, if not changing, the course of capitalist
development in more orderly and efficient way than their predecessors. Moreover,
democracy is no longer the best condition for social progress as diversity and free and
open discussion are replaced by the absorption and application of authoritative
knowledge of and from the pioneering West. The result was what is today known as the
“developmental state,” an interventionist state that rejects both laissez faire and state
socialism.23 Arguably, enlighten despotism defended in On Liberty’s led to the
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The concept of the developmental state was first presented by Chalmers Johnson in his
historical study on the development of industrial policy in prewar Japan (Johnson 1982).
It was later extended to the Northeastern states that used industrial policy effectively to
promote catch-up industrialization. However, it is debatable whether the developmental
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emergence of fiercely competitive international politics in which a powerful authoritarian
state, in an effort to convert a nation into an efficient economic and military machine, put
competitive pressure upon democratic societies in the West. Yanagita belonged to the first
generation of these bureaucrat-intellectuals, as he entered the state bureaucracy in the
early days of the formation of the Japanese developmental state.

Progress and Policy Science
This and following sections examine Yanagita’s early writings on agrarian policy,
published between 1902 and 1910. During this period, he was a young and ambitious
reformist bureaucrat-intellectual who actively engaged in the public debate on agrarian
reform. The major texts written in this period include Saishin sangyō kumiai tsūkai (最新
産業組合通解 The Newest Manual of Industrial Cooperative, 1902), Nōseigaku (農政
学 Agricultural Policy Science, 1902-1905), Nōgyō seisakugaku (農業政策学
Agricultural Policy Science, 1902-1903), Nōgyō seisaku (農業政策 Agricultural Policy,
exact publication date unknown), Jidai to nōsei (時代と農村 Our Age and Agricultural
Policy, 1910), and several articles published in various journals. The first text is a
commentary on the Industrial Cooperative Law of 1900, which explains the historical
background of the idea of cooperatives and the content of the law in non-expert
language.24 The next three texts are based on the lecture notes prepared for the courses

state is a phenomenon particular to East Asian countries or universally observable to
some extent in the course of global capitalist development. See essays contained in
Woo-Cumings (1999), especially Cumings (1999).
24

In spite of the name, the Industrial Cooperative Law was also applied to agricultural
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he taught at three private universities, Waseda, Senshū, and Chūō, respectively. These
texts were written by a fresh graduate for pedagogical purposes and it may be the case
that its contents are a reflection of a dominant discourse in the field at that time as well as
Yanagita’s original insights. While occasionally revealing his burgeoning criticism of the
government agricultural policy, they draw heavily on the thought of German Social
Policy School and the Young Historical School of Economics. As a result, the texts are
uncharacteristically theoretical and exhibit a strong statist tendency. Yanagita himself
seemed to repudiate later a good part of what he wrote, as suggested by his initial refusal
to the inclusion of those texts in his official anthology. At the same time, those texts are
also influenced by British reformist thoughts and Millian utilitarianism.25 As will be
discussed in detail in the following sections, the liberal side of Yanagita opposed the
excessive paternalism of the state bureaucracy and official academia, emphasized the
self-help of small, independent farmers, and favors education over coercion and
subsidies.

cooperatives. Yanagita and many other experts of agrarian economy considered the
promotion of farmers’ cooperatives as a promising policy to prevent an agrarian crisis.
25

Fujii Takashi (1995: 140) identifies a strong influence of utilitarianism in Yanagita’s
agricultural policy science and contends that he was much more influenced by British
liberal or socialist reform movements than the German Sozialpolitiker. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to distinguish clearly one influence from the other, because the leaders of the
Young Historical School, such as Gustav Schmoller, Lujo Brentano, Adolf Held, and
Georg Friedrich Knapp, were admirers of British social legislation, and they had more in
common with British reformers than with German state socialists such as Adolf Wagner.
Yanagita’s position is similar to that of Schmoller and Brentano who rejected the two
extremes of laissez faire and state socialism and tried to protect a rapidly disintegrating
middling class. For the importance of a middling class in the Historical School, see
Grimmer-Solem (2003: 96-104, 171-186).
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The publication of Jidai to nōsei, a collection of essays previously published in
various journals, marks the end of the first period of Yanagita’s intellectual career,
because from then on his principal interest shifted from policy science to ethnological
studies of rural life. The premonition of this shift was already discernible in the essays
included in Jidai to nōsei, as he came to question the universality of “scientific”
knowledge and the impartiality of state bureaucracy and academia. As a result, he
distanced himself from blatant statism that excessively relied on coercive means or
subsidies to promote agrarian reform. Instead, the potential of local natives as agents of
reform was increasingly appreciated.
Victor Koschmann points out that Yanagita’s career and disposition had much in
common with those who would later be known as “renovationist” (kakushin 革新)
bureaucrats. They are interventionist bureaucrat-intellectuals who, impressed by the
mobilizational power of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, aspired to establish a
controlled economy after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937.
Koschmann characterizes them as follows:
As a term used to describe the forward-looking application of bureaucratic
rationality, … kakushin also came to imply such qualities as nationalism, faith in
central planning, commitment to rising productivity, and opposition to “feudal”
social relationships. Kakushin officials sought to co-opt the left, and were critical
of the hanbatsu [region-based factions] cliques based on regional loyalties, the
ascriptive nobility, and also the big bourgeoisie, whose expansive enterprises and
financial combines sought to distort national plans to accommodate their own
“private, selfish interests.” They upheld all that was “public,” in the sense of
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bureaucratically impartial and technically rational. Hence, “progressivism” in this
sense is typified by the so-called kakushin kanryo (“progressive bureaucrats”) of
the mid-to-late thirties. [a footnote omitted] (Koschmann 1985: 135-6)
Like many other kakushin bureaucrats, Yanagita studied at the Department of Law in the
Imperial University of Tokyo. His major is nōseigaku (農政学 agricultural policy
science), which had a long tradition in Japan, but had become a modern policy science
under the heavy influence of the German Social Policy School by the time he studied it at
the Imperial University. His mentor Matsuzaki Kuranosuke (松崎蔵之助) studied in
France and Germany during the 1890s and was influenced by Adolf Wagner, an avowed
admirer of Bismarck and an advocate of state socialism. Yanagita was a regular member
of the Japanese Social Policy Association (Shakai seisaku gakkai 社会政策学会), a
group of reform-minded scholars, government officials, and businessmen, which was
modeled after the Verein für Sozialpolitik in Germany.26 Upon graduation in 1900, he
duly entered the Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture, one of the strongholds of
reform-minded bureaucrats, and became directly involved in the legislation and
implementation of various economic and social policies. Although his tenure in the
ministry was less than two years, he continued to be involved in agrarian issues as an
expert even after climbing up the bureaucratic ladder.
26

Kanai Noboru (金井昇 1865-1933), a founder of the Social Policy Association, studied
in Germany from 1886 to 1890 under leading historical economists, including Schmoller,
Johannes Konrad, Karl Knies, and Adolf Wagner (Pyle 1974: 139-140). On returning to
Japan, he was appointed as professor of economics at the Tokyo Imperial University and
became one of the most influential figures in the bureaucracy-academia complex and
served as the intellectual architect of many government reforms. For a summary of
Kanai’s career, thought, and influence, see Pyle (1974: 139-146).
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Therefore, it is not surprising that the early writings of Yanagita show the heavy
influence of the German political economy. Closely following a tenet of the Historical
School of Economics, he rejects the thesis that economic disparity among nations is
naturally given, as suggested by the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage. Rather,
he argues, the economic prosperity of a nation is determined by the combination of
natural and human agents. Natural agents include externally given conditions and events
such as climate, geographical characteristics, and natural disasters.27 In contrast, human
agents refer to whatever is achieved by the application of human knowledge and force to
nature, ranging from individual labor and inventions to governments’ policy (“Nōseigaku.”
Teihon 28: 189; “Nōgyō seisakugaku.” Teihon 28: 291). On the basis of this distinction,
Yanagita offers a definition of civilization as follows:
In the distant past, there was little difference in living conditions between animals
and human beings, and natural agents constraining them were so powerful.
However, as a result of cooperative life [kyōdō seikatsu 共同生活], humans alone
improved their life constantly and, as time progressed, were able to conquer nature
gradually. From this point of view, the so-called civilization of a country means the
conquest of nature by human agents—that is, the progressive victory of human over
27

In Nōseigaku, Yanagita treated race (jinshu 人種) and folk customs (minzoku 民俗)
as natural agents along with climates and geographical topology on the ground that they
are “permanent (jōzai 常在)” conditions. (Teihon 28: 189), but silently dropped them as
examples of natural agents in a later text, Nōgyō seisakugaku (Teihon 28: 291). Although
he did not offer any explanation as to why he did so, it is consistent with his later
conception of racial distinctions as a product of politics. As for folk customs, one of the
purposes of his minzokugaku is to recognize folk customs as the sedimentation of
ancestors’ practical attempts to control natural agents. In that way, Yanagita tried to
rehabilitate rural folks as rational actors and rural communities as a form of civilization,
coeval with the urban civilization.
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natural agents. What constitutes man-made economic phenomena, or the main parts
of the so-called economic actions, are efforts not only to avoid obstructing but also
actively foment what is convenient for human development out of natural
phenomena that have existed since the distant past, and, at the same time, efforts to
prevent and remove inconvenient natural phenomena so that they would not
reappear. [emphasis added] (“Nōgyō seisakugaku.” In Teihon 28: 292)
The notion that civilization as the victory of human will over nature means that progress
does not belongs to natural order but a man-made process. Therefore, human intervention
in natural order is justified in the name of progress. Yanagita further divides human
agents into conscious and unconscious ones and emphasizes that the possibility of
promoting further civilization and progress depended on the deliberate efforts to increase
the former (p. 190; pp. 291-292).
On the basis of these distinctions, Yanagita concludes that “pure” economic theory
and principle—by which he means the classical economic theory of the Manchester
School and the principle of laissez faire—is inadequate because it does not count on
deliberate human actions in determining economic outcomes. Thus, the task of
distinguishing what is desirable or not for humanity and consciously fomenting the
former while forestalling the latter requires what he calls applied economics, or “a
science that specializes in studying the means by which human beings bring about
economic phenomena desired by them” (p. 292). Yet Yanagita further divides this
practical science of applied economics into private and public branches—that is, applied
private economics that aims to identify the means by which private persons bring about
desired outcome in their respective lives and public policy science whose purpose is to
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identify means by which the state or local governments promote the common good for
collective life. He justifies this further division on the following ground:
The life plan of an individual and that of a community never coincide with each
other. True, everyone desires to live and, if possible, to live in comfort and
prosperity, but there is inevitably a huge gap between the individual and the state.
As a result, although both the individual and the state are the subjects of applied
economics, each of them necessarily demands research in different directions. First,
there is difference between the state and a private person in terms of the length of
life. Whereas human life is finite, the life of the state is, ideally speaking, eternal.
Whereas a individual person need not draw up a long-term plan for the next one
hundred years, the state must always plan for the eternal happiness [of the nation].
Second, there is a greater difficulty of internal unity [in the case of the state]. The
ears and eyes, the hands and feet of the individual are already in unity. No one feels
great difficulty in uniting its own body. The state is not like this. Although the state
is also a living body, it always needs far greater efforts to maintain internal unity.
The national population within the state contains various kinds of social classes
whose interests are mutually antagonistic. The so-called disagreement in opinions
occurs in any period of history. If the state is to stand above these complex [social]
interests and to judge the appropriateness of the so-called economic actions, it must
have its own standards. It is only natural that the state cannot meekly follow what
individuals approve or disapprove. (“Nōgyō seisakugaku.” Teihon 28: 292-293)
What Yanagita implied in this passage was that the temporal and spatial horizons of the
state or other public bodies were much longer than any private individual, whose
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decisions only reflect needs and desires in a relatively immediate space and time and tend
to neglect long-term consequences on the spatial unity of a whole. And “long-term”
means “eternal” and “a whole” is “the state (kokka 国家).”
According to Yanagita’s classificatory scheme, agricultural policy science is a
branch of public policy science along with industrial policy science, commercial policy
science, financial policy science, labor policy science, etc. However, he is emphatic that
the sectoral division of public policy science is for convenience and should not be taken
as a rigid demarcation. He writes:
In private economy, those who engage in agriculture, commerce, industry, and other
economic sectors are the subjects in their respective economic fields and only need
to acquire knowledge about their own respective fields. In consequence, each
branch [of private economics] can safely maintain its independence. In contrast,
when it comes to economic policy, the actor is always the state, and even if the state
has diverse aspirations, ultimately they come down to a single point. Therefore,
students of economic policy cannot remain complacent with knowledge provided
by any one branch [of public policy science]. For example, what agricultural policy
science suggests alone cannot dictate a final judgment, but inevitably take the
interests of commerce, industry, and other sectors into consideration and calculation
before a final judgment is made. For this reason, this classificatory scheme is not a
perfect one, and policy science should be studied, so to speak, as a whole.
(“Nōseigaku.” Teihon 28: 192)
According to this understanding, public policy science should represent the perspective of
the state, which supposedly exists independent from local perspectives of its parts.
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Yanagita’s emphasis on agricultural policy derives from a deeper concern, shared
by many other bureaucrat-intellectuals and their academic mentors, that Japan’s relative
backwardness made the challenge of industrialization more formidable, but chance to
preempt social ills associated with it was also greater. Many Japanese scholars and
bureaucrats feared that the seeds of social unrest were brewing in the countryside as a
result of the rapid growth of industry and commerce at the expense of the agricultural
sector and the encroachment of capitalist relations into rural communities. They had
learned from the experience of the West, particularly that of the United Kingdom, that the
decomposition of rural communities, while necessary to supply cheap labor to the
industrial and commercial sector, constituted one of the root causes of various social and
political ills that plagued industrial societies. If the transition from agrarian to industrial
society was orderly prosecuted, however, Japan could be able to nip a root cause of future
problems in the bud. In that sense, the relevance of agricultural policy was not limited to
the agricultural sector but extended to national economic and political stability (Pyle
1973). Yanagita shared this concern and hope, as suggested in the following passage:
Among nations around the world, Japan is an exceptional case in terms of the large
number of small farmers, merchants, and artisans. In addition, since there was an
abrupt importation of Western knowledge and products in the wake of the
Restoration, no traditional industrial organization has escaped its impact, and the
further accumulation of capital and the increase of wage laborers is a clear and
inescapable trend. Therefore, it is truly a matter requiring immediate attention to
prevent a social crisis in advance by proper means such as industrial cooperatives.
[emphasis added] (“Saishin sangyō kumiai tsūkai.” Teihon 28: 10)

76

In order to justify a broader scope of the state’s role than warranted by the orthodox
economic theory, enlightened despots in non-Western societies needed a new theory of
the state. In his early texts on agrarian policy, Yanagita tried to offer such a theory, which
is the topic of the following section.

The State and the Household
Yanagita grounded his justification for a wider scope of the state’s role on the claim
that it had an obligation to protect the public interest. He denied that the public interest
was merely the aggregation of private interests and defined it in terms of the obligation to
the temporal others, who were not born yet. An often-quoted passage from Nōseigaku
reads:
A nation’s economic policy of a country transcends and is independent of struggles
based on these private interests of classes and must be decided on some other basis.
The purpose of the state itself should never merely reflect the collective desires of
the majority of its people or of a particularly powerful class. In other words, the
sum of private interests does not constitute the public interest. To take an extreme
case, even if the people of the nation in a particular era were unanimous in desiring
a particular thing, the securing of that thing should not necessarily be adopted as
national policy. That is because the people (jinmin), whom the state represents and
whose interests it must defend, are not limited to those now living. The state also
includes their countrymen who will be born in later generations, so there might be
times when the interests of contemporaries will have to be sacrificed for the good of
the country’s future residents. Of course, national goal and the national interest
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cannot exist apart from the people (kokumin), but the interests of the whole country
have an entirely different basis from that of any particular part or class. [my
emphasis] (“Nōseigaku.” Teihon 28: 195-196. Translation from Koschmann 1985:
137-138)
Yanagita’s definition of the state membership is clearly intended to endow the
government with the authority to override the will of powerful social classes or even the
majority in defining the public interest. After mentioning the liberal principle that the
exercise of governmental power against the will of an individual is justifiable only to
prevent harm to others, he writes:
From the point of view of the possessor of rights, the state is one of others. Because
the members of the state who will live in the future can also be said to be others,
they are entitled to refuse to be harmed by the exercise of rights on the part of the
currently living people. However, because they are of course unable to make claims
by themselves, it is a duty of the state to make provision against [the infringement
of the rights of the unborn] on their behalf [emphasis in the original].” (“Nōseigaku.”
Teihon 28: 196)
In other words, just as spatial extension makes it difficult for each individual to figure out
what consequences his or her action entails for others, temporal distance tends to discount
heavily the interest of future generations. In both cases, the state is justified to step in to
guarantee that equal consideration is to be given to its present and future members.
It is probable that Yanagita, when he wrote the passage quoted above, had in mind
the following passage from Mill’s On Liberty: “[T]he sole end for which mankind are
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of
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their number, is to self protection. That the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others” (Mill 1991: 14). However, Mill suggests that certain actions to
prevent or correct injuries to others could be compelled against the will of an individual
and that failure to do so may be counted as an act of injury (pp. 15-16). Thus, by dint of a
unique conception of the state as an intergenerational community, Yanagita managed to
convert Mill’s harm principle into a justification for the interventionist state, whose
function expanded from reactive and regulatory to more proactive and preventive ones.
As will be discussed in the fourth chapter in detail, Yanagita’s emphasis on the
interest of temporal others is partly based on his Malthusian notion of space as the natural
limit on resources available to human exploitation. He distinguishes what are today called
renewable and non-renewable resources and justifies state intervention principally for the
“rational” exploitation of the latter—that is, “rational” from the point of view of the
temporary eternal and spatially organic state (“Nōseigaku.” Teihon 28: 197-198). In a
sense, therefore, the inclusion of the unborn in the membership of the state can be
understood as a rhetorical device to temper the excessively optimistic view, inherent in
progressivism, that most, if not all, existing spatial limits would disappear with the
passage of time. Although it has a conservative implication, its general spirit can be said
to be forward-looking. Equally, while Yanagita’s notion that the state represents the
interest of the unborn may raise eyebrows, most liberals today accept the state as a
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positive power to coordinate social actions as long as it does so for progressive
purposes.28
However, Yanagita’s formulation definitely takes a conservative turn when, in
Nōgyō seisakugaku, he unceremoniously includes not only the unborn but also the dead
in the membership of the state: “The state [kokka 国家] cannot be said to be composed
solely of those living now.29 Our dead ancestors are part of the nation [kokumin 国民] as
well and their wishes should be taken into account. Moreover, because the state is an
eternal entity, our offspring to be born in future makes part of the nation, and their
interests should be protected as well” (“Nōgyō seisakugaku.” Teihon 28: 294). The
apparently subtle expansion of the state membership carries profound political
implications, given that it runs counter to one of the basic tenets of liberalism privileging
the will and interests of the living over inherited traditions.30 Although Yanagita neither

28

For example, see John Rawls’ (1999: 251-258) discussion on inter-generational
justice.
29

Nōseigaku and Nōgyō seisakugaku were based on the lecture notes Yanagita prepared
for the courses of agrarian policy he taught at Waseda University and Senshū University,
respectively. Although both texts were published almost simultaneously, he started
teaching at Waseda in 1900 and at Senshū in 1902. That is because the definition of the
national membership given in Nōgyō seisakugaku is thought to be an improvement upon
the one given in Nōseigaku.
30

For example, Thomas Jefferson’s Letter to Samuel Kercheval
(http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=459, accessed December
9, 2010) defended each generation’s right to revise the constitution and denied that the
living had the obligation to respect the wish or interest of the dead:
But the dead have no rights. They are nothing; and nothing cannot own something.
Where there is no substance there can be no accident. This corporeal globe, and
everything upon it, belong to its present corporeal inhabitants, during their
generation. They alone have a right to direct what is the concern of themselves,
alone, and to declare the law of that direction; and this declaration can only be made
by their majority. That majority, then, has a right to depute representatives to a
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offers any explanation for the change nor elaborated on its implications in the text, his
move is a deliberate one, because from that point on he stuck to the same definition of the
state, as suggested by the following passage from Jidai to nōsei:
Although one half of the nation plus one constitutes the majority, it does not mean
that the interest of the other half minus one could be ignored. Moreover, even if the
entire nation wishes the same thing, the interest of several billions who are not yet
born should be taken into consideration in advance, because the life of the state is
eternal. In addition, we have millions of compatriots whose bodies were dissolved
into the soil, but whose spirits have infinite interests in the enterprise of happy
development [of the nation]. (“Jidai to nōsei,” Teihon 28: 256-257)
If the passage is taken literally, the will of the dead, as well as the unborn, is now counted
as a determinant of the public interest.
Apparently, Yanagita’s view of the state is informed by the popular conception of
the state as family or household (ie 家) writ large. For him, the household is not only a
private organization but also has important public functions, because “for a national
character such as the Japanese one, connection between each individual and
ancestors—namely, the awareness of the household—is simultaneously a link between
the individual and the state” (p. 39). Again, he does not elaborate, but by implication, it
means that a person is connected to the state as a member of a household, not as a

convention, and to make the constitution what they think will be the best for
themselves.
Jefferson is discussing inherited constitutions in this passage, but other forms of
inheritance from the preceding generations—traditions, customs, conventions, etc.—are
the major targets of scrutiny by Enlightenment thinkers.
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solipsistic rational individual. In fact, although Yanagita defends rural-urban migration as
a healthy economic trend on the ground that it is driven by rational calculations on the
part of unemployed or underemployed farmers, his endorsement comes with one
reservation: his expressed concern with “the question of household preservation [ie no
eizoku no mondai 家の永続の問題]” (“Jidai to nōsei.” Teihon 16: 38). According to
Yanagita, urban life encourages individualism because, by physically separating migrants
from their respective households back home, it weakens the idea of obligations to
ancestors and descendents and undermines the significance of the household. As a result,
their perspective becomes narrowed down to the immediate space and time, here and now
of each individual’s life. Because the majority of urban residents are migrants, the spatial
and temporal horizon of the urban population is substantially shorter than that of its rural
counterpart. Yanagita deplores this situation in the strongest terms possible:
In contrast to [Japanese religions’ tolerance toward suicide], there existed severe
social sanctions against the suicide of the household. Nay, if we take unborn
descendents into consideration, domicide—i.e., the homicide of the household—is
not suicide but murder, even when no member of the current household opposes it.
If those who kill their own children are accused of murder, why are not those
equally guilty who condemn the descendent to lose the awareness of their
genealogical lineage while they are still alive? Is it up to the discretion of a family
head to destroy in the space of day a household whose length of life is only second
to the state? Moreover, today, moving permanent residence to big cities almost
certainly results in domicide—namely, the homicide of the household. I refrain from
handing down a judgment here, but want to exhort those who migrate to cities for
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their own calculation, for their own convenience, to think it over. (“Jidai to nōsei.”
Teihon 16: 38-39)
Yanagita’s analogy between murder and what he called domicide certainly seems
overblown, but it reflects his concern with the political ramification of urbanization: if
one’s awareness of belonging to a household is “a link between the individual and the
state” (p. 39), the growing cases of domicide could potentially lead to the murder of the
state.
Yanagita was hardly unique in viewing the state in analogy with the household.
Rather, his view was in line with the dominant nationalist discourse that portrayed the
state as a family writ large. It was a popular and effective mode of representing the state,
partly because the Japanese word for the state, kokka (国家), is a combination of two
Chinese ideographs, kuni (国), a country or homeland, and ie (家), the household or
family. However, Yanagita’s analogy had a different emphasis than the one in the
dominant nationalist discourse. For the latter, the appeal of the analogy lay in the fact that
the structure of the household was thought to be an organic hierarchy paternalistically
presided by the household head. By presenting constitutional monarchy as akin to a
household, the government could draw on Confucian ethics or popular custom to demand
from the imperial subjects the same kind of obedience and deference to the Emperor and
his servants as those due to their fathers.
Yanagita did not share this view.31 Instead, his focus was on the psychological
security the household historically offered to each individual. First, belonging to a
31

In a speech made at an elementary school in 1930, Yanagita criticized the Imperial
Rescript of Education, which had become the official statement about moral principles
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household provided the minimum level of material security. It was the responsibility of
the head of a household to maintain the livelihood of the family members. “Materially, it
was the guarantee that the minimum amount of food would be supplied. No one was left
starving” (“Nihon nōmin shi.” Teihon 16: 218). However, what becomes the main
concern for him is the second kind of psychological security:
[S]piritually, it was the conservation of memories. This has something to do with
[the people’s] connection with land, because villagers, from top to bottom, had
names only if they had cultivated lands. The inheritance of a name from generation
to generation would be rendered meaningless once the household moved to another
place. Within the national tradition of worshiping ancestors and being worshiped by
descendents, one cannot comfortably get old and die without a conviction that the
family members would welcome him or her in bon and higan [when the spirits of
ancestors are thought to be returning to their home]. This is the so-called kesshoku
[血食 the practice of ancestor worship], and the Oriental idea of the household
always had the exchange and chain of affection and yearning [aibo no kōkan to
rensa 愛慕の交換と連鎖]. This point, if not others, is moot in the Western concept

that the subjects were expected to learn through mandatory public education. It
emphasized Confucian ethnical values such as loyalty and filial piety along with loyalty
to the state. Yanagita later explained his discontent as follows: “[The Rescript] does not
mention a sense of public duty [kōtokushin 公徳心] and public morality [kōkyō dōtoku
公共道徳]. True, it mentions love for one’s country [aikokushin 愛国心], but not love
for one’s village, one’s prefecture, and one’s region. It says nothing about an attitude
toward the general public” (quoted in Tsurumi 1998: 94). In other words, He rejects the
thesis that the state is a family writ large and private ethics is equally applicable to
political relations. Instead, genuine patriotism must be cultivated from bottom up by
expanding one’s horizon from the local and regional to the national level.
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of home, which dissolves in every generation. [my emphasis] (“Nihon nōmin shi.”
Teihon 16: 218-219)
The living are motivated to sacrifice their own interest for the sake of the unborn only if
they are assured that the unborn will eventually recognize their sacrifice. Because the
unborn stand to the living exactly in the same way the living stand to the dead, only by
paying due respect to their ancestors could the living convince themselves that the their
descendents will do the same in their turn. In this view, therefore, ancestor worship is
interpreted as a sort of intergenerational pact to preserve a household as the reservoir of
memories of contributions and sacrifices made by preceding generations. It is likely that
Yanagita’s addition of the dead to the membership of the state is inspired by this
“exchange and chain of affection and yearning” between the dead, the living, and the
unborn, institutionalized in the practice of ancestor worship. Despite its
backward-looking rhetoric, it is conceived as a complementary conceptual device to
motivate the living to look beyond the limited spatial and temporal horizons of the
individual. As will be discussed in the following chapter, even when he later became
disillusioned with the impartiality and foresightedness of state bureaucracy and academia,
he retained the household as a crucial institution linking the individual to the nation.

Yanagita’s Critique of Enlightened Despotism
The publication Jidai to nōsei (Our Age and Agrarian Policy) marks the end of the
agricultural policy period of Yanagita’s long intellectual career. It is a collection of essays
published between 1906 and 1909 and shows both continuities and discontinuities from
his earlier writings. He retains the conception of progress as the gradual victory of human

85

will over nature and the notion of sciences (gakumon 学問) as instruments to promote
progress by complementing the limited spatial and temporal horizon of the individual.
What recedes notably is the notion that the state is the principal agent of progress, and,
instead, criticism of political and economic centralization and the one-size-fit-all policy
becomes a more explicit theme, indicating that he was distancing himself from the
statism of his fellow bureaucrat-intellectuals. Although the difference between the earlier
and later writings may be partly due to the fact that the former are written for pedagogical
purposes, Yanagita’s personal experience also seems to have prompted this shift.
As mentioned before, Yanagita’s early writings already contain a harbinger of his
anti-statism. While granting a sweeping authority to the state in theory, in practice he was
critical of the heavy-handed way in which the government was imposing its will upon the
rural population and tried to temper the exercise of governmental power. For example, he
contends that the government should play a greater role in the distribution of wealth,
especially land, but warns against excessive intervention in production on the grounds
that it would reduce the farmer’s incentives and might be counterproductive. On the basis
of this reasoning, he limits government intervention in economy to the case of market
failure resulting from what economists today call incomplete information and bounded
rationality. A passage from Nōseigaku reads:
If humans are most quick to take measures for one’s own interest and everyone but
a few lazy and unlawful fellows works diligently for one’s own livelihood, one
might ask why the state needs to be troubled with legislation and administration [of
necessary measures]. This is because human wisdom is so far away from God, and
in confusion and by mistake, humans often take actions that are ignorant,
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unknowledgeable, and harmful. Therefore, the primary purpose of economic policy
in this respect must be cultivation and guidance (kaihatsu yūdo 開発誘導), by
direct or indirect educational means, leading the people to the point of making right
decisions without being forced (self-help [jijo 自助]). Coercive, police-like
commands or plain subsidizing measures have little effect and much potential for
abuse, and, hence, should be avoided as much as possible if not urgent and
necessary. (“Nōseigaku.” Teihon 28: 241-242)
The final sentence of the quote above is thought to be an indirect allusion to Sakō
Tsuneaki (酒匂常昭), reformist Director General of the Agricultural Affairs Bureau of
the Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture, whose heavy-handed policy stance was
known as “sāberu nōsei [サーベル農政 saber agricultural policy]” because of its heavy
reliance on coercive force (Kawada 28-48).
Yanagita’s criticism of paternalism becomes even more overt in the essays included
in Jidai to nōsei. Yanagita’s complaints are directed to two aspects of agricultural policy
science and the government’s agrarian policy: The connivance of sciences with power
and the narrow empirical basis of modern knowledge.

The Connivance of Science with Power
Yanagita’s criticism of the bureaucratic developmental state is closely related to his
personal experience in the government. Although the details remain unclear because of
his general reticence about his experience as a government official, indirect evidence
indicates his growing dissatisfaction with the way agrarian problems are dealt with by the
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government and academic authorities. His discontent is largely because his proposals for
agrarian reform literally fell on deaf ears. To his dismay, they were shunned by the
bureaucracy-academia complex, not because his arguments were refuted on the basis of
rational argumentation and empirical facts, but because it fell victim to factional politics
to which policy science was supposed to be immune. His frustration was discernible in
the following passage from the preface to Jidai to nōsei: “I had never seen any [written]
objection to my opinions [except once], but occasionally heard some through the
grapevine. However, they are very fragmented opinions. I do not know which part [of my
view], but an expert in Komaba [supposedly referring to Yokoi Tokiyoshi (横井時敬
1860-1920), then a professor of the Tokyo Imperial University and an authority in
agrarian economics] reportedly said, ‘Yanagita’s opinion is odd.’ And a famous
prefectural governor was heard saying, ‘I do not understand what that man [Yanagita]
says’” (Teihon 16: 4). Shunned from the bureaucracy-academia circle, Yanagita’s
proposals largely fell into oblivion.32 In order to understand why his proposals were so
thoroughly ignored by bureaucrats and scholars, it is necessary to turn to the contents of
his diagnosis of agrarian problems and solutions to them.
Yanagita’s diagnosis of agrarian problems was largely Malthusian.33 He believed
that as a result of the relatively rapid population growth during the early modern period
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Tōhata Seiichi, a prominent agricultural economist, later described Yanagita’s
agricultural policy science as “a solitary cry in the wilderness” (Tōhata 1961). In the
postwar period, however, his nōseigaku in general and his proposal for balanced
development in particular were recognized as farsighted and anticipating the postwar
agrarian reform.
33

Yanagita mentions Malthus by name and endorses his law of diminishing return in
Nōseigaku (Teihon 28: 202-203) and Nōgyō seisakugaku (Teihon 28: 307). However,
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from the seventeenth to nineteenth century, the rural sector was suffering from the
relative scarcity of arable land. The result was the progressive subdivision of cultivated
land into smaller plots and the proliferation of smallholders who barely scraped a living
off their lands. The symptom of overpopulation and the underutilization of labor forces
manifested itself in persistent rural poverty, occasional famines, the practice of
infanticide and granny dumping, and the increasing number of rural-urban migrants.
Under the condition of overpopulation, the replacement of feudal relations with the
market system did not necessarily solve “the problem of feeding the infinitely growing
population with the finite territory” (Teihon 28: 207). It even exacerbated the problem by
facilitating the concentration of land in the hands of few landowners.
The solution Yanagita proposed was the rationalization of land use, at both macroand micro-levels, from the national point of view. At the macro-level, he rejected both
agrarian country-ism (nōgyō kokuhonron 農業国本論) and commercial/industrial
country-ism (shōkōgyō rikkokuron 商工業立国論), which divided the public opinion at
that time. The former defended the agricultural sector as the basis of the Japanese nation
in not only an economic but also political and cultural sense. It criticized the corrupting
influence of urban culture on the traditional virtues of the rural population such as
frugality, diligence, loyalty, simplicity, and physical sturdiness. What worried agrarian
country-ists particularly was the accelerated pace of urban emigration, which Yokoi
Tokiyoshi attributed to “city fever (tokai netsu 都会熱)”— namely, an irrational frenzy

John Stuart Mill’s economic thought is also influenced by Malthus, and it is possible that
Yanagita came to know the Malthusian theory through Mill’s main text on political
economy, Principles of Political Economy.
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that spread among the rural youth lured by rumors about fancy urban life. To prevent a
further disintegration of rural communities, they advocated protective measures for the
agricultural sector even at the cost of commercial and industrial interests. In contrast,
commercial/industrial country-ism regarded agriculture as little more than a supplier of
food and raw materials, and, to lesser extent, a market for commercial and industrial
products. As such, the agricultural sector was substitutable with foreign suppliers and
consumers. Thus, commercial/industrial country-ism asked for a laissez faire policy
toward the agricultural sector so that the price of food and raw materials could be kept
low.
Yanagita’s position can be summarized as the advocacy of balanced development.
He argued that both agriculture and commerce/industry were important from the national
point of view and that their interests should be understood as mutually complementary,
rather than irreconcilably antagonistic. Moreover, in his view, favoring a particular
segment of the national economy over the rest was contrary to the public interest. A
passage from Nōseigaku reads:
Although there is no doubt that even today agrarian policy occupies a central
position among economic policies, it is very dangerous to jump from this fact onto
agrarian country-ism. The public opinion tends to assert that Japan is either an
agricultural or commercial/industrial country and, from this bold dogmatic
judgment, tries to infer national policy. However, because it is a plain fact that
under the current economic condition it is impossible for either of agriculture,
commerce, or industry to be the livelihood of the entire nation, and hence no one
would dare promote one of them and completely destroy the others. Or, does that
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mean that we should put emphasis on one kind of national livelihood and leave
others to rise and fall as nature dictates (probably resulting in constant decline), or
that we should take it as a natural tendency that the relapse of agriculture,
commerce, or industry that accompanies the disproportionate prosperity of one
sector and refrain from efforts to coordinate or assist [declining sectors]? No one
can tell that either of them is acceptable. (“Nōseigaku.” Teihon 28: 193-194)
In other words, the interest of any particular economic sector cannot be taken for the
public interest, unless it is harmonized with the remaining part of the national economy,
just as the eyes and hands are placed in their proper places within the entire body.
In a more specific political context, Yanagita’s critique of agrarian and
commercial/industrial country-isms derived from his view that both of them were
actually an expression of growing power of large landowners and urban capitalists,
respectively. For that reason, he directed his criticism not only to the proponents of
commercial/industrial country-ism but also to increasingly vocal advocates of agrarian
country-ism, including Yokoi and Sakō. What was completely neglected in the
dichotomous opposition, in Yanagita’s opinion, was the interest of small farmers, who
actually constituted the majority of the nation.
At the micro-level, Yanagita believed that although Japanese agriculture was already
very intensive in terms of land use, there remained “slack” to be tightened by means of
the consolidation of cultivated land holdings, the elimination of unnecessary ridges, the
improvement of irrigation systems, and the selective adoption of new crops, improved
varieties of seeds and technologies, and so on. However, his boldest suggestion was the
proposal of land redistribution aimed at the creation of independent mid-sized farmers.
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As is discussed above, he believed that a root cause for agrarian problems was
overpopulation, because “[i]t is just impossible from the beginning to settle more than
four million farming households on about five million chō [one chō is approximately one
hectare] of paddies and fields and try to support almost thirty million, including
landowners themselves” (“Chūnō yōsei saku.” Teihon 31: 413). During the feudal period,
the government had been able to maintain this state of affairs by harsh measures aimed to
keep the level of peasants’ consumption artificially low, but these measures were
impractical in the modern age, when farmers had become more self-conscious and started
asking why they remained so poor in spite of all the hard labor. Moreover, in the face of
foreign competition, agriculture needed to invest in both human and physical capital to
improve its productivity, but petty farmers, who barely survived at the subsistence level,
could not afford to defer consumption to save part of their meager income for capital
formation. To make the situation worse, whatever surplus remains was taken out of the
countryside by the centralized national financial system to invest in urban sectors or
overseas colonies (“Jidai to nōsei.” Teihon 16: 40).
The only fundamental solution, Yanagita maintains, is to thin out farming
households so that the remaining farmers could afford parcels of land large enough to
make farming a viable business. In his opinion, “[t]he decrease in the number of farming
households is not necessarily lamentable. In a country like ours, where the area of
cultivated land is very limited, what is lamentable is the increase” (p. 413). Yanagita
estimates that at least two chō of cultivated paddies or fields are necessary for farming to
be a viable business for an average-size household. Because the agricultural frontier of
Japan is limited, the number of middle-sized farmers could be increased only by easing
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millions of households out of farming (“Chūnō yōsei saku.” Teihon 31: 412). Commerce
and industry should be promoted to absorb those who give up farming.
Even in such a case, Yanagita prefers the development of industry and commerce
taking place as part of each rural economy. In an article titled “The Economic Missions of
Towns (Machi no keizaiteki shimei 町の経済的使命),” he classifies the approximately
1,100 existing towns into three types in terms of their historical function within the
national economy. The first type is the consumption or tourist town, where “people come
to spend money” (“Jidai to nōsei.” Teihon 16: 78). It is described as heavily dependent on
the consumption of unproductive classes and their residents as “frivolous” and
“untrustworthy” in nature (p. 78). The second type is the market town, where people
bring something to sell and buy something else in return. Although this kind of town
originally developed as a part of the rural economy, he complains that the development of
large market towns, such as Tōkyō, Yokohama, Ōsaka, or Kōbe, has come to occupy a
monopolistic position in the national economy and has established the centralized system
of distribution so that almost no merchandise reaches local consumers unless it goes
through the hands of middlemen residing in those cities. In contrast, the third type of
town, which Yanagita calls “production town” (p. 179), is more firmly embedded in local
economies in the sense that it directly relies on local labor and materials for its
production and has a positive and mutually beneficial linkage with its rural hinterlands.
Yanagita’s recommendation is to promote the third type of town as an absorber of surplus
labor.
Unlike agrarian country-ists such as Yokoi or Sakō, therefore, Yanagita welcomes
urbanization as a sign that surplus labor is being transferred from a stagnant to more
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dynamic sectors. Equally, he rejects the thesis that the rural youth is irrationally lured into
urban life. In direct allusion to the Yokoi’s “city fever” thesis, he suggested that “it is not
a mistake, or ‘fever,’ that young people emigrate from the countryside to increase their
income” (“Jidai to nōsei.” Teihon 16: 37). In his view, their behavior is completely
rational from the standpoint of each individual because it is supported by the sound
calculation that their labor could be sold at a higher price in cities than in the countryside,
where the overabundance of labor in relation to available land depresses their wages. On
that ground, he criticizes the attitude of agrarian country-ists toward the rural population
as overly paternalistic.
Yanagita’s preference for independent mid-sized farmers has an important political
aspect. What concerned him was the growing number of absentee landowners, who
abandoned their traditional role as political leaders and representatives of the interest of
farmers before higher authorities and were increasingly absorbed in partisan politics at
the national and prefectural levels. Yanagita suggested that even though traditional rural
communities were far from being egalitarian, they were the communities of farmers in
the sense that even landowners used to engage in farming by themselves. Nevertheless,
he feared, as the result of the introduction of capitalist relations into the countryside, a
sharp distinction between landowners and tenants was developing. Unlike their
predecessors, the new land-owning class was not farmers but rentiers and did not share
the same identity with the peasant class. As a result, the interest of landowners diverged
from that of farmers, and the former could no longer be said to be the representative of
the latter. Largely relieved from traditional obligations to their villagers but retaining
influential positions over the rural population as owners of the scarcest resources—i.e.,
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land and capital, they were no longer farmers but the exploiters of them. His proposal to
create a middling class in the rural population was an attempt to contain this trend of
class stratification in advance. In allusion to the absentee landowning class, he describes
mid-sized farmers as “landowners who have lived in the countryside for several hundred
years, own lands inherited from generation to generation, and constitute, in the past and
in the future, the backbone [chūken 中堅, literally the middle core] of the nation. Those
are payers of the land tax…whose bodies busy themselves with national and prefectural
affairs, but whose hearts at no moment stop thinking about the progress of agriculture”
(“Chūnō yōsei saku.” Teihon 31: 417).
As suggested by the previous quote, for Yanagita, middle-sized farmers did not
only constitute a middling element that mechanically balanced against the polarized
opposition of agrarian capitalists and proletariats. They were also the historical carriers of
a cultural ethos that Yanagita believes had critical importance to the preservation of the
nation. Middle-sized farmers were the backbone of the nation not only as productive
force but also as the preservers of the traditional institution of household (ie) and village
(mura), without which he believed the state could not survive. In contrast to absentee
landowners or tenant farmers, they would be sedentary and continue to work on lands
inherited from their parents and pass them on to their children. Their attachment to lands
would made them the core constituents of rural communities and the vigilant defenders of
their own interests. Their embeddedness in the exchange and chain of affection and
yearning through the practice of ancestor worship would serve as a bulwark against the
individualizing force of urbanization.

95

Beside the fact that the defiant posture of a young official would certainly get on
the nerve of his superiors and academic authorities, it is not difficult to imagine what part
of his proposal was hard to swallow for the latter. First, his acceptance of commerce and
industry as complementary to agricultural development must have seemed a “sell-out” in
bureaucratic turf wars.34 Equally, his proposal of land redistribution in favor of
middle-sized farmers was too radical and ran directly against the powerful agrarian
interest of the time. As a result, his somewhat naïve idealism fell victim to the
monopolization of knowledge by a small group of academic authorities and high-ranking
government officials. In his characteristically oblique statements, he expressed his
frustration in the following terms:
Usually, in any policy [field], academic power and administrative power run
parallel to each other, and experts hired by the central government are deemed as
the most important. Minor officials under their supervision are better off parroting
their theories. Nevertheless, studies of agrarian economy are the field most unfit for
centralization. … [i]t is simply impossible for five or eight experts in Tokyo to

34

Ann Waswo (1988: 571) briefly mentions a turf war between the Home Ministry and
the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. While the former saw traditional rural
institutions as a hindrance to national integration, the latter tried to co-opt them to
promote agricultural development. The internal battle within the Ministry of Agriculture
and Commerce, resulting in its breakup in 1925 into the Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, is documented in Johnson’s study
of the developmental state (1982: 83-95). In an editorial he wrote for Tokyo Asahi, a
liberal newspaper, Yanagita sarcastically pointed out that the breakup was little more than
an attempt by political parties to placate the landowning class that had been discontented
with the urban bias of the Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture (“Sekkyoku seisaku to
nōrinshō mondai.” Teihon sup. 1: 47-48)
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make observations and judgments that reach every corner of this long [archipelago
of] Japan. (Teihon 16: 13-14)
What was supposed to be the allegedly impartial and foresighted bureaucracy and
academia in theory turned out to be a close-minded clique of paternalistic officials
obsessed with their own turf, academic authorities with second-hand knowledge
borrowed from the West, and sycophantic followers who were ready to ignore any
inconvenient opinion for the sake of their own narrow sectoral interest.

The Narrow Empirical Basis of Theoretical Knowledge
Yanagita’s second criticism of the enlightened bureaucracy was directed at the
alleged universality of imported “scientific” knowledge monopolized by the
bureaucracy-academia complex. In this, he was faithful to the basic tenet of the Historical
School of Economics, but extended it further than his German counterparts and Japanese
followers were willing to do. For him, the narrowness of imported knowledge is
attributable to two causes. First, imported Western knowledge has an innate urban bias. In
other words, imported Western concepts and theories grew out of the experience of
Western cities and actually represent a particular local perspective—namely, that of the
urban literate class in the West. In Nōseigaku, he already complained that even the
self-claimed social reformers—an indirect allusion to scholars subscribed to the Social
Policy School—had been paying little attention to the rural sector because of the urban
bias. “Because even those who acknowledge themselves as social reformers are urban
residents and what they observe daily is limited to little more than the living condition of
some wage laborers,” his complaint goes, “every time they open the mouth, they say ‘the
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alliance of workers’ or ‘checking the power of manufacturers,’ and limited themselves to
advocating national policy for one generation [as opposed to the long-term planning] and
concentrating in this kind of partial enterprises [as opposed to the interest of the entire
nation]” (Teihon 28: p. 4). He suggests on several occasions that his writings are aimed to
broaden this narrow spatial and temporal horizon of self-claimed and potential social
reformers among rural residents who are less affected by foreign knowledge (e.g., Teihon
28: 5).
Second, he contends that Western theories’ narrow empirical basis is further
aggravated by the systematic exclusion of the experience of non-Westernized peoples. As
discussed in the previous section, imported knowledge is predicated on the
presupposition that every nation will follow the same developmental sequence, ultimately
converting into a single form of civilization. In consequence, Japanese scholars and
bureaucrats seek valuable lessons from the history of the United Kingdom and other
Western societies, instead of inquiring directly into the history and specific conditions of
the Japanese population. The result is that the Japanese experience is systematically
discounted as valid empirical material for theory making. Instead of testing and
improving theories with what is empirically observed, the enlightened bureaucracy and
scholars tend to think that whatever is conceived as inconsistent with their own theories is
an obstacle for progress and should be removed forcibly.
One such instance in which Yanagita is personally involved is the Shrine Merger
Act of 1906. Led by the Home Ministry, another stronghold of reformist
bureaucrat-intellectuals, the government aimed at consolidating small hamlet shrines into
one central shrine in each administrative unit. As a result of this act, about 40 percent of
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approximately 190,000,000 local shrines throughout the country were destroyed and
merged into central shrines by 1913 (Pyle 1973: 60). The policy was part of the efforts to
convert Shintō into a centrally administered national religion comparable with the
Christian Church in Western countries. The bureaucrats in the Home Ministry speculated
that the extreme decentralization of Shintō practices not only promoted parochialism
among villagers but also contributed to the shabby appearance of many hamlet shrines,
degrading Shintō into a less than prestigious status, compared with Buddhism or
Christianity. The centralization, they reasoned, would solve these problems. In various
parts of the country, however, the policy was fiercely opposed by local residents, and
some intellectuals joined their cause. At the request of Minakata Kumagusu (南方熊楠),
a renowned naturalist and fellow folklorist, Yanagita supported the resistance movement
behind the scenes from within the government. His major criticism of the policy was that
it was informed by an utterly mistaken notion of the Japanese indigenous religion.
According to him, hamlet shrines were not comparable with Christian churches or
Buddhist temples, because they were believed to be but markers for places where local
deities temporarily stayed during the time of festivities. What was important was the
place itself, not the artifacts upon it. Though as much appreciative of the role of religion
in social integration as the officials of the Home Ministry, he was concerned that the
destruction of hamlet shrines, centers of village communal life and closely related to
agricultural activities, would be counterproductive, exacerbating social disintegration in
the rural sector. Probably, this incident should have served him as a warning against the
hubristic intervention by bureaucrat-intellectuals, steeped in the knowledge of and from
the West but utterly ignorant of their own homeland.
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Since the power and authority of the enlightened bureaucracy derived from
imported knowledge predicated on the modern spatiotemporal order, Yanagita
subsequently directed his criticism to the assumption that all nations were situated
somewhere on a unilinear developmental sequence. As a result, he came to question the
presumption that the West, especially the United Kingdom, could serve as an image of
Japan’s future. A comparison between an early text, Nōseigaku, and an essay contained in
Jidai to nōsei reveals this shift. In Nōseigaku, Yanagita makes a case against national
specialization in a particular sector of the economy by using the experience of the United
Kingdom as an example not to be followed. According to him, the United Kingdom’s
error is that it “gave extreme importance to the benefit of the division of labor, and came
to apply that theory to international economy” (“Nōseigaku.” Teihon 28: 193). He points
out that Japan’s commercial/industrial country-ism is little more than the imitation of this
example. However, he asserts, the theory had already proved wrong, because the British
position as the industrial center in the international division of labor was being
challenged by the rapid industrialization of nations in the European subcontinents and
some others in Asia and America. As a result, “the international division of labor, which
the United Kingdom initially believed was everlasting and unchanging, has completely
changed in less than one hundred years” (p. 194), and the British economy was left in a
vulnerable position in the more competitive international environment. Yanagita
concludes:
Although the benefit that the United Kingdom reaped from the policy [of the
international division of labor and national specialization in commerce and
industry] is large, so is the loss that the same policy caused to the agricultural sector.
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This is because while intensive agriculture practiced in older nations is never
capable of competing with extensive agriculture in newly colonized countries with
the vast [uncultivated] land, the progress of the means of transportation reduced
shipping costs and destroyed the only defensive wall [that intensive agriculture had]
in international competition. Moreover, merchants and industrialists tend to
welcome international competition because cheap food and raw materials are
beneficial to them. Because the main outlet for their manufactured goods is
overseas exportation, the reduced economic power of their own nation’s countryside
is not their problem to mind about. In short, British agriculture waned little by little,
not because it was directly oppressed, but because the overemphasis on commerce
and industry is left to natural progression. In light of this, it is harmful enough for
national economic policy to concentrate its attention on a part [of the national
economy]. It is easy to imagine how horrific the outcome would be if to promote
the interest of one part, it sacrifices the interest of the rest. This point is applicable
not only to the case in which commerce and industry outdo agriculture but also to
the case where, in contrast to the example of the United Kingdom, the prosperity of
agriculture is prioritized and the remaining sectors were left alone. (“Nōseigaku.”
Teihon 28: 194-195)
Here, Yanagita is projecting the image of Japan’s future on the current condition of the
United Kingdom and is warning that the Japanese people should and could avoid the
same mistake.
On the contrary, in an essay titled “Inaka tai tokai no mondai (田舎対都会の問題
The Problem of the Country versus the City),” he repudiates what he wrote in Nōseigaku
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on the relevance of the British experience. Taking the specific British example as
universal, he suggests, agrarian country-ism wrongly assume that the country and the city
are necessarily antagonistic. He points out that even if demographic concentration in
cities is a universal trend, its causes and effects greatly differ across countries. Yanagita
raises the examples of the United States and France, where, according to him, internal
migration did not ruin the rural sectors, and contends that the specific history and legal
system of each country should be taken into account before handing down a premature
judgment (Teihon 16: 29-31). Concretely, in an essay titled “Machi no keizaiteki shimei
(The Economic Mission of Towns),” Yanagita suggests that in the case of Japan, the
boundary between the city and the countryside has never been clear-cut as is the case in
Western civilization (Teihon 16: 75-76).35 By rejecting the universal relevance of the
British experience, Yanagita takes a step away from the body of knowledge predicated on
the modern spatiotemporal order. Thus, he concludes that imported theoretical knowledge,
derived from the narrow experience of the Western metropolis, is not “universal”
knowledge applicable regardless of space and time. “What is needed today,” he claims,
“is not the diffusion of Western agricultural policy science but the development of
Japanese agricultural policy science” (Teihon 16: 10).
It is worth emphasizing that Yanagita does not give up the possibility of universal
knowledge. Rather, his claim is that Western theoretical knowledge is not universal
enough, because it refuses to take into account particular conditions and experiences of
non-Western societies. In order to compensate for this deficit in existing knowledge, a
35

The same theme was further elaborated on in the book Toshi to nōson (City and
Village), published in 1929 (Teihon 16: 237-391).
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national policy science has to develop first as a step toward a universal policy science.
“What I call science [gakumon 学問] with an air of self-importance,” he asserts, “is
comprehensive research that covers the entire nation laterally and spans from the past to
the future vertically” (Teihon 16: 10). According to him, such a science does not exist yet,
primarily because of the lack of knowledge about the Japanese national history and space.
In addition to his frustration with the government and academia, it was his
innumerable excursions into the interior of Japan and direct encounters with rural folks as
internal other that prompted Yanagita’s critical reappraisal of the despotism of the
enlightened bureaucracy. As a government official and expert of agricultural affairs, he
traveled extensively throughout Japan as lecturer and consultant and was struck by the
diverse economic and cultural conditions that Japan contained. Equally striking to him
was the lack of knowledge of, or even indifference to, those local conditions that local
government officials often exhibited. That forced him to rely on local natives for
information. Given such an internal diversity, he reasoned, one-size-fit-all policy was not
only inadequate but also positively harmful to the public interest because it neglected the
interest of minorities, or even the silent majority. A passage from Jidai to nōsei reads: “In
spite of the popular contempt for fussing over every trivial detail, from the point of view
of those trivial details, it would be very annoying to be left alone for so long without
being fussed over. Japan is a rare case in the world in that it is both mountain and island
country at the same time. Even remote and lonely islands, if combined, constitute a
substantial land mass. Remote mountain villages occupy a half of the national territory.
Agrarian policy solely aimed at farmers in flat land simply will not do” (Teihon 16: 19).
Accordingly, Yanagita became critical of the centralization of knowledge production and
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state administration, and, in the second period of his intellectual career, he became
absorbed into those “trivial details”—that is, people and life in remote mountains and
islands of the nation. Far from stranger to rural life, he himself had to admit his lack of
familiarity with many rural customs and institutions. In the afterword attached to the
1948 edition of Jidai to nōsei, he confesses that “[e]ven now, when I read [Jidai to nōsei],
it contains so many a fact to which I only gave some speculative thoughts but never could
explain why” (Teihon 16: 160). He expresses his hope that students of minzokugaku
would pay attention to those “mysterious phenomena” (p. 160) and complete his
unfinished job, suggesting continuity between his nōseigaku and minzokugaku.

Turning Mill against Mill
Now that Yanagita’s critique of Japanese enlightened despotism is clarified, we are
in a better position to examine the paradoxical relations between Mill’s On Liberty and
Yanagita’s apparently conservative minzokugaku. Although there is no direct historical
evidence for this claim, it is not difficult to find the Millian spirit in the following aspects
of Yanagita’s minzokugaku.

An Alternative to Dogmatic Sciences
Yanagita’s criticism of supposedly enlightened academic authorities and
bureaucrat-intellectuals is that they only possess the “ape-like [faculty] of imitation”
(Mill 1991: 65) and that allegedly scientific truth is actually second-hand knowledge
based on the experience of the West narrowly understood. In other words, enlightened
despots turn out to be mere imitators, not independent and critical thinkers. Their
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uncritical embracement of imported ideas amounts to little more than the replacement of
one set of customs by another, as the new generation of the Japanese elite turns their
belief in progress into another dogma to be followed blindly. In fact, the attitude of
Japanese bureaucrat-intellectuals and scholars is closer to what Mill describes as a sign of
the loss of individuality:
In our times, from the highest class of society down to the lowest, every one lives as
under the eye of a hostile and dreaded censorship. Not only in what concerns others,
but in what concerns only themselves, the individual or the family do not ask
themselves—what do I prefer? Or, what would suit my character and disposition?
Or, what would allow the best and highest in me to have fair play, and enable it to
grow and thrive? They ask themselves, what is suitable to my position? What is
usually done by persons of my station and pecuniary circumstances? or (worse still)
what is usually done by persons of a station and circumstances superior to mine? I
do not mean that they choose what is customary, in preference to what suits their
own inclination. It does not occur to them to have any inclination, except for what is
customary. Thus the mind itself is bowed to the yoke: even in what people do for
pleasure, conformity is the first thing thought of; they like in crowds; they exercise
choice only among things commonly done: peculiarity of taste, eccentricity of
conduct, are shunned equally with crimes: until by dint of not following their own
nature, they have no nature to follow: their human capacities are withered and
starved: they become incapable of any strong wishes or native pleasures, and are
generally without either opinions or feelings of home growth, or properly their own.
(Mill 1991: 68)
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Replace “the individual or the family” with “the nation” in the quote above and we get
Yanagita’s critique of Japanese political and intellectual leaders: They tend to ask first
what is usually done in the West, instead of asking what would suit the Japanese
character and disposition or what would allow the best and highest in Japan to have fair
play and enable it to grow and thrive. Their primary concern is how to make Japan look
more like a Western nation-state. The imitative political and intellectual leadership,
Yanagita worried, led the entire nation into the state of cultural subordination in which its
“human capacities are withered and starved: they become incapable of any strong wishes
or native pleasures, and are generally without either opinions or feelings of home growth,
or properly their own.” Yanagita’s minzokugaku is designed as an alternative mode of
knowledge production that would replace the mimic sciences practiced by the
bureaucrat-academia complex.

Criticism of Centralization and Suppression of Diversity
Yanagita’s critique of centralized administration and knowledge production also
echo Mill’s criticism of centralization:
In many cases, though individuals may not do the particular things so well, on the
average, as the officers of government, it is nevertheless desirable that it should be
done by them, rather than by the government, as a means to their own mental
education—a mode of strengthening their active faculties, exercising their
judgement [sic], and giving them a familiar knowledge of the subjects with which
they are thus left to deal. … The management of purely local business by the
localities, and of the great enterprises of industry by the union of those who
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voluntarily supply the pecuniary means, is further recommended by all the
advantages which have been set forth in this Essay as belonging to individuality of
development and diversity of modes of action. Government operations tend to be
everywhere alike. With individuals and voluntary associations, on the contrary,
there are varied experiments, and endless diversity of experience. (Mill 1991:
121-122)
As discussed in the following chapter, Yanagita tries to redefine rural communities as
unique and original human experiments. Experiments vary depending on the natural
conditions under which they take place and the course of history that people choose, and
it contains both successes and failures. Yet, each is valuable in its unique contribution to
universal knowledge about human history. However, after the Meiji Restoration, the
centralized government took over semi-autonomous communities and assumed the
position of sole planner and conductor of experiments and turned the self-governed
communities into mere objects of experiments. As a result, “individuality of development
and diversity of mode of action” was suppressed.

Selective Preservation of Customs
Even Yanagita’s criticism against the wholesale renunciation of customs is
essentially Millian. In spite of his general antipathy toward customs, Mill readily admits
that it is neither possible nor desirable for a new generation to renounce completely what
is inherited from the preceding generations and to start from scratch (Mill 1991: 64).
“[E]ven in revolution of opinion,” Mill concedes, “one part of the truth usually sets while
another rises. Even progress, which ought to superadd, for the most part only substitutes,
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one partial and incomplete truth for another; improvement consisting chiefly in this, that
the new fragment of truth is more wanted, more adapted to the needs of the time, than
that which it displaces” (p. 52). Both wholesale denunciation of the old and uncritical
embracement of the new are equally dogmatic. What is important is to keep open the
possibility for each generation to consciously choose which customs are to be kept and
which are not on the basis of utility for their own purposes:
It is the privilege and proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity of
his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way. It is for him to find out
what part of recorded experience is properly applicable to his own circumstances
and character. The traditions and customs of other people are, to a certain extent,
evidence of what their experience has taught them; presumptive evidence, and as
such, have a claim to his deference: but, in the first place, their experience may be
too narrow; or they may not have interpreted it rightly. Secondly, their interpretation
of experience may be correct, but unsuitable to him. Customs are made for
customary circumstances, and customary characters; and his circumstances or his
character may be uncustomary. Thirdly, though the customs be both good as custom,
and suitable to him, yet to conform to custom, merely as custom, does not educate
or develop in him any of the qualities which are the distinctive endowment of a
human being. (Mill 1991: 64-65)
Yanagita’s critique of the uncritical acceptance of imported ideas and the wholesale
renunciation of indigenous customs closely resonates with this passage. Minzokugaku is
against both dogmatic affirmation and blind denunciation of customs. Rather, the duty of
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the currently living is the critical examination of inherited customs and conscious
selection of what to be preserved and what is to be abandoned.
Thus, Yanagita turns Mill’s defense of diversity against his defense of despotic
government in non-Western society. In a sense, Yanagita’s minzokugaku can be
characterized as what Mill describes a local and temporal alliance between the spirit of
liberty and the opponent of improvement against the spirit of improvement “aim[ing] at
forcing improvements on an unwilling people” (p. 78). However, his conservatism is not
the negation of progressivism but a necessary means to conserve diversity and, hence,
long-term foundation of progress. Therefore, instead of turning to the
bureaucratic-intellectual elite as the guarantor of progress, he tries to rehabilitate the
ordinary people as genuine agents of progress. For that purpose, however, Yanagita has to
prove that in spite of Mill’s claim, the East has history—a history that has never been
written and is being forgotten because of the lack of written records. Here, another
passage from On Liberty is relevant:
The fact, however, is, that not only the grounds of the opinion are forgotten in the
absence of discussion, but too often the meaning of the opinion itself. The words
which convey it, cease to suggest ideas, or suggest only a small potion of those they
were originally employed to communicate. Instead of a vivid conception and a
living belief, there remain only a few phrases retained by rote; or, if any part, the
shell and husk only of the meaning is retained, the finer essence being lost. The
great chapter in human history which this fact occupies and fills, cannot be too
earnestly studied and meditated on. (p. 45)

109

One of the tasks of minzokugaku is to study a part of “the great chapter in human history”
in which the meaning of a unwritten doctrine of life that informed Japanese beliefs and
practices was forgotten and, as a result, what was once a coherent ways of life was
fragmented into a set of apparently meaningless customs.
However, one major obstacle to Yanagita’s application of Mill’s progressivism to the
case of Japan is the latter’s conception of progress, in which the genius of extraordinary
individuals is featured as a main catalyst for a change. The following chapter turns to the
question how Yanagita tries to offset Mill’s individualistic notion of progressive agency.
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CHAPTER III
THE HISTORY OF HISTORYLESS PEOPLE

Yanagita’s loss of confidence in the state bureaucracy and official academic
institutions prompted him to turn to society—that is, social relations outside the realm of
the modern state—in search of progressive agency. His disillusionment with the
“impartial” bureaucracy and academia might have taken him away from German statism,
more common among his fellow bureaucrat-intellectuals, to Millian liberalism. However,
as suggested in the previous chapter, the transition was complicated because of Mill’s
assertion that “[t]he greater part of the world [outside Europe and its colonial offshoots]
has, properly speaking, no history” (Mill 1991: 78). By this, he meant that non-Western
societies had shown little progress because of the shortage or absence of progressive
agents and, as a result, the non-West was little more than an extensive but depthless space
with no history to tell. By implication, Japanese society lacked progressive agency before
the advent of the modern state. In face of this claim, Yanagita needed to redefine
non-Western space as a progressive zone by telling an unrecorded history of peoples
without history. For that purpose, those denigrated as “backward,” “ignorant,”
“superstitious,” or “irrational” in modern knowledge had to be rehabilitated as rational
agents and the subjects in knowledge production. He may have shared Mill’s belief that
“the only unfailing and permanent source of progress is liberty” (p. 78), but, in extending
that claim to the non-Western space, he had to confront Mill’s individualistic notion of
liberty, diversity, and progress.
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In this process, Yanagita’s project intersected Marx’s materialist view of history in
which human life is reproduced in daily and incessant efforts to reorder nature to satisfy
their essential needs. According to this view, history is the transformation of nature by
human collective acts and progress can be measured by the extent to which social
organization adapts the natural environment for the satisfaction of their needs and adapts
itself to a limit imposed by nature at a given time. Human agency is exercised by a
historically defined collectivity whose scope and internal organization change as human
relations with nature are transformed. Both Marx and Yanagita try to reground the
economic sphere, abstracted out from anthropological space by classical economics, on
the concrete historical existence of humanity. At the same time, Yanagita’s appreciation
of Marx is limited to the latter’s methodological approach. He does not share Marx’s
ideological commitment and, instead, advocates a reformist and nationalist, rather than
revolutionary and internationalist solution, to the problems of global capitalism.
That space can be properly called anthropological in the sense that it is where
material conditions for human existence are constantly produced and reproduced by
human deliberate action. It is not another realm adjacent to various spheres of human life,
but a deeper layer underlying and integrating those compartmentalized spheres. For the
urban literate class, it has become a sort of invisible world, which always exists parallel
to the visible world, but is buried deep underneath the modern spatiotemporal order
superimposed upon it. As a result, anthropological has become an adjective that connotes
the world outside or before modernity and anthropology the study of “premodern”
societies. Although the contemporary academic division of labor between sociology and
anthropology makes the term anthropological unduly restricted, anthropological space in
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the sense used in this study is not a “prehistorical” or “animalistic” sphere of life in which
each individual concerned herself with the production and reproduction of its own body,
because it requires collective efforts to preserve human space within the cosmos which
human beings are at once part of but became alienated from.36

Yanagita, Marx, and Marxism
Yanagita was known to be critical of Marxism throughout his life, but never
directly engaged with Marx or Marxism in his writings. However, there is some indirect
evidence for his growing interest in Marx’s view of history during the 1920s. First, one of
his disciples, who attended a course taught in 1924 at Keiō Gijuku University, recorded
the following statement of Yanagita in his notebook:
… Out of the similar environment does emerge a similar phenomenon! I cannot
question this truth. From this point of view, I believe it impossible to think that our
country has its own idiosyncratic [tokushu na 特殊な] history. That is plainly
wrong… Historiography, for its research, must take into account mass psychology
and individual psychological effects. I think it is a mistake to think about history
with an exclusive focus on matter. For, when observed as the question of facts, idea
and matter, mind and body are indistinguishable. Although Marx and Engel’s view
of history is commonly called yuibutsu ron [唯物論 literally, exclusively-matter
theory] these days, it is a plain mistake to translate their word materialistische into

36

Thus, Yanagita’s approach resembles what Henri Lefebvre calls “the history of space”
that borders on anthropology and political economy (Lefebvre 1991: 116-117).
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yuibutsu. For, at least Marx neither ignores nor excludes mental activities in his
historical description. (Hayakawa 1970: 2-3)
Besides the fact that it is a remarkable statement for a person often characterized as a
cultural essentialist and an advocate of Japanese exceptionalism, he is here suggesting
that universal world history can be written and the history of Japan takes part of it. It is
not clear which texts he is referring to when he claims that Marx does consider
“psychological” dimensions, but regardless of whether his understanding of Marx is
correct or not, it indicates his positive estimation of Marx’s materialistische description
of history in terms of writing world history.
Second, Yanagita’s concern with the daily activities of the ordinary people closely
resonates with a famous passage from The German Ideology:37
[T]he first premise of all human existence, and, therefore, of all history [is] that men
must be in a position to live in order to be able to ‘make history.’ But life involves
before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other
things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these
needs, the production of material life itself. And indeed this is an historical act, a
fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, must
daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life. (Marx and
Engels 1978: 155-156)

37

The German Ideology remained unpublished until 1932, and it is unlikely that
Yanagita read it in the 1920s. My claim here is not that Yanagita was influenced by the
text but the theoretical concern he shared with Marx was captured in the quoted passage.
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Like Marx, Yanagita inverts the relationship between theory and practice and seeks to
ground human history on the daily activities of the productive class. His minzokugaku can
be described as an attempt to excavate a space in which this “historical act, a fundamental
condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, must daily and hourly be
fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life,” whose continual relevance, Yanagita
believes, is obscured by advanced social division of labor and the façade of spurious
urban civilization. According to this view, no material condition for human life is
naturally given, however natural or primitive it may seem to the eyes accustomed to the
visibly artificial space. Rather, it is human agency that creates and maintains them. The
anthropological space is a persistent, if obscured, reality that underlies even the most
advanced civilization.
Another piece of indirect evidence for the theoretical connection between Yanagita
and Marx is the fact that dozens of active or former Marxist student activists turned to his
minzokugaku in search of either a complement to or a substitute for Marxism. This is
partly because his minzokugaku provided an asylum for Marxist activists from the
government’s persecution, since, due to its apparent conservatism or political
innocuousness or Yanagita’s public stature as a former high-ranking government official,
minzokugaku largely eluded the increasingly intrusive official censorship and other
attempts by the government to muzzle potentially dangerous discourses. However,
historical evidence shows that those Marxists and former Marxists saw in his
minzokugaku not a convenient cloak but a true theoretical potential to complement or
supplant Marxism. The earliest example is Hashiura Yasuo (橋浦泰雄 1888-1979), who
met Yanagita in 1925 and from then on became his trusted lieutenant in the national

115

organization of minzokugaku researchers. He understood minzokugaku as a compatible
companion to Marx and Engels’ theory and saw no contradiction in being both Marxist
and a student of minzokugaku throughout his life (Tsurumi 1998: 19-65). Another
example is Fukumoto Kazuo (福本和夫 1894-1983), a leader and chief ideologue of the
Communist Party of Japan before his downfall from the party leadership in 1927. In 1942,
after serving ten-year term in prison, he met Yanagita, with Hashiura acting as
go-between, to ask for advice on a planned fieldwork of his own hometown in Tottori
Prefecture. Disillusioned with dogmatism and factional politics behind the communist
movement, and with the excessively paternalistic attitude of the Comintern in Moscow,
he also saw in the inductive methods of minzokugaku and its focus on kyōdo (more or less
equivalent to the American word hometown with a heavy rural connotation) a useful
correction to the dogmatism of the mainstream Marxist movement (Tsurumi 1998:
135-166). For other former radical students who completely parted with Marxism,
Yanagita’s concept of jōmin offered a volkisch alternative to the Marxian notion of the
working class (Tsurumi 1998: 67-105). As Tsurumi Tarō (1998: 14) points out, those
Marxist and former Marxist students turned to Yanagita for different reasons and their
relationship with him differ accordingly. Some, like Hashiura, became loyal disciples of
Yanagita, while others, like Fukumoto, remained independent. Yet all of them shared a
sense that his inductive methods and his notion of jōmin could be complements to or
substitutes for Marxist theory.38

38

Tsurumi Tarō (1998) documented the relationship between Yanagita and former radical
students. The episode is conventionally understood as proof of the capacity of
minzokugaku to embrace the diverse array of intellectual concerns as well as Yanagita’s
personal broad-mindedness toward differing opinions. However, Tsurumi points out that
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The theoretical affinity between Marx and Yanagita does not necessarily mean that
the former directly influenced the latter, and, given the lack of any direct evidence, it is
foolhardy to claim that Yanagita was consciously in conversation with Marx when he
wrote his texts. After all, their thoughts were the products of their respective space and
time and dealt with historically specific questions. Yet, even if such is the case, the
affinity itself constitutes an interesting puzzle: Why did those thinkers from quite
different backgrounds and ideological orientations come to focus on the anthropological
space? A possible answer is modernity. The answer relies on the assumption of a parallel
between Germany in the mid-nineteenth century and Japan in the early twentieth century.
Though this answer may not be totally off the mark, a more specific theoretical
connection emerges when we interpret Yanagita’s intellectual project as a critical
engagement with Mill’s philosophy of history. Mill identified both the people of the East
and the domestic laboring class in Europe as a stagnant portion of humanity. That is why
Marx’s efforts to rehabilitate the latter by excavating anthropological space is relevant to
Yanagita efforts to redefine the former as the subject in history, in spite of Marx’s own
prejudice against the East. Marx’s notion of the proletariat has a correspondence in
Yanagita’s concept of jōmin. They are both the direct producers of the material basis of
society. Another important concern both thinkers share is the relationship between
knowledge and the material basis of society. Both of them are critical of modern

the relationship between the master and his Marxist followers bears creative tensions.
Some of them came to challenge openly his methods and theoretical assumptions and his
reaction to them was often irritable and intolerant. A point of contention concerned
Yanagita’s reluctance to allow disciples to engage in theoretical debate, which reduced
them to the status of fieldworkers gathering data for him.
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knowledge precisely because it systematically exclude the subjective experiences in
anthropological space. In their view, any knowledge about human life, if detached from
anthropological reality, could be neither objective nor universal. And for both, the neglect
is not merely a product of the unfortunate negligence on the part of individual scholars
but a reflection of a larger social structure in which mental labor separates itself from
manual labor and gains upper hand. Therefore, the self-examining education of the
oppressed class becomes a key ingredient in their intellectual and political projects.
All of this does not mean that Yanagita is a closet Marxist. Just like his engagement
with Mill, the way he appropriates Marx’s thought, if he does it at all, is highly selective
and his overall ideological orientation stands in paradoxical relations to Marx’s own.
Yanagita’s historical narrative aims at relativizing and neutralizing class conflicts, instead
of embracing them as an inevitable aspect of and driving force for human progress. Most
likely, Yanagita found in Marx’s materialist view of history a useful correction to Mill’s
philosophy of history, but considered the Marxist theory as too abstract and Eurocentric.
Yet, even if he did not directly engage with Marx, the latter’s thought provides a useful
point of reference to understand, appreciate, and criticize Yanagita’s unarticulated social
and political theory.
At the same time, the affinity between Marx and Yanagita’s overall problematic
also brings differences between them into relief. It is these differences in similarity, not
the extent to which Yanagita’s thought is influenced by Marx that makes the comparison
between the two thinkers a rewarding endeavor. Probably, Yanagita himself was not so
much interested in theoretically engaging with Marx, or any other theoretical thinkers for
that matter, as in warning younger generations against the danger of an uncritical and
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imitative application of an imported theory to the case of Japan. After all, Marxism is
what Michel Foucault names as a prominent example of “totalitarian theories” (Foucault
1980: 80) that tend to disregard local particularities for the sake of abstract universality.39
In spite of his general sympathy toward Marxists’ concern with the oppressed class,
Yanagita would argue that the importation of another theoretical knowledge predicated on
the Western experience would simply reproduce in Japan the same kind of social conflicts
afflicting the Western societies. Thus, he would be repeating what he had concluded
about agrarian policy science: What was needed in Japan was not the importation of
Marxism but an endogenous theoretical and practical knowledge for resistance and
change. If he appropriated Marx’s historical view, he did so in the Millian spirit of
self-reliance.
Two clusters of differences can be identified as the most relevant to this study in
distinguishing Yanagita’s from Marx’s thought. First, Yanagita does not share Marx’s
belief that industrialization and urbanization is an inherently progressive, if morally
ambiguous in the short term, process. Rather, he embraces agrarian society as a model of
civilization. As discussed in the previous chapter, however, this does not mean that he is a
reactionary agrarian thinker, because he also believes that industrialization and
urbanization are desirable for Japan of his time. His appreciation of agriculture as a
quintessentially civilizational activity is rooted in a particular understanding of the
relationship between nature and human beings. The second cluster of differences
concerns the role of culture, or religion especially, in social integration. Unlike Marx, he
39

It should be noted that Foucault’s meaning could have been rendered as “totalizing,”
rather than “totalitarian,” theories. I thank Clement Fatovic for pointing this out to me.
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believes that religious beliefs and practices are essential ingredient for the reproduction of
material conditions for human existence—i.e., a historically specific form of human
space, because it is by the means of religion that the individualizing force of daily labor is
mitigated and a broader spatial and temporal horizon is secured, though tenuously. To use
the Marxian terminology, religious practices belongs to the base, rather than
superstructures, and the distinction between the base and superstructures is not the same
as that between matter and idea. However, it is not any kind of culture, but a set of
indigenous practices informed by a particular cosmology of agrarian society—i.e., an
understanding of the social and natural world—that contributes to the reproduction of the
material conditions. Such cosmology is inseparably embedded in and permeates the daily
and local political economy. Culture, in this sense, is specific to each material space.
Combined, the two clusters makes Yanagita’s anthropological space explicitly
heterogeneous in comparison with Marx’s. The heterogeneity of space is no longer
translated into historical stages and continues to be spatial differences contemporaneous
with each other. In other words, he re-spatializes global diversity temporalized by Mill,
Marx, and other Western thinkers and redefines each spatial division not as a stage of
universal history but as a container of its own time. As will be discussed later, this
procedure has far-reaching implications for his conception of global order.
In the remainder of this chapter, I elaborate further on the differences between
Marx and Yanagita’s anthropological space. The first section deals with the question of
labor and stagnant space that discursively connects Mill, Marx, and Yanagita’s thoughts.
The second section discusses Yanagita’s conception of the relationship between nature
and human space. Yanagita inherits the Western notion of civilization/progress as the
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conquest of nature by human agents, but not the belief that natural time and space is
inherently harmonious and orderly. As a result, his historical view lacks the teleological
and deterministic aspects of Marx’s progressivism. The third and fourth sections shift the
focus to the two major differences between the two thinkers and look into Yanagita’s
agrarianism and his concept of jōmin, respectively.

Stagnant Space and Labor
In the simplest form, the modern spatiotemporal order divides the world into
progressive and stagnant spaces and time is conceived quite differently in each space. In
the progressive space, time accumulates itself, so to speak, and the accumulation
sediments into history. The accumulation of time in this sense can be measured by the
continuous addition of extra units of wealth, knowledge, or other goods in general, and
progress can be defined as the accumulation of the good in a particular place. In the
stagnant space, in contrast, each unit of time becomes a spent force as soon as it passes
off, leaving a few traces behind. Time does not sediment, but dissipates in the air. The
stagnant time can be described as cyclical, recurrent, or repetitive, or, alternatively, time
itself is converted into a space, since the past, present, and future look almost identical
with each other. When Mill declares that non-Western space did not have history, he
means that the world outside Europe belongs to the stagnant space in this sense. And, he
is afraid that the advent of democracy could put a brake on the accumulation of time and
that eventually the history of the West, and with it human history itself, might come to
standstill.
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Mill’s otherwise surprising equation between the future of Western democracies
and the sclerotic ancient civilization of China, mentioned in the previous chapter,
becomes comprehensible if it is understood to reflect his concern with the possible
decline of Western civilization. The threat he felt came not from outside but from within,
as his main concern was the entry of the laboring class into politics. While championing
the cause for the extension of franchise to the working class, he was at the same time
apprehensive about the prospect of the uneducated masses’ becoming the preponderant
majority and exercising tyrannical power over minorities by means of class legislation
and social pressure (Mill 1991: 8-9). Thus, whereas he considered political participation
to be a necessary instrument for the education of the general public, his democratic
theory introduced many safeguards against the tyranny of the majority. The social form of
the tyranny of the majority would be particularly dreadful for him because the laboring
class, he feared, was more prone to be complacent with the status quo and not progressive
enough to keep society from descending into conformism and mediocrity.
Arguably, Mill’s skepticism toward the laboring class derives from the notion that
labor is a merely reproductive activity to satisfy the recurrent bodily needs of the
individual.40 The products of labor are consumed as soon as they are produced and leave

40

In Principles of Political Economy, Mill distinguishes productive and unproductive
labor. According to his classification, productive labor is that which adds material wealth
to society, whereas unproductive labor is that “which does not terminate in the creation of
material wealth; which, however largely or successfully practiced, does not render the
community, and the world at large, richer in material products, but poorer by all that is
consumed by the labourers while so employed” (Mill 1967: 50). He denies the view that
unproductive labor is necessarily wasteful, but points out that “its use may consist only in
pleasurable sensation, which when gone leaves no trace; or it may not afford even this,
but may be absolute waste” (p. 50). While expansion of unproductive labor is a mark of
civilization, since it means that an increasing potion of labor is used to satisfy wants of
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no trace behind. In other words, the laboring class is the faceless denizen of a stagnant
space with no history to tell. The space to which the laboring class belongs is a China
within, so to speak, now threatening to take over the progressive space of the West.41
Then, Mill’s liberal theory could be understood as an attempt to gradually incorporate this
stagnant potion of the population, the barbarian within, into a progressive nation without
the latter being absorbed into the former. Western civilization he desired to defend was
actually the fruit of “remarkable diversity of character and culture” (Mill 1991: 80)
nurtured and protected under the decentralized aristocratic political system. With the
advent of democracy, he feared, it would be run over by the faceless and homogeneous
horde of laborers. As a result, his acceptance of democracy only comes on the condition
that the development of individuality is shielded from the tyrannical majority by the
protection of individual liberty. He expected that private autonomy protected by law
preserves oasis of aristocratic virtue in the flat social landscape of democracy.
Not surprisingly, therefore, Mill’s notion of liberty and progressive agency is
highly individualistic. Social progress is a function of the genius of a few exceptional
individuals, who, against the social conventions of their respective times, blaze a new
trail for the less ingenious part of humanity. What separates those independent-minded,

the community other than mere living, he believes that unproductive labor should not
outpace productive labor.
41

In an interesting twist, therefore, now China, and the East in general, did not represent
the past but a possible future of the West. To put it differently, what is allegedly in the
past/East is actually present within the present/West. Beate Jahn (2005) points out that
Mill’s image of the barbarian is a projection of the internal other of the West. “Indeed, the
barbarian is civilization’s historical self, its contemporary other, its internal other, and its
future self” (Jahn 2005: 610).
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convention-defying, eccentric, or even aristocratically insouciant persons from the rest is
the critical use of reason. Instead of accepting received knowledge blindly, they examine
them critically, explore alternative ideas, and experiment them in action. Their geniuses
work best when they are insulated from mundane concerns that preoccupy the minds of
the ordinary people. Even though their contemporaries often misunderstand and vilify
them, it is they who lead the rest of humanity in the long run into a higher stage of
perfection. Mill argues that Europe was able to pull ahead of the rest of humanity in the
developmental race precisely because its decentralized social and political institutions
offered refuge for talented individuals from social pressures and political persecutions.
On the contrary, in China and the entire East, overbearing government and society robbed
individuals of opportunities to develop their individuality and withered their potential
talents. As a result, society as a whole suffered from the shortage of progressive agency,
unless on rare occasions overambitious despots came on the scene and dragged society
out of its sleep by force.
To Yanagita, Mill’s view on progress must have had disturbing but not easily
refutable implications. According to this view, the apparent permanence and the
predominance of labor in rural life might be a proof of its stagnant nature. Moreover, it
was difficult to argue that rural communities were hospitable to the development of
individuality and experimentation with new ideas. Quite to the contrary, they were known
for the pervasiveness of oppressive social norms, which were often contrasted to
individual freedom enjoyed in cities. In a similar vein, the rural population was depicted
as the mass of anonymous laborers who clung to inherited customs out of the irrational
worship of the old. In order to rehabilitate rural space as a site of progress, Yanagita
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needed to redefine labor as a progressive activity. It is for that purpose that Marx’s view
of history may have offered Yanagita a useful hint. However, Yanagita’s anthropological
space differs substantially from Marx’s in various aspects, and the difference can be
traced back to his conception of the relationship between the natural and the human.

Time, Nature, and Human Space
Anthropological space is the realm where human life reproduces itself. It is not a
static space, though. For both Marx and Yanagita, that is where progress is being made.
However, Yanagita’s conception of space and time in anthropological space differs from
Marx’s in an apparently subtle but quite consequential way. For Yanagita, time is neither
the succession of empty and homogeneous moments in which history unfold itself nor a
preordained journey to a given destiny. Instead, it is full of contingency, unpredictability,
and ruptures. Even nature is not immune to drastic changes. In his travel writings, he
often notes that natural conditions, which seem permanent from the limited perspective of
an individual, have constantly been changing. Sometimes, natural disasters such as
earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, or volcanic eruptions suddenly and radically change
natural landscapes. Other times, a river gradually shifts its course or silt piles up in a
narrow strait converting an offshore island into a cape. Animal populations also wax and
wane. A passage from one of his travel writings reads:
It is not only the human world that is changeable. The rapid mutability of nature is
equally surprising. Humans grow up in a fixed way, look for spouses, have children,
and perish. The so-called four seasons of human life are rather well regulated.
Greed and hunger are permanent as well. Such a drastic change as to turn a
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mulberry field into the blue sea cannot be observed in the human world. In
comparison with this, the future of the natural world is by far more uncertain.
…The mutability of the animal world deserves grievance dozens of times as much
[as that of the human world]. Whereas the traces of human beings fills day by day
the space between the site of placenta burial in Dōkan Mountain and the cemetery
in Yanaka and Somei [which marks the western and eastern edges of the north
Tokyo metropolitan area], changes in the natural world are but transient as
everybody neglects and forgets them. (“Mame no ha to taiyō.” Teihon 2: 328-329)
Thus, Yanagita inverts the conventional relationship between nature and man-made
space: Now nature represents transience and society permanence. Nevertheless, he does
not think that the relative permanence of human space is a matter of course. Rather, it is
only by means of human agency that a lasting spatial order is maintained. In fact, where
he and his Romanticist friends in the literary circles had once seen pristine nature, he now
sees the traces of human intervention. In allusion to Musashino (武蔵野 1901), an
influential Romanticist essay in which Kunikida Doppo (国木田独歩), then a close
friend of Yanagita, eulogized the unspoiled beauty of the Musashi Field outside the west
of Tokyo, Yanagita writes:
The oak forest on the border with the village that Mr. Kunikida loved was actually a
human artifact made in the early modern period, not a remnant of the [pristine]
Musashi Field. Two ri [approximately eight kilometers] northwestward from
Shibuya, oak trees are replaced by cedar trees. Because cedar trees especially stand
close to houses and are carefully administered, no one mistakes them for naturally
grown, although they look old. The same can be said of the oak trees. Because there
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was such high demand for fuel in Edo [the old name of Tokyo] as to ship [firewood]
from Izu Ōshima [an island in the Pacific], farmers in the neighboring areas, upon
calculation, often found it advantageous to plant trees for fuel, instead of clearing
and cultivating the land. (Teihon 2: 334)
In other words, what seemed a primeval forest to the urban literate class turns out to be a
product of a commercial enterprise of rational farmers and an important part of the
economy of urban civilization. Similarly, Yanagita is emphatic that the rural landscape of
agricultural society, which seems to the urban literate class natural or closer to the state of
nature, is actually a deliberately created and carefully maintained spatial order.
That nature is more mutable than human society does not mean that human life is
fully regulated and hence predictable. On the contrary, the vagaries of time affecting
human space is one of the persistent themes of Yanagita’s travel writings. In a most
poignant section of Yukiguni no haru (雪国の春 Spring in the Snowy Country, 1920), for
example, he records his surprise in finding that a family-owned small inn he had stayed
during his travel to Tōhoku six years before disappeared without any trace. After
inquiring the fate of the owner family from villagers, he learned that it was abandoned
after the ship the husband was aboard never returned and the wife had moved to a town to
work as a domestic servant, and that two children were now separated from her (Teihon
2: 105-111). Not only individual families but also entire town or villages meet a similar
fate. Prosperous port towns, which attracted sailors and prostitutes throughout the country,
disappeared without leaving almost any trace, because the construction of a railroad
nearby made sea transportation suddenly unprofitable. However, the decline often takes
the form of the slower and invisible unraveling of spatial order, largely due to unintended
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consequences of internal changes. Like Fortuna in Machiavelli’s The Prince (1992:
67-69), Yanagita’s time is fickle and unreliable, and even if subdued for a moment, for
the next it threatens to sweep away human traces accumulated in space. The best humans
could do is to be vigilant against any sign of danger, prepare for the worst, and pass on to
coming generation lessons learnt from past experiences.
For Yanagita, therefore, labor is not merely a mindless and instinctive activity to
satisfy the recurrent bodily needs, but also a conscious collective effort to carve out and
preserve human space out of unpredictable nature. This conception of labor draws
Yanagita closer to Hannah Arendt’s critique of Marx. She distinguishes “work” from
“labor” on the ground that the former, unlike the latter, “provides an ‘artificial’ world of
things, distinctly different from natural surroundings” (Arendt 1998: 7). Those man-made
artifacts are not immediately consumed, but are intended to outlive those who produce
them to make part of the world into which their successive descendent are born.
Yanagita’s conception of labor clearly embraces both “work” as well as “labor” in the
Arendtian sense.42 As a result, the product of collective labor, human space itself, is no
longer a faceless, homogeneous one. On the contrary, each space has its own human face
and a distinctive history behind it. It is not mass-produced products but “works.”
In Yanagita’s view, therefore, rural space is far removed from the state of nature.
Indeed, it is an advanced form of political space created by the collective will of a
community and maintained with the greatest possible precaution and care. As he inverts
42

It is arguable that Arendt interprets Marx’s notion of labor in an unduly restricted way.
After all, the accumulation of capital, which is constantly reinvested into the means of
production, is central to Marx’s theory. For a critique in this line, see Pitkin (1998:
127-144).
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the relationship between the natural and the human, the assimilation of the latter into the
former does not guarantee permanence. Rather, it is by means of human active
intervention that some degree of permanence is achieved, albeit tenuously. Therefore, a
task of historiography, he claims, is “a study of human power vis-à-vis nature” (Teihon
16: 168). This sounds Marxian, but, because of his notion of non-linear time, his
progressivism lacks a teleological element characteristic of the Western historiography
during the nineteenth century. As a consequence, his historical narrative is less
deterministic because the prospect of human progress depends on nothing but human will
and action. And for him, the primary form of this historical agency is labor—that is, an
act of working in and on nature. Thus, his historiography has more affinity, not with
Marx the structuralist, but with Marx who emphasizes the subjectivity of members of
classes. Thus, from the late 1920s on, Yanagita shifted his attention from policy science
to historiography and, with the help of minzokugaku methods, attempts to write a less
deterministic history of human progress that count in the agency of those who are
denigrated as stagnant peoples. The unrecorded history excavated in this way, he expects,
would serve as the reservoir of self-knowledge—viz., knowledge of one’s relations
within and to society and nature, and a practical instrument in political resistance against
the imposition of the modern spatiotemporal order.

History without Proper Nouns
To excavate the anthropological space is to write a history of anonymous persons
who collectively produce the material conditions of life, but are never counted as the
subject in history in the conventional biographical history, whose main focus is
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extraordinary events and individuals. Because the dominant form of life before and
outside modernity is agriculture, the majority of those anonymous persons are farmers.
Yanagita points out that they are often represented in old paintings by the myriads of the
Japanese phonetic alphabet he (へ), because of the shape of the woven hat they wore, or
pill-like circle in the background (Teihon 25: 10). In other words, they are comparable to
the repetition of the same symbols, lacking individuality altogether. They matter only in
quantity, not quality, and their life makes no difference in the self-perfection of humanity.
As such, they do not have any history. However, he points out, each of those represented
by a he or circle was the head of a respectable household and political leader back in their
hometowns (p. 10)—the mid-size farmer, in other words, who had constituted the core of
Japanese civilization. Yet, urban artists and historians systematically misrepresented them
as little more than passive elements in the background against which various dynasties
waxed and wane through the heroic actions of prominent figures. For the urban class,
history exclusively belongs to the class of nobles and warriors with proper nouns, not to
anonymous peasants. The situation did not improve much in Yanagita’s time, when
modern knowledge, while exalting the value of the individual, reinforced the preexisting
prejudice against agricultural laborers, as attested by a quip given by a professor of
Japanese history at the Tokyo Imperial University, when one of his students expressed his
interest in the history of peasants: “My dear, do pigs have history?” (Irokawa 1996: 35).
It is against this backdrop that Yanagita felt the need to write “history without proper
nouns.”
History without proper nouns is primarily an antithesis to the conventional
historiography in Japanese official academic institutions. The latter is mainly concerned
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with great historical characters. The history of nobles and warriors is taught in classroom
throughout the country as national history, and, as a result, the experience of peasants is
completely left out from it. Therefore, history without proper nouns is a history of rural
communities in which ordinary peasants have never ceased to be toiling on land to
produce and reproduce spatial order until this day. At the same time, theoretically it
assumes collective, not individual, agency in the creation and maintenance of political
order and can be opposed to the Millian theory of progress, or any kind of political theory
that presupposes the abstract individual at the basis of political community. In a sense,
rural communities are to Yanagita what Greek and Roman republics are to such Western
republican thinkers as Machiavelli and Rousseau—exemplary models from which both
positive and negative lessons can be drawn—but his rural communities have neither
written down laws nor identifiable individual legislator—no Lycurgus or Solon, no
Romulus or Numa. Instead, unwritten customs and traditions function as law and
“legislation” is a collective act of innumerable and anonymous individuals, both dead and
alive.
The major difficulty, however, is the lack of written records of the ordinary life of
the common people. Most old documents pay scant attention to the daily life of the rural
population, and if they do, they are written from the perspective of the center and are
blatantly biased. Moreover, most preserved records belong to either the late ancient or the
early modern period, when the Japanese archipelago was pacified by a relatively
centralized government, but scarce written records are preserved from the war-ridden
middle age, when Yanagita believes the foundation of autonomous rural communities was
laid under a decentralized feudal system. Because of this bias in preserved historical
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records, the philological approach only yields urban-centric history, usually concerned
with politics at the center. Meanwhile, another kind of historiography, based on
archaeological methods, is mainly concerned with the distant past and its empiricism is
often compromised with wild speculations about the origin of the Japanese race. What is
missing is the history of rural Japan, in which innumerable communities, unknown to the
central authority and the urban class, established themselves as small and relatively
independent republics throughout the country and gradually expanded human
space—namely, the history of Japanese civilization.
His attempt to rewrite the history of Japanese civilization begins with his
reengagement with the agrarian problem in two books published in the late 1920s, Nihon
nōmin shi (日本農民史 The History of Japanese Peasants, 1926) and Toshi to nōson (都
市と農村 City and Village, 1929). In them, he adopted an explicitly historical approach
to the same agrarian problems addressed in his earlier writings by tracing the long-term
historical process, in which agrarian society was differentiated into the urban and rural
sectors and corresponding social classes. Although his historical account does not follow
the substance of Marx’s theory of class struggle, the general style and methods have an
affinity with the Marxian approach in a broader sense that they center on the evolution of
productive activities and corresponding social relations, rather than a series of events that
mark the rise and fall of succeeding governments or acts of extraordinary individuals. It
is a history in which human collectivities gradually and imperfectly conquer their natural
environment to satisfy its basic needs, but not without generating unintended
consequences.
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Yanagita’s further experimentation with the history without proper nouns results in
Meiji Taishō shi: Sesō hen (明治大正史

世相編 The History of Meiji and Taishō

Periods: Social Aspects, 1931). In the preface to the book, he explains that his project
derives from the premise that “respectable history can be written simply on the basis of
the cross section of modern life, that is, facts that appears and disappear everyday before
our eyes” (“Meiji Taishō shi sesō hen.” Teihon 26: 129). The book traces the history of
the lifeworld subjectively experienced from generation to generation by the ordinary
people. It consists of fifteen chapters, apparently arranged to zoom out from the most
personal to the most collective experiences. It begins with the history of what the
common people see and hear (the colors and shapes of things and sounds surrounding
them), what they eat (food), what they live in (housing), and then moves to the history of
their immediate environment including landscapes, relations within and between
communities, communication and transmission of culture between communities, the
function of sake in social life, the art of love and marriage, and the household. The tenth
to the fourteenth chapters deal with questions of the national dimension such as
production and trade, labor distribution, poverty and disease, associations and
self-government, and political leadership. Yanagita further clarifies his intention in the
preface:
[B]ecause of the dissatisfaction with the conventional biographical history, this
book intentionally avoid mentioning any proper noun… Therefore, Sesō hen is not a
book about what heroes thought and did. It concerns only what common persons
[jōnin 常人], who fill every corner of this country, can see and hear if they open
their eyes and listen intently, and expresses nothing but opinions that occurs to them
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when they meditate a little. I would be troubled if someone views it as the
imposition of the diagnosis of an observer with a unique standing. I am in no way a
person proud of one’s own knowledge, but my opinions are a little bit more original
than these [presented in the book]. However, I think it dishonest to force them by
the name of lecturing history, and I did not. (Teihon 26: 130)
In other words, Yanagita is claiming that even the subjectivity of the author is sacrificed
to write a history acceptable to all. Though the claim of objective history sounds naïve
today, it suggests his conviction that the common experience of the ordinary people
should be the foundational basis of history.
Generally, the book tells the history of improvement, perhaps with the notable
exception of political leadership, as he suggests that although many things have been lost,
“what has been gained during the sixty years of Meiji and Taishō is certainly more than
what has been lost” (Teihon 24: 226). However, he points out, both gains and losses are
not necessarily the results of deliberate plan and coordinated actions but the unintended
consequences of uncoordinated behavior of individuals and are not without negative
effects on the overall welfare of society. Then, the final chapter exhorts readers to be
active and conscious agents, “public citizens [kōmin 公民]” (p. 414), in determining their
own fate. The uncharacteristically optimistic diagnosis is likely to be the result of the fact
that the book has been written not to convey his own view but opinions that are
acceptable to all, but the underlying message is clear: The common people have been
making progress without the help of extraordinary individuals or a paternalistic
government, but the accelerated pace of social change is outdoing their consciousness.
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Yet, in the preface to the book, Yanagita concedes that the book was a failure.
Although originally he thought it possible to write an objective history solely relying on
information conveyed in newspaper articles, it turned out that “real society is far more
complex than is reported [in overabundant news articles] and newspapers only cover a
portion of it” (Teihon 24: 130). Therefore, he was forced to abandon newspapers as the
primary source of data and resort to “facts that the reader knows and I also know” (p.
131) and adopt “methods of listing up facts that nobody dare refute so that there is no
need to verify the sources” (p. 131). It seems that partly because of this experience that he
felt keenly the need of systematizing the methods of minzokugaku. Instead of newspaper
articles, minzokugaku relies on an extensive network of fieldworkers who gather relevant
information according to the classificatory scheme laid out by Yanagita in two manuals
for minzokugaku research, Minkan denshō ron, (民間伝承論 Theory of Oral Traditions,
1934) and Kyōdo kenkyū no hōhō (郷土研究の方法 The Methods of Hometown Studies,
1935). Minkan denshō ron and kyōdo kenkyū are two names Yanagita used to call the
academic discipline he tried to establish before he accepted, somewhat reluctantly,
minzokugaku as its official name in the mid-1930s. In other words, minzokugaku is a
method for historiography that excavates the unrecorded history of social progress and its
agents—namely, those who produce human space by working in and on nature. For
Yanagita, they are true progressive agents and legitimate owner of a national space. He
gives them the name jōmin—i.e., the common people. Before examining the concept of
jōmin, however, I now turn to his agrarianism to understand the theoretical underpinning
of the concept.
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Agriculture and Civilization
One of the most obvious difference between Marx and Yanagita is the latter’s
preference for agricultural society over industrial society. In spite of his criticism of
agrarian country-ism, he does prioritize agriculture as the basis of the national economy
and political community in his own way. Therefore, he does not share Marx’s conviction
that cities represent a more advanced form of civilization, and favors agrarian society as
the model of civilization. In Nōgyō seisakugaku (Agricultural Policy Science, 1902-1903),
he already describes agriculture as the integrative fabric of the “modern” state/nation:
The state is composed of a people and a territory. Territory is neither a mere
container of a people nor the means to make known the reach of the sovereignty [of
the state]. It constitutes an element of the state by itself. … In order to connect a
people with territory, it is necessary to settle them on land. Settlement on land is
nothing but an element of the existence of the state. The state in the modern sense
would not be established without settlement. The origin of the settlement is, in turn,
agriculture. In other words, what connects a people to land is agriculture. Floating
elements [fuyū bunshi 浮遊分子] among the national population increase as
agriculture wanes. Agriculture is the anchor of the nation [kokumin 国民]. (“Nōgyō
seisakugaku.” Teihon 28: 302)
Another passage from Jidai to nōsei (Our Time and Agrarian Policy) emphasizes the
integrative function of agriculture more explicitly by connecting the individual, the
household (ie 家), the village (mura 村), and the state/nation: “If one likens the
organization of the national economy to a machine, agriculture is its cogwheel as well as
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its conveyer belt. If one look out from one end to the other, from a nation formed by
villages, which are composed of households, which, in turn, are organized by individuals,
the most important warp thread running through them is agricultural production” (“Jidai
to nōsei.” Teihon 16: 9). According to this view, the defining element of the state/nation is
farmers who work on land, and relations of what he calls “floating elements”—i.e., those
who do not settle on land and do not engage in agriculture—with the state/nation is
tenuous at best.
Yanagita emphasizes agriculture in part because in his time Japan was still
dominantly agrarian society and the rural population constituted the majority of the
nation. However, there seems a deeper philosophical reason for his agrarian bias. In his
view, the relationship between nature and human beings is discernible in a most direct
and transparent way in agriculture. In other words, agriculture is a quintessential
progressive activity. Human labor cannot create anything from nothing, and the
production of material goods is little more than spatially rearranging physical substance
and energy existing in nature in a way that creates products useful for human needs. In
this sense, all essential goods necessary for the production and reproduction of human life
are the products made out of nature. Thus, the physical environment constitutes both the
basis of and the limit to productive activities. Agriculture reveals most directly this dual
relationship between nature and human beings. Unlike hunting and gathering, agriculture
not only extracts goods from nature but also deliberately renews available resources.
Agricultural society is the producer of the rural space but at the same time a product of
the natural environment. It transforms nature, but at the same time has to adjust itself to
the rhythm of nature beyond human control.
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Agriculture is also the primordial form of human labor in the sense that almost
everyone used to engage in it to satisfy her essential needs. In other words, in the early
phase of human civilization, “the history of peasants was almost the entire socioeconomic
history” (Teihon 16: 165). A passage from an early text reads:
In the past, agriculture [nō 農] was not, strictly speaking, an occupation [waza or
gyō 業]. … [In the seventh century] land was distributed [by the government] so
that the people could support themselves, not that each individual occupied it in
order to make a profit by the use of free choices. Because of this, from the highest
rank of aristocrats to the lowest class of servants, everyone was entitled to his
portion [of land]. Each individual offered a part of the fruits of their labor to the
government and supported himself with the rest. Only those who had extra energy
to spare for other works engaged in industry and commerce. Industry and commerce
were already occupations from the beginning … but that agriculture used to be what
should be called the only condition of life. (“Nōseigaku.” Teihon 28: 206; see also
“Nōgyō seisakugaku.” Teihon 28: 330-331)
Meanwhile, agriculture is also a womb of civilization in another sense—that is, arts and
sciences, industry and commerce, leisurely activities, the literate class, the state, and
other products that characterize urban space. Agriculture makes it possible to accumulate
surplus and channel it into other uses than reinvesting in the production of essential goods.
The accumulation of surplus wealth results in the differentiation of social structures and
the emergence of social classes other than farmers. In this transformation, the state of
“natural economy” gave way to a more complex socioeconomic conditions and political
institutions and to the emergence of lettered classes and full-time artisans and merchants,
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although, Yanagita points out, the majority of farmers continued to “eat what they
cultivated, wear what they wove, and demanded little other than what they produced by
themselves” (p. 206) until the Meiji Restoration of 1868.
However, in his view, even in the most advanced civilization, economic activities
ultimately boil down to the exploitation of nature for the sake of satisfying human needs,
and human beings depend on nature for all essential materials to sustain their life.
Commerce and industry, no matter how far they develop, cannot sustain human life
without food and raw materials, the bulk of which is produced by farmers. If the growth
of non-productive activities in cities outpaces productive activities in villages, the
accumulation process is reversed, resulting in the decline of civilization. Furthermore,
alienation from agriculture has a profound effect on the psychology of urban dwellers:
In my imagination, the fact that [urban residents] do not make what they wear, eat,
and live in by their own hand, that is, the helplessness of being separated from the
production on the soil, makes people suddenly insecure and sensitive. Today, one
can assert vehemently that trade is for mutual benefit and one does not have to give
without being given, but various kinds of articles used to be very different in the
degree of indispensability. It is self-evident that an owner of commodities that can
be done without, that have substitutes, or whose consumption can be delayed, if he
wants to exchange them for food indispensable even for one day, cannot afford to
wait idly for a the other party to come. … Every transaction in trade is either one of
two cases: passive or active. It is the party with greater needs that actively seeks for
transaction, and this is equally applicable from trade in Nagasaki [where Dutch
merchants were granted an exclusive right to trade with Japan] during the period of
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national isolation to peddlers who wandered from one village to another. (“Toshi to
nōson.” Teihon 16: 250)
According to him, therefore, urban aggressiveness to seek agricultural products on
favorable terms stems from this weakness. In Yanagita’s view, the rapacity of the
metropolis, from Western colonialism to the exploitation of the rural population by cities,
is driven by this psychological insecurity.
In Toshi to nōson (都市と農村 City and Village), he spells out a historical narrative
in which villages are favorably compared to cities. According to it, the construction of
Japanese cities was a project made possible by peasants’ enthusiasm toward it. They
readily sacrificed their labor for them, and in exchange found consolation in the pleasure,
the beauty, and the comfort provided therein. They felt some sort of ownership and were
proud of towns to which they themselves made contribution. As such, Yanagita even calls
a city “the spiritual hometown [kokoro no furusato 心の故郷]” (Teihon 16: 243) of rural
folks. However, as cities lost contact with their rural origin, they became a purely
parasitic existence living off of productive labor of the rural space. Thus, Yanagita again
inverts the conventional relationship between cities and villages: “Many medium- and
small-size cities are unable to strike out in a new direction except by coaxing subsidies
and uselessly leave the prosperity of the land up to the unhealthy consumption trade. That
is because their existence depends on the strength of villages through their residents
coming and going freely. People assert the decline of villages, but it is cities that are far
more mutable and transient” (“Toshi to nōson.” Teihon 16: 246). Moreover, because the
continuous influx of immigrants from the rural area, substantial portions of the urban
population considered themselves to be temporal residents and did not share the burden
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of preserving urban spatial order. Unlike a village, therefore, a modern city was an
amoeba-like organism, lacking a center, and was not equipped with institutions to form
collective will. In short, it is not a political community in the sense that a rural village
used to be. “A town,” Yanagita complains, “is nothing but an agglomeration of residences
and a container that can hold both water and oil, whereas a collectivity in a village is like
fabrics with a invisible figure on it and newcomers must be woven into this figure”
(Teihon 16: 188). In spite of its artificial appearance, therefore, urban life looks closer to
the state of nature, where each individual concerned with the satisfaction of one’s own
needs at the expense of the public good.
Yanagita suggests that the public spirit found in rural residents is due to the fact that
the time horizon of the individual perspective is broader in rural communities. For
example, in villages west of Tokyo, Yanagita notices that the ladder set to climb the
scaffold to bang a fire bell in the case of emergency was made of a conveniently forked
cedar tree. It turns out that it is not a naturally grown tree, but villagers grow them
purposefully. Upon this discovery, he observes:
In order to grow a tree of the height of a fire-bell scaffold, it takes at least more than
thirty years. It would be a nonsensical plan for those who are intent on siphoning
off the fortunes that will be made by the coming seven generations or issuing
high-interest bonds unredeemable for fifty years. Yet the senior members and others
in those villages, in the same manner that we [the modern urbanite] worry about the
provision of tomorrow’s portion of rice, foresee the future of the villages along with
the future of the trees, and plant them from now in order to detect a fire in an
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adjacent village, bang the fire bell, and call on it to express their sympathy. (“Mame
no ha to taiyō.” Teihon 2: 326)
In other words, in contrast to the selfishness and shortsightedness of the modern and the
urban, who do not hesitate to live on money borrowed from future generations, villagers
rather sacrifice themselves for their unseen descendents. It is worth emphasizing that this
is the reversal of the statist view expressed in his early writings, according to which the
farsighted bureaucracy was expected to complement the shortsightedness of society. He
continues to offer another example involving an even longer temporal horizon:
Even more surprisingly, in Nasu Mountain of Hyūga region, a bridge is suspended
by the longest vines tied to huge cedars standing at the four corners of the bridge.
Although the cedar trees, to all appearances, are eighty or ninety years old and still
look strong, a young cedar tree of good quality, which seems to have already passed
several dozens of years, is planted in each corner of the bridge, next to the old one.
Thinking that the entire village may have been replaced by a new generation by the
time those trees grow up to be useful, it came home to me how much village life
takes its time in doing things. Maybe some people, at listening to this story, think
that it is an instinctive act just like an insect inserting its ovipositor into a fruit. Yet,
even if farmers are so deprived of consciousness, we must admit that it is even
more significant an event that the world has changed so much as to overturn such
instinctive prediction. (p. 326)
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Again, Yanagita contrasts the lengths of the time horizon in rural communities with that
in modern cities. Villages are ready to sacrifice the present for the future, while cities the
future for the present.43
Thus, Yanagita redefines rural space as a product of progress—a spatial order that
human agency creates, maintains, and protects from the tyranny of time. Labor no longer
dissipates in the air, but accumulates into space. And, maintaining a spatial order vis-à-vis
unpredictable time requires will and action supported by critical ability, caution, a
broader time horizon, and courage to experiment with new things, the proof for which
Yanagita takes every pain to excavate in the history of rural communities. Therefore,
where conventional wisdom observes the passivity of rural life, he finds active will
formation and collective action to carve out human space out of nature. Any lasting rural
communities may be stationary, but cannot be static, because given the vagary of natural
time, stationariness must be a deliberate choice. And their conservatism cannot be another
name for blind obedience to customs.
The activity of rural life is obscured precisely because its time horizon is unusually
long—that is, “unusually long” by the standard of modern life—and the exercise of
human agency is diffused into a broader time span and a complex web of many
individuals unknown to each other. In contrast to Mill, therefore, Yanagita has to argue
43

The long time horizon does not mean that the rural population always made right
decision. Rather, Yanagita observed that with the wisdom of hindsight, history seems full
of wrong decisions, which results in the unraveling of spatial order. “Their judgment is
not always happy one,” he writes. “Looking back from now, there are at least several
cases in which one wonder whether it is a mistake to have taken this path, whether that
path could have been taken” (“Nihon nōmin shi.” Teihon 16: 163). However, this is a
corollary of underdetermined history and what matters to Yanagita is the extent to which
decisions are made consciously.
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that it is a collectivity of anonymous persons, not a few eccentric individuals emancipated
from the need for labor, that plays a progressive role. This is in part because the two
thinkers have different emphasis in their respective conception of progress. For Mill, on
the one hand, progress is defined in terms of the discovery of new possibilities, which are
not expected from what has already been known. On the other Yanagita’s emphasis is
place on the continuous accumulation of what is already known as good by past
generations.44 Yanagita does not necessarily deny the role of individuals, but suggests
that the final outcomes of individual innovations are not necessarily what original
innovators ever intended it to be. One example is his discussion of the impressive
diffusion of the cultivation of sweet potatoes in Japan during the early modern period.
Introduced to Japan in the early seventeenth century, sweet potatoes became an
indispensable staple in the Japanese diet. After citing the names of individuals who
allegedly contributed to the proliferation of sweet potatoes, he asks to what extent those
individuals knew beforehand the social benefits this innovation would bring about. His
answer is:
I think that at least that [achievement] was an effect unexpected [by individual
innovators]. … [i]t seems that they merely thought that sweet potato could be at
best a supplementary food to farmers’ rice in lean years or a means to alleviate the
hunger of those who were banished to islands. Yet, today, it is being cultivated in
quite extensive regions and has become an agricultural product that not only the
banished but also everyone invariably plants and eats even in normal years. Such a
44

I thank Clement Fatovic for pointing out to me the important difference between Mill
and Yanagita’s conception of progress.
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change in [human] life can rightfully be called a great undertaking. However, it
was designed and achieved by no particular person but by two hundred and dozens
of years. (“Kainan shōki.” Teihon 2: 224).
On the basis of these observations, he wonders whether “the diffusion of sweet potato
was really achieved by great persons, or human need to live inexpensively partly
contributes to the popularity of a crop like this” (p. 225). To put it differently, individuals
may play a role in the discovery or diffusion of knowledge or technology, which catalyze
major social change, but ultimately it depends on socially perceived needs, not the
intention or preference of innovators, which knowledge or technology are accepted and
adopted at the social level. In other words, society, and not individuals, is the final judge
of innovations. Thus, rationality is not a natural property of the individual but is exercised
within and in relation to community.
Yanagita’s agrarianism also has an implication for the question of diversity.
According to him, the most radical difference exists among agrarian ways of life, partly
because agriculture is more directly conditioned by diverse natural conditions and partly
because human responses to the imperative imposed by nature are fallible and therefore
diverse. In other words, the basis of global diversity is not a mere difference of culture, if
by the latter term is meant the ideational realm of social life. Instead, it is the
earthboundness of human life and a constant struggle by humanity to free itself from
spatial confinement that produces diversity. Thus, Yanagita once again inverts the
conventionally understood relations between the urban and the rural. Now it is the rural
that possesses individuality, whereas the urban tend to become faceless and homogeneous
everywhere. It follows that as the entire society moves from agricultural to
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industrial/commercial, it loses its distinctive character. The convergence, however, comes
with the negative effects of the abstraction from reality, as increasing numbers of
individuals feel alienated from both society and nature. The resulting cosmopolitan
society would be a society of faceless individuals suffering from a simmering sense of
insecurity.

The Concept of Jōmin
In the late 1920s, Yanagita started to use the term jōmin (常民) to refer to
progressive agents misrepresented by the urban literate class as stagnant people. It is one
of the rare abstract concepts he routinely uses in his writings and it is understood as a key
element in his thought, so much so that one’s appreciation of his thought, to a substantial
degree, depends on how one interprets this confusing concept. It is composed of two
Chinese ideographs. The latter half of the word, min (民), stands for people or folk, while
the first half, jō (常), stands for permanence as well as commonness. Yanagita’s own
English translation of the word seems the common people, but he never clearly defined
the meaning of it and his use of the word is not quite consistent throughout his career.
Although it sporadically appears in earlier texts, it is most heavily used in those texts
written from the late 1920s to 1940 (Itō 2002: 122-123), when he attempted to establish
the discipline of minzokugaku. In early texts, it was used to refer to farmers inhabiting
plains to distinguish them from the inhabitants of mountains, but in the later period it has
acquired more positive attributes (Iwamoto 1983: 172). Itō (2002: 123) also points out
that the use of jōmin becomes more sporadic as another word kokumin (国民), whose
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standard English translations include a national people or nation, appears more frequently
in the text written from 1940 on, thus suggesting some conceptual connection between
the two terms.
What makes jōmin a complex concept is the uneasy coexistence of two meanings.
On one hand, it can be understood as the Japanese rendering of the economically
exploited class with a rural connotation. On the other hand, it is associated with the
German concept of Volk, a classless and culturally or ethnically homogeneous nation.
Yanagita himself explains that it is rather the British connotation of common and folk that
he wanted to incorporate into the term. When asked in an interview (Minzokugaku ni
tsuite: 179-180) why he chose jōmin, instead of shomin (庶民), a more common Japanese
term for the ordinary people, he replies that the latter was deliberately avoided because it
connotes something “inferior than us, lower than intellectuals [interi インテリ].” In
contrast, the British people are emphatic, in fact too emphatic, he points out, because of
their desire to underplay class division within the British nation, that the word common or
folk in English does not have a connotation of being low or base [iyasii 卑しい].
Therefore, jōmin is not a totally class-neutral notion, at least in the original sense
(Iwamoto 1983: 187-188). Rather, it is intended to give a collective identity and a
respectable name to a class of people who are economically exploited, culturally
denigrated, and politically misrepresented, and it is consistent with his political project to
recognize the agency of the rural population. Water is muddied, however, when, in the
same interview, he makes a perplexing statement to the effect that jōmin includes the
members of the Imperial Household as well as the wives of nobles and feudal lords, but
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apparently not their husbands. It is equivalent to say that the British royal family and the
wives of the nobles are also commoners and risks rendering any kind of class connotation
meaningless. Even worse, the identification of the sovereign ruler with jōmin resonates
with the ultranationalist discourse of the volkisch nation during the prewar period.
Interestingly, Yanagita fully elaborates the concept for the first time in a report on
the welfare of natives in Mandated Territories, submitted to the Permanent Commission
of the League of Nations.45 The mandate system was established after the First World
War to administer territories, mainly former German colonies and regions formerly
belonging to the now dismembered Ottoman Empire, in Africa, the Middle East, and the
Pacific. In the report, Yanagita identifies the chief beneficiary of the mandate system to
be what he calls “the common people” or “the common body,” apparently a translation of
jōmin. No precise definition is given in the text, but he excludes from it certain classes of
residents in mandated territories—those of mixed parentage, foreigners, the heads, chiefs,
and notables of tribes and local communities, and those who received foreign education
and learn to speak foreign languages (Iwamoto 1983: 184-185). Thus, the category of
jōmin does exclude ethnic others, but also is narrower than an ethnic group, as it also
excludes indigenous power holders and a class of people in position of mediating
between the foreign ruler and the native ruled.

45

“Welfare and Development of the Natives in Mandated Territories.” Annexes to the
Minutes of the Third Session, Thirty-Second Meeting, Permanent Mandate Commission,
held at Geneva from July 20th to August 10th, 1923, League of Nations. It seems that
Yanagita wrote it in Japanese and have it translated into English. The English translation
is included in Yanagita Kunio zenshū 26: 64-82. The Japanese original text seems to have
been lost.
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The ethnic marking of jōmin becomes further blurred when Yanagita reintroduces
the concept into the history of Japanese rural communities. Again, Yanagita does not offer
a clear definition, but provides some criteria. First, the core of jōmin consists of regular
farmers who directly work on land, whether their ownership is legally acknowledged or
not by the central authority. It does not include village chiefs and notables, resident
Buddhist or Shintō priests, government officials, or other lettered classes sent from
outside. Also excluded are landless peoples, such as wandering peddlers, craftsperson,
entertainers, and sorcerers and sorceresses, who temporarily reside in or near a village. In
other words, they are a middling, not lower, class between power holders and those
whom he once called “floating elements [fuyū bunshi 浮遊分子].” The similarity
between the middle-size farmer [chūnō 中農] in his agrarian policy science and jōmin
immediately comes to mind. The former is defined in terms of the size of their holding,
not large enough to spare the owner from the trouble of involving themselves in
agricultural labor, but not too small for them to achieve self-sufficiency with respect to
essential goods. It is a class largely innocent from the taste for luxurious goods. Yanagita
believes that they once constituted the middle core of pre-national agrarian society and
should do so in the modern nation. Equally, he suggests that jōmin is the defining element
of the nation. However, jōmin is a broader category in the sense that it includes farmers
with holdings of any size, as long as they are direct producers—that is, they directly work
in and on nature. Thus, the attachment to land seems the first criterion of jōmin.
The second criterion is literacy. Jōmin are either illiterate or semi-literate and are
opposed to the lettered class. Yanagita’s suspicion with priests of established religions
partly derives from the fact that they are literate. And, in all likelihood, the inclusion of
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wives of nobles and feudal lords in the category of jōmin is partly because of the fact that
many women from the upper class remained generally illiterate or semi-literate. His
apprehension of lettered classes seems attributable to the fact that written languages
contain more terms imported from abroad than spoken languages and have served
instrument of the dominant classes. In his report to the Permanent Mandate Commission,
he turns particularly skeptical eyes to native translators who mastered the language of the
colonizer, because he believes they tend to identify themselves with the master rather
than their own brethrens and are more accurate at communicating the intention of the
colonial masters to the natives than the demands and grievances of the latter to the
government. Generally, he fears that those who received Western education constitute a
distinct class occupying the dominant position within local society because of their ties to
a foreign authority. The same is also true for the case of Japan. At the level of a village,
priests of universalistic religions traditionally constitute such a class. At the national level,
however, the entire lettered class may fall into this category of “translators.” Their
language system is heavily influenced by China in the ancient period and by the West in
the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. They know better about foreign
civilizations than about their own found in the rural area, and serve better in
communicating foreign ideas to the natives than the other way round. Modern-day
scholars and bureaucrat-intellectuals are not exceptions.
Yanagita does not intend to keep jōmin illiterate for the sake of their cultural purity,
but he is worried that the existing written language has a built-in bias against jōmin.
Because written language is an abstract representation of reality that can cross borders
with ease, it is relatively autonomous from material conditions. Particularly, “for any
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people [minzoku 民族], the capital city and the court were always the utmost entry-point
for foreign cultures, and it is the characteristics of our cities to quickly grasp and apply
them and keep moving from one new thing to another” (Teihon 16: 274). Because of the
cultural hegemony of cities, however, the representation of reality is taken for reality
itself. He fears that the articulateness and verboseness of the urban literate class puts the
illiterate class at a disadvantage and makes it easy prey for cultural colonization.
Therefore, the advent of public education and literacy in the rural area is a mixed blessing
in the sense that a language system taught thereby systematically misrepresents the rural
population and inculcates in the rural youth a sense of contempt for their parents and
themselves. A purpose of minzokugaku, therefore, is to restore self-esteem to the
denigrated population by transcribing unstated reasons for what is misrepresented as
“superstitious,” “irrational,” and “ignorant.”
The third criterion for jōmin is ancestor worship. As is the case of mid-size farmers,
jōmin are the collective preservers and transmitters of cultural values. As discussed in the
preceding chapter, ancestor worship and the household are identified by Yanagita as
critical institutions to maintain political order. Instead of a state bureaucracy, ancestor
worship and the household emerge as key social institutions that counter the
individualizing effect of urbanization and broaden the temporal and spatial horizon of the
members of society. Thus, agriculture, the household, and ancestor worship are an
inseparable triangle of political order in rural space. Indeed, he believes that the center of
a stateless—namely, lacking the centralized government—rural community is religion by
means of which the popular will [min’i 民意] is periodically confirmed by the members
of a community.
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For Yanagita, ancestor worship is also a defining element of the Japanese national
character. He finds that the actual practice of ancestor worship, which he believes is the
pristine form of the Shintō religion, is extremely decentralized, but still shares a certain
degree of uniformity throughout Japan, indicating a common origin of the practice. He
links this commonality to rice-cultivation culture (inasaku bunka 稲作文化). On the
basis of this assessment, he hypothesizes that the Japanese people are the descendents of
immigrants who arrived at the southern islands and gradually moved northward with rice
plant in their hands, and that even when the history of this internal migration is forgotten,
the memory is conserved in the common religious practice. Therefore, jōmin can be
understood as the reservoir of the historical memory of the Japanese people and the
legitimate representative of Japanese civilization.
Yanagita’s perplexing statement that the Imperial Household also belongs to jōmin
seems to derive from such a meaning of jōmin. Although the members of the Imperial
Household are neither farmers nor illiterate, he believes that they are descendents of those
who served as mediators between the divine and the human in an ancient agrarian society.
In other words, the Japanese emperor is not comparable to European emperors or kings,
as the founders of the modern Japanese state attempted to portray, but closer to the
farming class. Although the advancement of the social division of labor and the
functional differentiation of occupations resulted in the professionalization of the clerical
classes, on the one hand, and internal division of the clerical class into subclasses of
officially recognized priests/priestesses and a socially stigmatized wandering
sorcerers/sorceresses, on the other, the similarity between artifacts and rituals indicates
that they share the common origin. The common origin does not mean that they share the
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same religious doctrine or sacred texts, but that they both catered to the spiritual needs of
jōmin. In other words, it is jōmin and the material conditions they live in that largely
shape the contents of the religion, not vice versa. In this sense, Yanagita’s apprehension
of imported religions parallels his concern with imported languages. It is spurious
universalism, other-worldliness, and abstract notions of humanity, rather than foreignness
per se, that makes them dangerous to political order. On the contrary, his appreciation of
the Imperial Household seems to derive from his hope that it could serve the purpose of
nation-building, not as a sovereign ruler, but as a useful symbolic center of a fractious
nation of jōmin.
Finally, from this understanding of jōmin, Yanagita’s special emphasis on women
becomes less perplexing. As a matter of fact, a concrete model of jōmin he has ever
mentioned is his own mother, Matsuoka Take. She was semi-literate and because of her
illiteracy was largely innocent from the abstract knowledge possessed by her husband.
However, Yanagita personally witnessed that his mother’s “common sense” was socially
more effective than his father’s knowledge of Confucianism and Shintō. In an interview,
he suggests that women like his mother played an important role in the governance of
rural communities:
If one half of the village were the intellectual class and the other half the
uneducated, the village would naturally be led by the former. But, if the entire
village consists of the non-intellectual class, except a resident Buddhist or Shintō
priest, what moves the village is the judgment of those without knowledge [mushiki
no mono 無識の者]… There used to be women who could say respectable things
… there used be such women among those who could not write. In fact, my own
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mother never wrote a letter throughout her life because she feared that her children
would laugh at her, but she had an excellent memory and was good at detecting the
defects of others and correcting them…. I must confess that I still admire my
mother. She gives reasons [rikutsu 理屈]. She says them with such poor words that
they would not make any sense if written down literally, but she was able to
convince others with such reasons. Such reasons are a dominant force, not only
until the early days of the Meiji period, but also after elementary schools were built.
(Yanagita Kunio Taidan shū: 185)
In his view, women, and not men, possess more jōminness for various reasons. First,
women are laborers, at least as much as men are. As a matter of fact, Yanagita, who often
turns compassionate eyes in his travel writings to the plight of women exploited by their
fathers and husbands, suggests that they are burdened with a disproportional share of
labor in both senses—that is, they not only work on land as men do, but also bear and
rear children. Second, they are also the chief guardians and transmitters of customs and
traditions in rural society and the chief educational agents concerning ethical values.
Indeed, Yanagita believes that women used to play a central role in the Japanese
religion, chiefly as mediators between the divine and the human, because they were
recognized, even by male counterparts, as more innocent of vices. In his assessment,
women’s role becomes more important when many men work away from home during a
good part of a year as seasonal workers. For example, he concludes the essay “Yukiguni
no haru (雪国の春 Spring in the Snowy Country)” as follows: “Will the tradition [of
nightly story-telling by the fireside] eventually become extinct? Or will it continue for
long as unspeakable bliss? [The continuity of the tradition] ultimately depends on what

154

young women in the snowy country study and is influenced by the flow of their emotion.
As a growing number of men are far away from home [to work in cities as migrant
workers], time for contemplation has come. The maintenance of calmness and beauty in
spring of the snowy country has long been put into the hands of women” (Teihon 2:
16-17). Paradoxically, therefore, it is the confinement of women to what is today
categorized as the private sphere that makes women formidable agents in anthropological
space.
Jōmin is a quite amorphous concept with blurred boundaries, but its defining core is
consistent with Yanagita’s project to rehabilitate the subjectivity of the people without
history. It is the name of the neglected subjects in history who carve out human space
from nature. Or still better, it is not so much the subject as a spatial category, “a constant
womb” (Irokawa 1996: 17), from which the subjectivity of human beings are nurtured.

Diversity in Uniformity
There are two theoretical implications in Yanagita’s turn to anthropological space as
a true site of human history. The first implication is the reconsideration of the role of
labor in human progress. The Western intellectual tradition long denigrated labor on the
ground that its aim is the satisfaction of recurring bodily needs. Protestantism and
Lockean liberalism partially reversed this tendency, but not without individualizing the
cause and effect of labor. Against this intellectual tradition, Marx rehabilitates collective
labor as the driving force for progress. In a broad context of intellectual history, it can be
argued that Yanagita’s thought belongs to the post-Marxian discursive field. The second
implication of his turn to anthropological space is the location of human agency.
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According to him, it is not the individuality of eccentric individuals, as is expected by
Mill, but the diverse individuality of collective life that provides the basis of global
diversity. Equally, it is not the reason possessed by the solipsistic individual but collective
rationality that conditions knowledge production and human progress. Therefore, it is not
enough to guarantee individual rights to exercise one’s own reason, and, in consequence,
the explanation for diversity expands from the purely biological and psychological to the
social and institutional dimensions of opinion-formation and political judgment. As a
result, deductive theories relying on abstract conceptions of human nature must be
replaced by inductive theories based on historical experiences of concrete human
institutions.
However, Yanagita’s anthropological space differs from Marx’s in two crucial
aspects. First, it is not uniform but heterogeneous space, partly because of diverse natural
conditions to which human life must adapt itself and partly because of the fallibility of
human intellect. In his view, human life is inevitably cultural from the very beginning and
there is no universal history of humankind that could be deductively constructed from
any hypothetical conception of human nature. For him, therefore, human history is a
history of various collective experiments whose successes and failures inscribed in space,
and diversity is but an inevitable outcome from these varying experiments. In that sense,
global diversity is not a reflection of diverse humanities, but diverse expressions of a
common humanity, which is not easily dissolved into an abstract and individualistic
notion of humanity.
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CHAPTER IV
CIVILIZATION AND WANDERING

Yanagita’s minzokugaku provides methods to excavate a progressive history of
jōmin. However, there is another motif in his minzokugaku: the history of wandering
people (hyōhakumin 漂白民).46 Tsurumi (1998: 250-255) identifies seven categories of
wanderers that appear in Yanagita’s historical narratives: 1) disseminators of religious
faith such as wandering priestesses/priests (miko ミコ/hijiri ヒジリ); 2) groups of
technical experts such as makers/repairers of brushes, baskets, straw rain-capes, or
umbrellas, producers of wooden tableware known as kijiya (木地屋), or founders and
smiths; 3) performing artists such as blind bards (zatō 座頭), dancers/singers/prostitutes
(yūjo 遊女), monkey showmen (sarumawashi 猿回し), lion dancers (shishimai 獅子
舞), and puppeteers (kugutsushi 傀儡師; 4) mountain people (yamabito 山人) including
mysterious nomadic peoples known by the name of sanka (サンカ); and 5) travelers such
as Sugae Masumi (菅江真澄) and Matsuo Bashō (松尾芭蕉);47 6) professional

46

My argument in this chapter is partly informed by Tsurumi Kazuko’s (1998: 240-274)
reconstruction of Yanagita’s theory of social change in terms of interaction between
settlement and permanent and temporary wandering. “On the one hand,” she writes,
“jōmin, as settlers, are awaken and invigorated by encounters with wandering people. On
the other, jōmin, who usually live in a fixed place, are prompted by some opportunity to
embark on temporary wandering and expand intellectual horizons and regain vitality. In
order for jōmin to be agents for social change, either they theselves have to go through
the cycle of settlement-wandering-settlement and/or they have to experience shocking
encounters with wanderers” (Tsurumi 1998: 246).

47

Tsurumi distinguishes permanent and temporary wanderers. The latter refers to
temporary travelers who have fixed places of residence and travel back and forth between
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wanderers such as peddlers and those who travel in search of livelihoods—i.e., seasonal
workers and migrants; and 7) deities (kamigami カミガミ) that travel between
mountains and villages in flat land or between different communities. They are known by
various names but all of them except deities are what Yanagita once called “floating
elements” (“Nōgyō seisakugaku” Teihon 28: 302) within the state living on the margin of
agricultural civilization. In his own words, they are “anyone but those who belong to the
classes of court-nobles, samurai warriors, priests, monks, and peasants—in other words,
the entire class that do not make a living off land” (“Iwayuru tokushu burakumin no
shurui.” Yanagita Kunio zenshū 4: 500). Lacking land to cultivate, wanderers are
condemned to cross borders from one place to another to supplement their livelihood
with a tiny share of surplus agricultural products in exchange for whatever they could
offer. Even when they settle in, they become the objects of systematic discrimination on
the part of jōmin, often marked as racially or ethnically distinct or even less than human.
Yet, they maintain their shadowy presence and play a crucial role throughout the history
of jōmin precisely because of their lack of spatial affiliation. From the point of view of
jōmin, wandering people are strangers, but at the same time they are the major link to the
outside world. In Yanagita’s view, their existence is “the most important factor in the
transportation of culture” (Teihon 24: 402) and it is through them that a common culture
has been transmitted from one place to another throughout the Japanese archipelago and
possibly beyond. In other words, they unintentionally serve as a countervailing force
against the innate parochialism of semi-autonomous republics of jōmin.
it and other places. She suggests that Yanagita himself may belong to this category
(Tsurumi 1998: 252).
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Hyōhakumin are in many senses the Other of jōmin—the “barbarian” within, so to
speak, in agrarian civilization. First of all, they are the external other who comes from
outside and does not belong to jōmin’s space. However, they also constitute the internal
other, because they represent the suppressed self of the civilized—mobile, free from
monotonous labor, and unbound by overbearing social norms, although their freedom
comes at the cost of the material and psychological security offered by civilized life. Yet,
they are also the temporal other of jōmin in the sense that they are what jōmin used to be
before they settled on land and what they will become if they are severed from the soil.
As such, wandering people also provide a link to the forgotten memory of the past, when
the Japanese people arrived at the Japanese archipelago and spread over, and to the
imminent future, if, as Yanagita fears, the disintegration of rural communities continues.
Although they are defined as the opposite of jōmin, wandering people, in
Yanagita’s historical narratives, are far from being a superfluous population parasitic of
agricultural civilization because their relationship with jōmin has a certain degree of
mutual complementarity in the history of civilization.48 Overall, the livelihood of
wandering people depends on the explicit or implicit admission on jōmin’s part that their
community cannot be a completely closed system because of its embeddedness in a wider
spatial order that exists prior to the foundation of their own republic. Historically,
founders of any agricultural community must come from some other place. Although
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Tsurumi identifies three aspects of the relationship between wanderers and jōmin. First,
wanderers are the object of discrimination and contempt. Second, however, they are
partners in commerce and exchange, as they offer the products and services not produced
in villages. Third, they are the objects of admiration because of their association with the
spiritual world (Tsurumi 1998: 246-249).
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jōmin’s consciousness of the pre-foundational origin is often expressed in mythical terms,
their communities have passed down, from generation to generation, oral traditions
indicating that their ancestors had been wanderers, personified by either mythical heroes,
noble princes banished from Kyoto, or defeated samurai commanders, before they settled
in. Even relatively new villages often try to embellish their ancestry by linking their
foundations to nationally renowned personalities. Spatially, jōmin recognize that their
control over what happens within their space is limited and does not hesitate to resort to
some external intervention whenever necessary. Even deities other than their own are
invited to solve a problem at hand, be it draught, epidemics, or insect plague, if such
deities are deemed more capable of doing it.
However, it is the question of birth and death—that is, where each person comes
into this place and where he or she goes afterward—that persistently besieges the mind of
the civilized people but cannot be addressed in the context of daily life. For Yanagita, the
question of afterlife is not simply an otherworldly concern because he believes that the
material reproduction of a this-worldly community would be impossible without giving
some answer to the question, lest the living would lose the sight of a reason for all
sacrifices demanded for the preservation of civilized life. The daily life in civilization, in
which humans struggle to satisfy immediate needs, exercise an inexorable evervating
effect upon human vitality, because the immediacy of everyday life’s goal tends to
individualize the temporal and spatial horizons of the laboring class and alienate them
from nature and community in spite of the embeddedness of their existence in the latter.
Yanagita finds that the monotonous and repetitious days of labor (ke ケ) are punctuated
by seasonal festivities (hare ハレ) in which all the members of a community share in
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commemoration of local deities (ujigami). The temporal suspension of social statuses and
contacts with outsiders (wandering priests/priestess, entertainers, artisans, beggars, etc.)
often characterize hare occasions, serving as a reminder of the situatedness of one’s
existence in larger temporal and spatial contexts. What is more interesting,
etymologically, the concept of the political (seiji 政治) in Japanese was associated with
that type of collective religious practice (matsurigoto 政). In other words, hare is a
moment to confirm “the exchange and chain of affection and yearning [aibo no kōkan to
rensa]” (Teihon 16: 218-219), which motivate people to sacrifice the present for the
future, the individual for the communal.49
The consciousness of the pre-foundational origin and the impossibility of fulfilling
spiritual, or psychological as Yanagita rather would term, needs in the sphere of daily life
create demand for goods and services that can only be provided by outsiders, and
wandering people, associated with the outer space that exists prior to civilization, are
particularly suitable for that purpose. From jōmin’s point of view, therefore, wandering
people are linked to a larger cosmos with which the finiteness of their own communities
is contrasted. In other words, jōmin’s attitude toward hyōhakumin reflects their
consciousness of openness of a particular community to a wider spatial and temporal
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Yanagita documented various practices associated with the distinction of hare and ke
in Shokumotsu to shinzō (食物と心臓 Food and the Heart) and other writings, but did
not develop coherent theory and concepts of the distinction. My account of hare to ke
draws on the work by Sakurai Tokutarō (1987), one of Yanagita’s disciples. Sakurai
proposes that the term ke was originally understood as life energy or vitality and kegare
(ケガレ, 穢れ), the term ususally understood as uncleanness or impurity, often
associated with menstruation, originally meant the drying up (kareru 枯れる／涸れる)
of ke. Hare is an occasion to replenish the lost energy. See also the discussion by
Trsurumi (1998: 257-261).
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order from which all good and bad things beyond its control come. Thus, wandering
people are attractive as well repellent to jōmin.
On that account, it is not surprising that Yanagita’s representation of wandering
people as the mirror image of jōmin reflects his ambivalence toward civilization and
progress. He recognizes that the civilization of jōmin, whose progressive history he tries
to excavate, does not escape the tendency toward conservatism, conformism, and
mediocrity, and hence decline.50 Moreover, material and psychological security in
civilized life comes at a price: It demands the sacrifice of individuals for the sake of the
common good. As a young poet, he was influenced by European Romanticism and his
initial engagement with wandering people, especially yamabito, seems to be motivated, at
least partially, by his desire to project the image of the internal other of the civilized self
into external others. In the course of his intellectual evolution, however, his Romantic
identification with wandering people gave way to an effort to integrate them within a
common historical narrative, in which both jōmin and wandering people are assigned
proper places in the progressive history of human civilization, and, as a result, the
division between them is dissolved in the flow of time. The theme of wandering is even
more important for this study because he incorporates temporary wandering—i.e.,
traveling—as a method for knowledge production and political education.
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Yanagita comments on oppressive social norms prevalent in agrarian communities as
follows: “Conformity to the opinion of the majority means lapsing into mediocrity.
Because people tend to favor an old known way whenever they have to choose, it takes a
lot of persuasion and patience to introduce a new species of crop or adopt a new
technology. Overall, persons with progressive ideas are put down. Therefore, there is
little hope that human talents are utilized. Then, often time an entire village suffers from
ignorance” (“Nihon nōminshi.” Teihon 16: 186).
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The importance of wanderers in Yanagita’s thought is relevant to the question of
space and time discussed in the preceding chapters. His re-spatialization of global
diversity risks dividing anthropological space into small, semi-autonomous communities,
each governed by a distinctive spatial order, and the possibility of communication
between them is severely restricted by the exclusion of those “contaminated” with foreign
culture. As a result, even an allegedly homogeneous nation like Japan is redefined as a
radically heterogeneous space tenuously held together by the coercive means and
monetary incentives dispensed by the modern state and a spurious universalistic culture
invented by the urban literate class. Yanagita’s search for an underlying commonality in
the heterogeneous national space led him to the cosmological world of jōmin, but
wandering people played a crucial role in unifying and invigorating it. In his historical
narrative, the Japanese medieval period, from the late twelfth to the early seventeenth
century, witnessed the decline of the relatively centralized Yamato dynasty, the
dissolution of large manors, and the emergence of a large number of displaced people,
and the establishment of small, self-governed agrarian communities.51 Yet, those
semi-independent republics of farmers were also loosely connected through a common
culture transmitted by wandering people. His interest in wandering people partly derives
from the peculiar role that they played in the cultural unification and refinement of
Japanese civilization.

51

In a passage, Yanagita speculates that from two thirds to three fourths of the
approximately 180,000 villages that exist in his time were founded during the Middle
Age (Teihon 16: 173).
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For Yanagita, the dialectical relations between sedentary civilization and wandering
are not a past event but a continuing process to his day. The saturation of the countryside
with the growing population has forced many farmers to abandon their own native lands
and emigrate to cities, but the persistence of parochial identities of jōmin and the
urban-rural divides, aggravated by the advent of modernity, prevents the rational
reorganization of national spatial order. In his assessment, the overscription by the state
bureaucracy and the urban literate class of an abstract national space upon a
heterogeneous one is interrupting the spontaneous development of a national culture
nurtured in interactions between settlers and wanderers. As an alternative to
nation-building from above, Yanagita exhorts jōmin to exile themselves temporally from
their own communities, explore the neighboring villages and beyond, and compare
diverse ways of life without any presumption of superiority of one’s own. He expects that,
just like wandering people before them, traveling researchers can play a leading role in
the production and dissemination of a common national culture.
The task of this chapter is to clarify the role that Yanagita assigns to the act of
wandering in his unstated theory of civilization and method of knowledge production.
The first section examines the major source of his wariness toward civilization—that is, a
Malthusian notion of spatial limits to progress. Given this limit, progress eventually
reaches the point at which the accumulation of human time in space comes to standstill or
is even reversed. However, this spatial limit is partially overcome by those who brave the
uncertain fate of wandering to find a new land. Therefore, the second section reconstructs
his unstated grand historical narrative in which local Malthusian traps are overcome by
successive waves of emigration and the imminent return of cyclical time in human
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history is temporarily averted by the spatial expansion of human civilization, if not before
civil wars and foreign interventions brought misery to the vanquished. The third section
turns to the question of wandering people and their dialectical relations to jōmin. In the
fourth section, I will explain how the methods of Yanagita’s minzokugaku are built upon
his historical narrative introduced in the preceding sections. The final section offers
concluding remarks about how his methods redefine the relationship between global
diversity and universal knowledge.

Spatial Limit to Progress
As shown in the previous chapter, the major aim of Yanagita’s project is to write
the progressive history of “historyless” people. Yet, his historical narratives lack any
teleological element and progress is not regarded as an automatic or preordained journey
to a given destiny. Instead, his narratives are almost always marked by innumerable
setbacks, many of which are the unpremeditated consequences of well-intended human
actions. For example, a passage from Momen izen no koto (木綿以前の事 Before the
Advent of Cotton, 1939) reads:
We cannot blame our ancestors for not being thoughtful enough even if [their
decision] eventually results in an unendurably bad outcome after the passage of
years. We can only learn one thing from their experience: that in the human world
controlled by chance in so many ways, we cannot afford to be at ease assuming that
progress is always heading for the good. Even a forceful trend, in which all the
people are streaming in one direction with nothing in their way, or a change of a
nation apparently as smooth as the growth of a tree or the downward flow of water,
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carries loss and gain, if one ponders it calmly. Even if one does not regret the loss
because one does not notice it or just leaves it alone because it is no use regretting,
the end of that long thread [of our ancestors’ decision resulting in an undesirable
outcome] is nothing but the reality before our eyes and dogs us around. (Teihon 14:
11)
Chance, so much emphasized by Machiavelli and deemphasized by subsequent modern
political theorists, is a crucial element in Yanagita’s conception of history, because while
negating the possibility of any self-sustaining order, it also creates room for human
agency. In his view, civilization, understood as “the conquest of nature by human agents”
(Teihon 28: 292), is impossible without active human action and complacency is a sign of
corruption.
Even though Yanagita is critical of many aspects of civilization, he seems to
maintain an optimistic attitude toward modernity and is ready to defend the Meiji
Restoration and subsequent social change (e.g., Teihon 16: 167-168). Nonetheless, he is
not convinced that civilization is universally good. As Tsurumi Kazuko aptly describes,
“Yanagita is well aware that social change and modernization is full of paradoxes. His
way of thinking is not linear. Whenever there is something revealed, there are always
concealed things. With every good thing there comes a bad thing. He always sees internal
connection between the revealed and the concealed, the good and the evil. … One of his
assumptions is that nothing gets better or worse without a contrary effect” (Tsurumi 1998:
232-234). Neither does he believe that the consciousness of the people keeps up with the
consequences of such complexity of social change and modernization. To the contrary, he
suspects, the dissolution of households (ie) and villages (mura) and resulting
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individualism makes it harder for them to regain collective control over social change and
hence puts in jeopardy spatial order that made civilization possible in the first place.
Atomized individuals tend to make decisions without much meditation on the possible
consequences beyond their immediate spheres, and causal relations between their action
and its effects are lost in a myriad of unconscious individual decisions. The result is the
loss of control by human collectivities over their own fate. As a result, the increase of
individual freedom comes at the expense of collective freedom from the contingency of
life and the continual accumulation of human time in space is interrupted.
A main source of Yanagita’s wariness to sanguine progressivism is a Malthusian
notion of the natural limits to progress. According to Malthus, “the increase of population
is necessarily limited by the means of subsistence” (Malthus 1992: 43) and the
improvement of material conditions will at some point reach its limit. When that point is
reached, the population growth is checked by famine, disease, and war. A famous passage
from Malthus’ An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798) reads:
Famine seems to be the last, the most dreadful resource of nature. The power of
population is so superior to the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man
that, unless arrested by the preventive check, premature death must in some shape
or other visit the human race. The vices of mankind are active and able ministers of
depopulation. They are the precursors in the great army of destruction, and often
finish the dreadful work themselves. But should they fail in this war of
extermination, sickly seasons, epidemics, pestilence, and plague, advance in terrific
array, and sweep off their thousands and ten thousands. Should success be still
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incomplete, gigantic inevitable famine stalks in the rear, and with one mighty blow,
levels the population with the food of the world. (Malthus 1992: 42-43)
That is because space is far from being infinitely malleable to human will and sets
conditions to human existence. First of all, productive activities require the exploitation
of nature, but natural resources available for human exploitation are not limitless. New
scientific knowledge and technological innovations temporally expand the exploitable
frontier, but they have not been able to completely get rid of the spatial limit on human
life as long as humans are bound to the Earth. The Malthusian wariness is a persistent
theme throughout Yanagita’s writings and seems to constitute an implicit literary plot in
his historical narratives.
Nevertheless, Yanagita does not accept Malthus’ diagnosis uncritically. In his own
diagnosis, the scarcity of arable land and hence the means of subsistence, observed in
some localities, is attributable to artificial spatial divisions hindering the movement of
labor. In an essay titled “Japan’s Population Problem” (1925), he criticizes Malthusian
theory in the following terms:
A scholar by the name of Malthus who lived one hundred years ago was so
aggrieved to witness this kind of scarcity before his eyes that he even tried to
predict that people would eventually be forced to reduce their number by one means
or another because of the limited means of subsistence. Given that the earth’s
surface is finite, it is mathematically correct to say that there is a limit to population
growth. However, scarcity observed until today is not an outcome after a new way
of production and distribution has been attempted. Way before reaching that point,
the anxiety of scarcity and competition emerged within one narrow class or region,
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and that produced enough misery among people. When nations only harbors
animosity toward each other and cannot taste their own happiness but by
comparison with the suffering of others, this misery torments us even more easily.
(“Nihon no jinkō mondai” Teihon 29: 107)
Yanagita goes on to argue that the population problem has acquired a global dimension
partly because of international order based on the territorial sovereign state. A passage
from the same essay reads:
As a matter of fact, many discussions on the population problem start from the
assumption that such an international organization and mode of territorial
possession as exists today is fixed and unchangeable. If movement between one
country and another were not restricted and people could move freely, like the wind
blowing in the air or the current running on the surface of the ocean, there would be
no need for a nation or two to passionately inquire into population policy and,
accordingly, it would take long before the entire world needs to treat
[overpopulation] as a problem. (p. 97)
Furthermore, he blames Western colonialism and the enclosure of global “ownerless”
land for the problem of local scarcity in a country like Japan. He continues:
Whereas it is known that there has long been a demarcation between “our land” and
“their land” within a county or a municipality and it is not easy to borrow [land],
even if it is more spacious in one and wanting in the other, there was, until quite
recently, a swath of supposedly ownerless land in the international space and any
people [minzoku 民族] desiring a piece of it just set out and took possession of it.
Japan … was a little bit late in setting out, and the vast North Asian continent has
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become Russian territory and many Pacific islands British and French, etc. As a
result, … there has emerged a stark national difference between country A, which
possess spacious land in relation to population, and country B, such as Japan, in
which the population problem becomes an issue demanding an urgent solution. (p.
97)
Thus, in his diagnosis, the enclosure of global open space by sovereign states and
colonial powers artificially hastens the advent of the Malthusian limit to human progress
in some nations. In other words, the immediate barrier to further progress is not natural,
as Malthusian theory suggests, but man-made. As such, it can be changed by human
agency.52
It is worth remembering that he applied a similar diagnosis to the problem of
persistent poverty in the Japanese countryside in his writings on agrarian policy science.
The population problem is an unintended consequence of past progress but it is
aggravated by maldistribution of land resulting from fixed and rigid boundaries between
communities and between private properties. And, one of his proposed remedies is the
redistribution of land and the creation of independent, mid-size farmers and promoting
region-based small and mid-size cities absorbing the surplus labor eased out from
agriculture. In other words, Yanagita’s solution to the agrarian problem is to redraw the
existing boundaries and rationalize the use of land from a wider—that is,
national—spatial perspective. Also, it should be reminded that in the early texts, he
52

Ironically, the first victims of the localized Malthusian limit would be the most
advanced civilizations whose progress induced rapid population growth in the past.
Yanagita does not explicitly state this, but not only Japan, but also China, India, and other
densely populated civilizations in Asia would have been the case.
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conditioned the claim for territorial sovereignty on the productive and efficient use of
land to support human life. Indeed, he once seriously considered whether the emigration
of Japanese peasants to uncultivated land in the Pacific islands as a means to alleviate, if
not solve, the population problem in Japan (e.g. “Imin seisaku to seikatsu antei” Teihon
29: 80-81). His complaint about the enclosure of global space by Western colonial
powers can be understood in this context. For him, colonial empires are equivalent to
landlords who amass large tracts of arable land to the exclusion of many landless people.
He is well aware that given international cultural hierarchy and racial prejudices,
his proposal for the rational allocation of labor to land—that is, migration of landless
people to underutilized space—was even less likely to be accepted by international
society. In an editorial of Tokyo Asahi, for example, he expresses dismay at the enactment
of the US act of immigration of 1924, which bans the entry of Japanese immigrants:
Even in such a humiliating and disappointing moment, we were able to pick up
invaluable [lessons from the] experience… First of all, there have been thick
national boundaries within humanity up to today; second, friendly relations between
the civilized nations adorned with colorful diplomatic language are not without a
silly limitation of politicians’ convenience; and finally, the lofty ideal of
international mutual aid among the working class turns out to be a mere token
slogan, and one party not only is an onlooker of a misfortune of the other but also
actively guard against and try to expulse the latter. (Teihon sup. 1: 6)
On the basis of the observation, he concludes that “at least in the present day, [mutual]
aid based on patriotism [aikoku shin 愛国心] is necessary for our own happiness” (p. 6).
In other words, as long as the principle of territorial sovereignty remains sacred, the
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problem of overpopulation must be solved within the framework of a nation-state, rather
than by appealing to lofty but hollow internationalism, either liberal or socialist. In the
long run, however, he is hopeful that the accumulation of knowledge about common
humanity and the elimination of racial prejudice will facilitate a “rational” solution to the
premature closure of human progress caused by the enclosure of open space.
Nevertheless, such a notion of common humanity must be inductively constructed from
concrete historical experience of all the members of the human race.
Thus, Yanagita’s progressivism is tempered by Malthusian wariness, and as a result,
a cyclical motion is reintroduced into progressive time, as the linear accumulation of
human time in a particular place, when having exhausted the limited gift of nature therein,
results in a setback or even a complete reversal. Spatial limit means that today’s
prosperity may be purchased at the expense of the future’s progress. Although he does not
presuppose a complete trade-off between present and future gains, because some
resources are renewable by human hands, he does fear that the prosperity in today’s urban
space is built upon the sacrifice of spatial and temporal others. Not only the current
productive class in the rural area is footing the bill of the extravagance of the urban
unproductive class, but also the future generation of the entire humanity will end up
paying back the debt accumulated by the preceding generation.
One example of Yanagita’s non-linear time is given in his discussion of
overpopulation in the Japanese countryside. He traces the root cause of population
growth to the early modern period (from late seventeenth century through the Meiji
Restoration of 1868), when the pacification of the country and reestablishment of a
relatively centralized political order boosted agricultural production and made austere
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rural life more comfortable and gentle (Teihon 16: 318-332). Yanagita readily admits
material prosperity and population growth is a sign of social progress. In the preface to
Nihon nōmin shi (The History of Japanese Peasants), for example, he welcomes the
increase of love (ai 愛), pleasure/comfort (raku 楽), and beauty (bi 美) as the major
benefit of the advancement of civilization. “To change is not the same as corruption,” he
declares. “On the contrary, in many cases, it means that there are prospects for the further
increase of happiness and nobleness. In fact, even today there are innumerable things that
nobody doubts has become better than before. Children are [more] loved. Many people
get [more] pleasure/comfort. And there are more beautiful things. The truth is that few
think ill of those facts” (Teihon 16: 167-168).
However, overpopulation is partly a consequence of this increase of love, comfort
and beauty. In the past, the institution of household and primogeniture used to check
demographic pressures by restricting the subsequent division of property into smaller
plots and concentrating the right to inherit the means of production, especially land, in the
hand of the eldest son. Other male siblings became servants of a household, either their
own or other’s, or married into another households in need of a male heir. As a result,
fewer people could have garnered enough fortune to establish large families.53

53

Yanagita contends that the household system based on primogeniture was firmly
entrenched in the Middle Age partly because of military needs in a disorderly time.
During the Middle Age, when there was no centralized government and hence no security
for property, the concentration of power and land in the hand of the household of a single
proprietary lord (daimyō and shōmyō) best ensured the means of protection from external
military threats (Teihon 16: 191-192, 319). Here, there is more than a distant echo of
Adam Smith’s argument on the origin of primogeniture in the second chapter of the Book
III of The Wealth of Nations (Smith 2000: 413-414). Smith believes that primogeniture
not only makes no sense but also has become unreasonable and unjust in the modern age
when security is provided by a centralized government (pp. 414-415). Yanagita also
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Nevertheless, as social norms became lax as a result of relative material prosperity and
security from violence, the latent “conflict between care for the [invisible] household and
love for visible children and grandchildren” (Teihon 16: 191) became a salient question
for the head of a household. As parents’ love for children other than the eldest son often
overweighed the necessity of preserving the household, other siblings were given plots to
sustain their own life and were allowed to establish branch families (bunke 分家), which
were nominally subordinate to the head family (honke 本家) but often came to claim
independence and parity. As a consequence, a large household was dissolved into more
individualistic households in the course of time, and accordingly a collectively cultivated
land was subdivided into smaller plots (Teihon 16: 201-202). The final outcome is the
gradual but irreversible downfall of collective farming and the proliferation of
smallholders brimming the rural space and barely scraping by on their respective tiny
plots. According to the narrative, therefore, material prosperity, the equalization of social
status, and the increase of parental love temporarily relieved the pain of unfortunate
offspring, but in the long run, it had negative consequences on the general welfare of the
farming class.54

acknowledges that when internal peace was achieved under the auspice of the relatively
centralized Tokugawa regime and the sharp distinction between peasant and samurai
classes were institutionalized, primogeniture became an outmoded institution for farmers,
except some descendents of former lords that tried to preserve their social status (Teihon
16: 191-192, 319). However, Yanagita believes that the household and primogeniture has
various functions other than military defense and does not share Smith’s judgment that
“nothing can be more contrary to the real interest of a numerous family, than a right
which in order to enrich one, beggars all the rest of the children” (Smith 2000: 415).
54

Yanagita, it should be reminded, does not mean that the decentralization and
democratization of the political and economic structure of rural communities should not
have happened. On the contrary, his historiography focuses on the vibrant culture of
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In spite of his Malthusian wariness, however, Yanagita generally maintains a
progressive outlook in the foreseeable future, because immediate obstacles to progress
are not natural but artificially made and the further admancement of humanity is up to
human agency to remove them. In other words, whether time is linear or cyclical is not
determined by nature alone because it substantially depends on human will and action. A
major man-made obstacle to further progress, according to him, is various kinds of
boundary that compartmentalize humanity into discrete entities—be it villages, regions,
sovereign states, ethnic nations (minzoku 民族), or civilization—and hinder the rational
reallocation of labor and capital, especially land. Yet historically, Yanagita hypothesizes,
the local Malthusian limit has been overcome by those who decide to leave a crowded
place, cross borders, find a virgin soil, and found a new community and there is no reason
humans cannot repeat the same process, hopefully before descending into another
internecine struggles and the segregation and stratification of the victorious and the
vanquished. Therefore, he remains cautiously optimistic that the same solution would
become more acceptable with the proper understanding of human history of migration
and resettlement. Such history of migration and resettlement constitutes a grand historical
narrative that underpins his conception of global diversity and knowledge production.
The next section turns to this narrative.

semi-autonomous and self-governed peasant communities that emerged as a result of the
dissolution of feudal manors, nominally owned by sole proprietor lords and governed by
single military and political leader, into more egalitarian villages. His point is that while
those changes brought about many good things, they also introduce another set of
problems hardly expected by those involved in that change.
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History of Migration and Resettlement
Yanagita is critical of any “theoretical or conjectural history” and never wrote any
grand history.55 His historical narratives are always so tentative in attempt, so ambiguous
in meaning, and buried in so many particular details that it is difficult to identify a single
55

The terms “theoretical or conjectural history” is originally used by Dugald Stewart in
his Biographical Memoir of Adam Smith to describe Smith’s approach to history (Stewart
1811: 49). It is conjectural because it supplements the lack of historical facts by the
deductive application of principles to infer what human actor would behave under certain
conditions. “In this want of direct evidence,” Stewart writes, “we are under a necessity of
supplying the place of fact by conjecture; and when we are unable to ascertain how men
have actually conducted themselves upon particular occasions, of considering in what
manner they are likely to have proceeded, from the principles of their nature, and the
circumstances of their external situation. In such inquiries, the detached facts which
travels and voyages afford us, may frequently serve as land-marks to our speculations;
and sometimes our conclusions a priori, may tend to confirm the credibility of facts,
which, on a superficial view, appeared to be doubtful or incredible” (Stewart 1811: 48;
See also the discussion of the text in Meek 1976: 231-234). Stewart here is referring to
Smith’s The First Formation of Language, which was later included in The Theory of
Moral Sentiment, but he points out that the same approach is used in all his other works
(p. 46). He suggests that “inquiries perfectly analogous to these may be applied to the
modes of government, and to the municipal institutions which have obtained among
different nations” (p. 50) and hints that that is exactly what Smith did in The Wealth of
Nations and his lectures on jurisprudence, when the latter claims that the mode of
subsistence determines institutions and ideas of a particular age and that human
civilization advances through the four modes of subsistence—hunting, pasturage,
agriculture, and commerce. Yanagita never used the terms “theoretical history” or
“conjectural history” and there is no evidence indicating his familiarity with Stewart’s
text. By stating that Yanagita is critical of “conjectural history,” I do not mean that he was
directly criticizing the approach Stewart describes, but that his critical assessment of
mainstream historiography is directed to an approach similar to what Stewart describes as
“theoretical or conjectural history.” I would argue that it is not a mere coincidence
because, as discussed in the first chapter, “four stages theory” was an expression of the
modern spatiotemporal order and laid a foundation for the nineteenth-century discourse
of world history, which Yanagita found inadequate and problematic. Meek is somewhat
skeptical of the view that the “four stages theory” is conjectural history and argues that it
was intended as “a broad generalization of the historical facts as they saw them” (Meek
1976: 238). However, he admits that Smith and other proponents of the four stages theory
may have unwarrantedly presuppose that the life of contemporary “savage” peoples was
comparable to that of ancient barbarians and may have translated temporal order into
cultural hierarchy (pp. 240-241).
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grand narrative that pierce them together. In fact, his insistence on inductive methods
seems to derive, at least partially, from his dissatisfaction with conjectural grand
historical narratives offered by Western progressive historians such as Henry Buckle,
François Guizot, H. G. Wells, and probably Marx, in spite of his appreciation of the
latter’s materialist view of history. For example, in reference to Wells’ popular The
Outline of History (1920), he complains: “I suppose many people have read world history
by Englishman Wells. The white people, since when they finally realized that the earth is
round, have often wanted to write books of human history or world history. That is partly
their habits dating back to ancient Greece—namely, they tend to think that it is okay to
write as much as they know from their ethnocentric perspectives under such grandiose
titles. Yet, they have no excuse when someone objects that theirs is not true world history.
Then, when they start afresh and attempt to write how entire humanity has lived and what
changes they have undergone, the best thing they can get is something like the book by
Wells” (“Kyōdo seikatsu no kenkyūhō,” Teihon 25: 168). In spite of his antipathy to
abstract progressive historiography, however, Yanagita’s historical narratives are by no
means innocent of any grand hypothesis. At least, the Malthusian storyline—the cycle of
a founding, progress, overpopulation, decay, emigration, and a new founding—seems to
serve as a persistent underlying plot in his narratives. To put it differently, if his
fragmented historical narratives were assembled into a coherent narrative of Japanese
civilization and possibly beyond, it would certainly seem to follow the Malthusian
storyline described above. Overpopulation—that is, the excess of labor in relation to
arable land—creates underemployed and hence underfed laborers, who eventually give
up their native land and start wandering in search for new livelihood. In a sense, the
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possibility of emigration offers a safety valve to the local Malthusian trap as long as open
space is available for new settlers. Partly because of difference in natural environment
and partly because of isolation from the mother community, a new community develops a
different set of practices and symbolic order and the historical memory of the ancestral
land fades into myths and folklores. The cycle was repeated again and again until the
Japanese people have been dispersed throughout the archipelago and differentiated
themselves into distinctive communities barely aware of each other’s existence.
Yanagita has long entertained the hypothesis that the direct ancestors of the
Japanese people first arrived on the southern islands and went northward, as the limited
space of each small island was filled up in turn. The portion of an overcroweded
community, perhaps young and the most enterprising, broke insular mentality and braved
the wrath of the sea in the search of an unknown shore. When they reached the southern
tip of Kyūshū or other parts of the mainland, the same cycle was repeated within the lager
islands of the Japanese archipelago, until the Japanese people reached the northern tip of
Tōhoku. Thus, they filled up almost all the inhabitable space, from the remotest island to
the steepest mountain, and dispersed into diverse and semi-secluded agrarian
settlements.56 In this process, each agrarian settlement became a sort of small
independent republic and their common ancestry was largely forgotten. However, along
with the history of migration and resettlement, there is always the presence of wandering
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Yanagita points out that the Japanese term for islands, shima (シマ,島), was also used,
and is still being used in certain localities, to refer to inland agrarian communities. He
associates shima with the adjective semai (セマイ) or narrow and concludes that it
originally meant “my/our own place” or “my/our village” regardless of whether it is on
the sea or land (Teihon 15: 573).
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people who, left out from settlers’ communities, either voluntarily or involuntarily, travel
between dispersed settlements, and possibly beyond the current national borders,
transmitting a common culture.
Yanagita is generally reluctant to extend this history of migration and wandering
beyond the contemporary border of the Japanese state. However, in his last major book,
Kaijō no michi (海上の道 Paths on the Sea, 1961), he throws off that reluctance and
explicitly elaborates on the hypothesis that the ancestors of the Japanese people originally
came from southern China, having crossing the East China Sea in search for cowries,
whose shells were then highly valued as currency and ornaments throughout Northeast
Asia (Teihon 1: 25-29).57 Thus, he suggests that the entire Japanese nation is the
57

Before the publication of Kaijō no michi, Yanagita persistently tried to confine the
jurisdiction of minzokugaku to the territory of the Japanese modern state, and his
reluctance was criticized by more theory-oriented disciples as a sign of cultural
exceptionalism or ethnocentrism. However, the reluctance is partly explained by his
awareness of the connivance between ethnology and colonialism. In his view, the
European discipline of ethnology, also translated as minzokugaku but with a different
Chinese ideography zoku (族 tribe), is an attempt to represent ethnic others from the
perspective of the outsider, and as such tend to offer justifications for colonialism. As
Oguma (1995) documents, the dominant discourse in the prewar period was that Japan
was a multi-ethnic nation, and the claim that the Japanese and the Korean peoples shared
the common ancestry (nissen dōso ron 日鮮同祖論) was utilized as a justification for the
annexation of Korea. There are some textual evidences indicating that in the early days of
his intellectual career Yanagita himself had entertained the idea that the Japanese
ancestors came from the Asian Continent through the Korean peninsula, but in the course
of time, he seemed to lean toward a minority opinion that Japan was a culturally, if not
ethnically, homogeneous nation (Oguma 1995: 205-234). However, he continued to think
of Japan as a multi-ethnic nation, although he generally downplayed the ethnic origin as
the relevant issue for national integration. These episodes suggest that it is for a political
reason that he tried to seal the application of minzokugaku to oversea colonies. In fact,
whereas Yanagita was able to maintain a distance from Japanese imperialism during the
war period, Japanese ethnologists, including his disciples, actively joined the
government’s effort to justify Japan’s expansion into Asia through official research
institutes. He broke the seal of comparative minzokugaku only when there was no longer
danger of Japanese imperialism.
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descendent of immigrants from southern China. Even before the publication of Kaijō no
michi, he, in rare occasions, cautiously explored the hypothesis that the existence of
similar myths or folktales in various regions in the world indicates a long chain of
cultural intercourse or migration between apparently separate communities through
migration or wandering. The first of such instances is Momotarō no tanjō (桃太郎の誕生
The Birth of the Peach Boy, 1933), a collection of essays examining different variations
of similar folktales. In the opening essay of the book, he points out that there exist too
many similar folktales throughout Japan and the world to be a mere coincidence. An
example of which is what is known as Cinderella in Europe, and various variations of a
similar fairly or folk tale can be found throughout Japan. He contends that the similarity
between European and Japanese Cinderella stories is so striking that the coincidence is
unlikely to be an accident. “Either we [i.e., human beings] once lived together and told
the story to each other, or because of human nature, we all go through a stage in which a
similar kind of imagination is indulged in, and, on top of that, we share the common habit
of not losing the memory of such imagination” (Teihon 8: 6). Yet he confesses that no
decisive conclusion can be drawn yet for lack of empirical evidence. In another text,
Mukasibanashi oboegaki (昔話覚書 Notes on Old Stories, 1943)), he expresses his
puzzlement as follows: “It is a unbelievable miracle if those who shared the same bonfire
in the immemorial past have passed down [those tales] from generation to generation by
word of mouth long after parting company, not only preserving more or less the original
forms but also embellishing them in a way that corresponds to each cultural particularity.
Or, even if those tales are relayed from one place to another in turn, but without being
lost in the place of origin, no one yet accounts for the existence of such large-scale and
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complex intercourse as long as cultural history is concerned” (“Mukashibanashi oboegaki”
Teihon 8: 338). However, he is more than open-minded to the possibility that today’s
distinctive regions, nations, and civilizations could find a commonality, not in an abstract
notion of humanity, but in a concrete historical experience.
Yanagita is aware that a grand history of human migration and cultural intercourse
requires much more than he has already known about the history of the Japanese people
and generally abstains from bold assertions about such history. However, there are several
passages that reveal the surprisingly ambitious scope of his historical imagination. One
example occurs in the text of Seinen to gakumon (青年と学問 Youth and Learning,
1924):
In the Polynesian elements [in the culture of the southern Pacific], there are traces
that I think indicate they came across the ocean from northwest long time ago.
Because of life in isolated islands at sea that has lasted for approximately two
thousand years, the physical constitution of the Polynesian acquired new
characteristics to such a degree that many [scholars] start arguing, as ordinary
travelers are already imagining, that their lineage is not so different from that of the
Melanesian. Anyway, it is almost impossible to inquire into the [ethnic] origin
because of very complex crossbreeding. However, if the seaborne movement of the
people originally started at the southern tip of the Asian Continent and if the
Polynesian are distant cousins of a great tribe who have moved from there to west
[i.e., the Aryan], it is possible that a pre-Christianity, pre-Hellenism, or pre-Vedas
burgeoning thought of the Aryan is preserved in some aspects of [the Polynesian’s]
life. The possibility raises infinitely difficult questions about the fact that a culture

181

takes such a different form with the long passage of time and environmental change,
present and future confusions and conflicts caused by the clash of different
religious faiths and social institutions—each of which is a product of a distinctive
environmental condition—and the impact of such confusions and conflicts on the
fate of the entire world. (Teihon 25: 100)
In the passage above, Yanagita underplays physical characteristics as a marker of
ethnicity and directs the reader’s attention to possible cultural commonality that he
believes exists between the Polynesian and the Aryan. In so doing, he is advancing a bold
hypothesis about a transcontinental migratory process that allegedly took place two
thousand years ago. Another example of the scope of Yanagita’s historical imagination
occurs in the same book, also concerning Southeast Asia and the Pacific.
Even if we are fortunate enough to finish the task of discovering the important law
of human growth [by this he probably meant the law of human civilization] in
Japan, there remain China and the problem between the Malay and India …
Dispersed between them, in the vast mountainous regions, are the Shan, who have
some resemblance with us Japanese in major aspects of food and clothing, the
Karen, and many other tribes, … too many to list up all the names here. Now
turning south and pursuing traceless paths on the sea, from island peoples further
down from Taiwan and the Luzon, especially young brothers in Micronesia, to
many tribes, almost indistinguishable from each other, in Melanesia and Papua, all
of them appear to be waiting, wondering whether the advancement of Japanese
learning may reveal secret causes for their poverty and misery as well. (Teihon 25:
258-259)
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In this passage, Yanagita explicitly includes Japan as part of a hypothetical history of
migration and cultural intercourse in Asia, not only in the past but also in the present. He
is vague as to whether similarities between the Japanese and other peoples in Asia and the
Pacific are attributable to the same ethnic origin or the similar environment, especially
the condition of being shima—that is, being relatively isolated from other communities
either by the vast ocean or steep mountains, but he firmly believes that the experience of
the Japanese people is not idiosyncratic but directly relevant to other peoples in the
similar condition.
Yanagita’s interest in the southern Pacific coincided with Japan’s inroad into it as a
colonial power, and his identification of the island peoples as a “young brothers” evokes
the theory of common ancestry between the Japanese and the Korean that was widely
utilized to justify the annexation of Korea. However, Yanagita’s history of migration is
not necessarily limited to Asia and the Pacific. Although he never wrote about them, there
were some evidence for his interest in Gypsies and the Jewish people, both wandering
peoples in Europe. Yanagita Bunko (柳田文庫), a collection of minzokugaku-related
materials donated by him to Seijyō University contains a dozen of books on Gypsies.58
He also took an interest in the Jewish people during his stay in Geneva and in 1922 he
made a request to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a travel expense of his planned trip
to the Palestine territory, though the request was rejected by the Ministry and he had to
give up the plan (Yanagita Kunio Kenkyūkai 1988: 640).
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Internet search at the Yanagita Bunko database,
http://www.lib-finder.net/seijyo/index.html, returns ten Gypsy-related books (accessed on
November 6, 2011).
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Overall, Yanagita’s grand historical narrative is the history of the dispersion and
differentiation of humanity. The more successful a civilization is, the higher the rate of
population growth becomes, and the local Malthusian limit results in the surplus of labor
in relation to arable land. The constraint is overcome by migration and the establishment
of new settlements, but often not before internecine struggle produced civil war, the
subjugation of the vanquished by their own compatriots, and the resulting internal social
differentiation and stratification. The victors then rewrote history in a way that denigrated
the vanquished or the conquered as the barbarian, and history prior to the advent of a new
upper class is left to oblivion.59 If the local Malthusian limit is overcome by emigration,
emigrants found new political communities and lost the memory of their historical origin.
In Yanagita’s view, the existing spatial divisions, both internal and international, are the
products of such a historical process. His hope is that tracing back the migratory history
that cuts across the existing borders would eventually reverse the reification of the
boundaries that divide humanity into various compartmentalized spaces.
Islands have a particular place in Yanagita’s world history. He suggests that an
island reaches the Malthusian limit relatively quickly and results in what he calls “island
politics (shima no seiji 島の政治).” Besides the fact that islands are more vulnerable to
natural disasters, such as tsunamis or typhoons that instantly sweep away the
accumulation of human time in space, the small size of the territory shapes the political
59

One of the examples of such a narrative is the one he gives in Kainan shōki concerning
the history of southernmost Yaeyama islands (Teihon 1: 283-284). A chieftain known by
the name of Akahachi (赤蜂 Red Bee), who was in the official history of Ryūkyū
Kingdom depicted as a tyrannical ruler and a barbarous rebel, was actually the head of a
powerful local clan and “a patriot of Yaeyama, or, at least, the leader of an independent
party” (p. 283).
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culture of an island in a way that makes it particularly prone to internal strife and foreign
intervention. In a passage from Seinen to gakumon (The Youth and Learning, 1928),
Yanagita describe the history of Okinawa as follows:
When an island was filled up with people and a scramble [for survival] broke out, it
was those who established a relation with a outside country and secured its support
that was able to complete the great enterprise of unification, maintained peace in the
island, and established a disarmed kingdom. However, there was a cruel struggle for
survival immediately before and after the unification and many people died of it. Of
course, this is a way to sort out the mess [seiri 整理], because with the size of the
population out of proportion to the fertility of land, there is no other choice but to
slay each other incessantly or to do away with the problem in that way [i.e., violent
unification]. This is, so to speak, the adaptability of an island when human intellect
was not sufficiently developed. (“Seinen to gakumon.” Teihon 25: 154-155)
As a limited space is quickly saturated with people, intensive competition for scarce
resources breaks out. Although they are all the descendents of migrants who once braved
the wrath of the ocean for a better future, the geographical seclusion of an island made
them oblivious to the fact that the sea could be a pathway to a new land. The insular
mentality and the intense scarcity produce a particularly fierce internecine conflict and
invited intervention from an outside power, often at the request of one party in the
conflict. Those who won the civil war with the help of a foreign power become the
dominant class, and then rewrite history in a way that depicts the vanquished as the
barbarian and the victorious as a civilizing force. The victor becomes the upper class
(jōryū 上流) and tends to hold the foreign civilization supporting it as a model and tries
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to assimilate itself into it as much as possible, creating a huge rift among former
brethrens (Teihon 25: 154-155).
Yanagita suggests that the same pattern of island politics is repeated at multiple
levels. Even smaller islands south to Okinawa has their own center-periphery relations
among them, whereas those islands collectively constitutes the periphery in relation to the
main island of Okinawa, where the independent kingdom of Ryūkū was located until it
was formally absorbed into Japan in 1879. Yet the island of Okinawa, the center of the
southern archipelago, is now a periphery in the entire Japan and is subjected to the
government in Tokyo. Furthermore, Japan is an island in the world, whose dominant class,
with the help of powerful external civilizations, first China and later the West, has tried to
subjugate the rest of the population. Immediately after the quote above, he continues:
I think that even a large island like Japan was not an exception to this tendency [for
internecine conflict and foreign intervention]. Only the case of Japan contains more
complex relations and is of wider scope [than the case of Okinawa and the southern
islands], and [the entire picture] is not immediately recognizable unless we infer it
from the experience of such a [simple] model case [as Okinawa]. The strategy of
conquering the inside by the clever use of support from the outside is common, not
only in military but also economic wars, and there have already emerged attempts
to win the recent ideological wars by the same old means. It seems that the bad
habit of sacrificing one’s own families cannot be corrected in a short time. (Teihon
25: 155).
In spite of the vague language, it is not difficult to recognize the barb Yanagita throws
against the Japanese urban elite that conquered and subjugated their own brethrens with
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technological, economic, and intellectual support from the West. Escaping from the
politics of islands requires the transcendence of insular mentality and the fundamental
transformation of spatial consciousness, not only among elite but also the common
people.

Settlers and Wanderers
As discussed in the previous section, one way out of the local Malthusian trap and
resulting internal strife is migration. As long as there exists open space available to
colonization, those who are displaced from land have an option to leave their native
community in search of a new land. It may not be an option they happily choose, but as
the present misery increases, a hope for better future outweighs the fear of uncertainty.
However, when there is no longer vacant space available to newcomers, those who left
their native land become permanent wanderers. According to Yanagita, there have existed
various types of wandering people throughout Japanese history and the way they
interacted with agrarian civilization varies. Yet, they were all landless people, “jōmin who
eat but do not cultivate rice” (Teihon 25: 463).60 As such, they were forced to sell
whatever they could in exchange for rice and other agricultural products. From Yanagita’s
account, it can be inferred that all the trades wandering people were specialized
in—performing arts, and the production and sale of handicrafts, or even
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In this quote, Yanagita refers to hyōhakumin as a type of jōmin, but in the later writing,
explicitly excludes the former from the category of the latter. See the discussion in the
following section. This is one example of inconsistency with which he uses the category,
but, as argued above, he believes that the two kinds of people are internally connected
both spatially and temporally.
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prostitution—had once been related to the spiritual life of jōmin. Because the demand for
essential goods in largely self-sufficient rural communities was limited, non-essential
goods constituted a major part of commodities wandering people peddled to peasants. In
other words, they were “cultural” goods in the sense that they were dispensable for local
productive activities, but made the life of jōmin more pleasant, beautiful, or fulfilling.
Unlike the austere and ascetic culture of jōmin, “new culture” (Teihon 25: 463)
transmitted by wandering people was less conditioned by local material conditions and,
hence, had more universal appeal, because it reflected the latter’s aspirations for what
they did not have, what was absent in their everyday life. Or, to put it differently,
universality, understood as detachment from particular spatial conditions, was precisely
the major attractiveness of those cultural goods.
Yanagita’s engagement with wanderers actually precedes his interest in jōmin
(Tsurumi 1998: 242-243) and takes place during his second intellectual period. During
this period, his attention was diverted from the mainstream agricultural society and
farmers in flat lands to those who lived on its margin. Yanagita’s interest in wanderers
seems to stem, at least partly, from Romantic yearning for wandering life, and this
inclination can be traced back to his formative years. Before becoming a
bureaucrat-intellectual, he was a sensitive young poet influenced by, among others, the
European Romantic literature. One of the characteristics of his prose poems was a
nostalgic longing for pristine nature, which was supposed to be found either outside
urban space and in the subconscious depth of the interiority of the individual.61 Indeed, it
61

See Karatani (1993) for an insightful analysis of the relationship between modernity
and the early Romantic tendency and modern Japanese literature.
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seems that the Romantic inclination sometimes carried him to the point of obliterating the
distinction between the real and the imaginary. The tendency is most apparent in the case
of his interest in mountain people (yamabito)—mythical inhabitants of mountains with
superhuman strength and primitive manners and frequent characters in folktales
throughout Japan. During this period, he formulated the hypothesis, only to abandon it
silently later, that mountain people were in actual existence and were the survivors of
indigenous civilization that prospered in the Japanese archipelago before the arrival of the
ancestors of the Japanese people. Nevertheless, his search for proof of mountain people’s
existence came to naught and, instead, he shifted attention to the shadowy presence of
real wandering peoples throughout Japanese history.
In 1913, he founded, with mythologist Takagi Toshio (高木敏雄), Kyōdo kenkyū
(郷土研究 Hometown Studies), a journal dedicated to ethnological and ethnographical
studies of Japanese rural life. With the departure of Takagi in 1914, he ended up editing
the journal on his own in the official residence of Secretary General of the House of Peers.
He was prolific during this period and wrote a good part of articles that appeared in
Kyōdo kenkyū with various pseudonyms, until 1917 when he decided to discontinue it.
Those articles demonstrated his growing interest in wandering people. Two representative
texts during this period, “Fujo kō [巫女考 On Sorceresses/Priestesses]” and “Kebōzu kō
[毛坊主考 On Buddhist Monks with Hair],” which appeared in Kyōdo kenkyū serially
between 1913 and 1915, chased the elusive presence of wandering sorceresses/priestesses
(aruki miko) and their male counterparts known as hijiri in the history of Japanese
religious life. His hypothesis is that wandering sorceresses, who traveled around the
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country to offer cheap spiritual services to jōmin, and Shintō priestesses, who serves at
officially recognized shrines, descend from the same class of people before they were
differentiated into wandering and settled elements (“Fujo kō” Teihon 9: 296-301). The
existence of hijiri, he believes, also predates the introduction of Buddhism into Japan by
the Yamato dynasty in the sixth century (“Kebōzu kō” Teihon 9: 423). They belonged to
the landless class who made a living by catering to the spiritual needs of jōmin.
During the same period, he also showed interest in those subjected to systematic
discrimination in contemporary Japan. One of them is a class officially denominated
tokushu burakumin (特殊部落民 special hamlet people) consisting of the descendents of
eta (エタ popularly understood as unclean or sinful) and hinin (非人 literally,
non-human)—two classes of people who had been placed at the bottom of the social
hierarchy during the feudal period. In spite of the official abolishment of the status
system in 1871, they continued to be discriminated against, mainly but not exclusively in
terms of employment and marriage. In Yanagita’s assessment, those discriminated people
were the descendents of landless people, who had decided or were forced to settled down
on the margin of agricultural villages to specialize in certain types of trade that peasants
themselves avoided or in which they lacked technological expertise but for which a
substantial demand existed. Such trade includes the handling of dead animals and leather
tanning, the cleaning of public roads, prison guard, or grave digging (“Iwayuru tokushu
buraku no shurui” Yanagita Kunio zenshū 4: 491-504). Besides them, there were
communities or households that were rumored to be “possessed” by evil creatures. Again,
in Yanagita’s view, they were likely to be the descendent of wandering priests/priestesses
who had settled down and the memory of whose spiritual power had been degraded into
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superstitious beliefs in mysterious creatures, as the original meaning of cosmological
symbols were forgotten (Teihon 9: 305-317).
After Yanagita’s interest shifted back to the life of jōmin, wandering peoples
receded into the background.62 However, the idea that they played an important role as
the transmitter of common culture between self-secluded agrarian communities was not
abandoned. In his view, the ubiquity of similar oral traditions and practices throughout
Japan is largely attributable to them, and, according to his account, wandering people
provided semi-secluded rural communities with an important link to the outside world
and stimulated social change. If the culture of jōmin provides Japanese civilization with a
stable core, the culture transmitted by wandering people embodies its endogenous vitality
and dynamism. In an essay published in 1934, he writes:
If it had not been for their wandering, more cultural factors from antiquity would
have been preserved in the country. Yet the extent to which external stimuli taught
62

When this shift occurs and why is an important question in the evaluation of
Yanagita’s minzokugaku. A number of scholars points out that by shifting his focus from
strange, unfamiliar, and marginal people to the mainstream national culture, his
minzokugaku either turned its back to the plight of the most discriminated and oppressed
elements in Japanese society or prematurely foreclosed the rich potential of his earlier
studies that pointed to the possibility of a multicultural or even multiethnic nation
(Ariizumi 1972; Tanikawa 1975; Akasaka 1991; Akasaka 1994; Akasaka 2000). Akasaka
(1994: 33) examines Yanagita’s texts and identifies the period before and after1928 as the
watershed. Oguma (1995: 212-217) suggests that his experience in Geneva from 1921 to
1923 influenced the shift of focus. However, if we consider the agricultural science
period into consideration, his foray into the origin of wandering people is rather a
relatively brief intermezzo, though an important one for the later development of his
thought. I do not mean to deny an important change in Yanagita’s thinking or the rich
potential of his writings during Kyōdo kenkyū period, but the critics perhaps exaggerate
the extent of rapture. The interpretation offered in this study suggests a more specific
form of change in Yanagita’s thinking: The status of wandering people shifted from the
object of Romantic yearning for spatial and external other to the temporal and internal
other of jōmin and the important element in the latter’s history.
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[Japanese farmers] new lifestyles and ways of thinking and made [their]
imagination more colorful far exceeds [the impact of] sporadic intercourse with
foreign countries. … [I]f a portion of the nation had not been these wandering
elements and if they had been materially as self-reliant as fishermen living by the
sea here and there, the Japanese culture of the medieval period would not have
undergone such a drastic shift. (“Bunka unpan no mondai.” Teihon 25: 465)
In other words, the existence of wandering people made contribution to the progressive
history of jōmin by breathing new life into the monotony of agrarian life and stimulating
new experiments. In terms of national integration, moreover, the conservative and
parochial tendency inherent in rural communities was tempered by the transmission by
wanderers of a new culture.63
In a sense, this is the role that Yanagita points out cities and towns had historically
played. The surplus products of agricultural labor were partly channeled into
unproductive activities, such as the production of arts, sciences, religions, or
entertainment industry in cities that gave comfort and pleasure to peasants. In contrast to
cities and towns, however, because of the relatively weak position vis-à-vis their
customers, wandering people, for all the fraudulent tricks they employed to seduce them,
were ultimately at the mercy of jōmin. Thus, although wandering peoples must be the
“active” party of the commerce, like the contemporary urban merchant, they had no
63

Tsurumi Kazuko (1998: 256) argues that Yanagita understood social change as “a
process of interrelations and interpenetrations among permanent wandering, temporary
wandering [i.e. journey and migration], and settlement.” Although he believes that
settlement is the starting point of civilization, “wandering people [can] make contribution
to social change by [appealing to] the psychological urge of those who took root in a
particular place” (p. 256).
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choice but to cater to jōmin’s needs. Therefore, their “new culture” did not aspire to
supplant or denigrate the culture of jōmin, as does the urban literate class today. In other
words, in contrast with contemporary Japan, cultural markets in medieval Japan was
driven more by the demand of jōmin than by the supply-side necessity.
Wandering people had a particular advantage of catering to the spiritual needs of
jōmin. A spiritual need is by definition the one that cannot be satisfied at the site of
material production and requires intervention from beyond the space of everyday life. In
the old cosmology of jōmin, the space outside village boundaries was the external world
where deities and the spirits of the dead, good or bad, belong, and wandering people
coming therefrom were often regarded as the possessors of spiritual power. As a matter of
fact, jōmin’s attitude toward wanderers was ambivalent, and even after the old cosmology
was largely forgotten and wanderers were looked on with suspicion, they tended to regard
them with a sense of both “contempt and awe (besshi to ikei 蔑視と畏敬)” (Tsurumi
1998: 249). At normal time, wanderers were treated as beggars, swindlers, or potential
thieves, but during special time of the year such as New Year or other festivities, villagers
often invited them to give blessing to their households or communities.64 Some types of
wandering people were specialized in the production of certain handicrafts, such as tea
brushes (chasen 茶筅) made of bamboo. Yanagita inferred from its shape that that they
were associated with instruments used by wandering priestess and priests for esoteric
religious practice (Teihon 9: 380-382).
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Yanagita hypothesizes that a Japanese term referring to beggars, hoito (ホイト),
derives from hogibito (祝ぎ人) or those who bless (Teihon 10: 80-82).
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The critical role that Yanagita assigned to wandering people in the spiritual life of
jōmin has something to do with its being the latter’s internal other. As such, his
representation of wandering people reflects his ambivalence toward civilization. He was
initially interested in mythical characters known by the name of yamabito (mountain
people). The ancestors of yamabito, he hypothesized, were hunter-gatherers who
inhabited a wide area of the Japanese archipelago until the rice-cultivating ancestors of
the current Japanese people appeared on the scene. Coming under competitive pressure
from superior civilization, the indigenous population waned, and, according to him, there
are six routes to the extinction of the indigenous Japanese as a distinct people. The first
route is to surrender and swear allegiance to the new ruler—“the most dignified way of
assimilation” (“Sanjin kō.” Teihon 4: 182). The second is to resist and die fighting and the
third natural extinction because of low birth rate (shizen no shison danzetu 自然の子孫
断絶) (p. 182). Fourthly, however, they might “reconquer newly arrived farmers through
religion and eventually merged themselves with the latter on favorable terms” (p. 182).65
The fifth is the most common route, which is a gradual and unrecognized process of
settlement and crossbreeding. However, some of them simply chose to retreat into deep
mountains and retrogressed into wandering yamabito (pp.182-183).
Yanagita’s attitude toward yamabito is a mixture of pity and longing, as suggested
by the opening passage of “Yamabito gaiden shiryō (山人外伝資料 Supplementary
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In this sentence, Yanagita seems to suggest that at least a part of wandering people
who catered the spiritual needs of jōmin are of distinct ethnic origin. In later period,
however, he generally underplays the importance of the ethnic origin of wandering and
discriminated peoples.
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Material on Mountain People),” a series of articles published in Kyōdo kenkyū
intermittently from 1913 through 1917:
I believe that yamabito are the descendents of the indigenous people who flourished
in this island country long time ago. That civilization has already retrogressed. For
the past three thousand years, no single history book has been written for them.
Only when their tribe seems to be almost in extinction does person like me, who is
one of their sworn enemies, plan to do that. They are truly pitiable people, if only
for that reason. However, I myself have no idea of who are my ancestors ten
generations ago. I cannot declare that I have no blood relations at all with them.
Considering that I have an unreasonable liking for mountains and dislike some
Japanese compatriots so intensely as to shudder at the sight of them, God only
knows, I may inherit yamabito’s blood from some lineage. I will leave that
possibility out of consideration, nonetheless. I just plan to face their past with the
dignity of a descendent of the honorable everlasting conquerors and the similar
attitude with which Tacitus once described the German. If I am fortunate to write a
book later, it may be a good memorial service for them.
In this passage, he hints that even though the identity of the indigenous people was lost,
its genetic and cultural heritages may be weaved into the tapestry of contemporary
Japanese civilization. Yet he ultimately characterizes yamabito’s ancestors as barbarians
vanquished by superior civilization. In other words, while accepting the possibility that
the barbarian is within civilization, he ultimately seems to define them as the external
other. At the risk of reading too much from literary rhetoric, however, it is tempting to
inquire Yanagita’s intention to draw an analogy between the Roman/the German and the
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Japanese/the indigenous people, given that the Western Roman Empire was later overrun
and replaced by the descendents of the Germanic people supposedly brought into
civilized life by the former. Also, it is worth remembering in this connection that just two
years before, he proclaimed in the preface to the Tales of Tōno, “Let the people of flat
land tremble at [the stories of mountain deities and people]” (Teihon 4: 5). “The people of
flat land” here represents the conquering civilization, but this civilization is still terrified
and fascinated by the specter of the vanquished barbarian in the form of mythical figures
in folktales. In Yanagita’s writings during this period, there is a hint of his view that
yamabito, monsters, and deities that appear in folktales are expression of the suppressed
part of the civilized self and the barbarous within the civilized psyche may eventually
reemerge to reclaim a rightful place.
As it became clear that his hypothesis about the actual existence of yamabito was
untenable, Yanagita precisely turned to the psychology of “the people of flat land.”
Although he never explicitly recanted his hypothesis, in Yama no jinsei (山の人生 Life
in the Mountains, 1925), he no longer asks whether yamabito really existed and, instead,
analyzes the folktales of yamabito largely in terms of jōmin’s psychology. Yamabito were
believed to kidnap people, especially women, from villages, but he points out that there
have been many cases of jōmin fleeing from the yoke of civilized life into mountains and
swelling the rank of yamabito (Teihon 4: 61-79). He suggests that certain types of persons
are psychologically inclined for being spirited away (kami kakushi 神隠し) and
confesses that he himself got caught on several occasions when he felt like being spirited
away during his childhood (Teihon 4: 80-81; “Fujo kō” Teihon 9: 254-267). Romantic
poems he wrote as a youth also indicate his wariness toward civilized life. Although he
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later self-criticized the Romanticism of his early years and embraces progressivism and
positivist science as the grounding theoretical framework of his intellectual works,
arguably his ambivalence toward civilization continues to linger on in his great interest in
the spiritual life of jōmin, especially concerning the question of death. As Mishima Yukio
(三島由紀夫), a novelist and an admirer of Yanagita, notes, “innumerable cases of death
are recounted matter-of-factly in The Tales of Tōno. Minzokugaku is a discipline
[gakumon] smelling of death from its very beginning. It is not possible to speak of
minzokugaku without touching upon death and community” (Mishima 1973: 198). When
Yanagita’s interest shifted from wandering people to jōmin, his attention also turns from
the sphere of death to the sphere of life. Yet, the question of death always lurks behind the
life of jōmin depicted by him.
During the Kyōdo kenkyū period, Yanagita seemed to conceive a vague notion of
the important connection of the spiritual life of jōmin assisted by wandering people with
rural economy, but was unable to articulate any coherent discourse that links the former
to the latter. When Minakata Kumagusu (南方熊楠), a renowned naturalist/ethnologist
and one of the contributors to Kyōdo kenkyū, criticized the journal’s (and Yanagita’s)
excessive concern with wandering people and urged it to refocus on the economic issues
of rural life as promised initially, he retorted that Minakata understood the terms rūraru
ekonomí (rural economy) too narrowly. Minakata’s confusion, he suggested, is because
the term “economy” is conventionally understood in too a constricted way in Japan, and
he would rather translate “rural economy” into nōmin seikatushi (農民生活誌) (Teihon
30: 335), the literal translation of which can be rendered the ethnography of peasant life.
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The aim of the journal is “to stand apart from the issue of policy direction or the
assessment of a project and to concentrate on the description and exposition of [real]
situations” (p. 335), and the question nōmin seikatushi addresses is, “how did and do the
common people [heimin 平民] live?” (p. 337). Based on this understanding, he asked
back whether “‘Fujo kō” is right in the center of nōmin seikatushi” because the issues
dealt with in the essays “had a major influence on today’s rural life and also [even] touch
upon the economic issues most narrowly defined” (p. 336). Here we can detect a notion,
though inchoate, that the spiritual life of jōmin and wandering people is an inseparable
part of rural economy.
However, when Yanagita publicly justifies the relevance of his studies of
wandering people in other texts, he tends to rely on the discourse of sedentarization and
assimilation. A notable example is a 1913 journal article entitled “Various Types of the
So-Called Special Hamlet People (Iwayuru tokushu burakumin no shurui 所謂特殊部落
民の種類).” The article is aimed at dispelling the popular belief that the discriminated
people are ethnically different from the Japanese, but Yanagita adds two more reasons for
the importance of his study. The first is the “antisocial feeling” harbored by the
discriminated (Yanagita Kunio zenshū 4: 485). He points out that there are approximately
700,000 discriminated people throughout Japan, almost one out of seventy Japanese and
warns that they will pose a considerable threat to public order if they manage to unite
themselves against society (p. 485). The second reason is that they are potentially an
additional source of labor supply and their integration into society may have a substantial
impact on rural economy (p. 485). Yanagita’s concern here seems that the rural economy
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is already overpopulated and has little capacity to absorb additional labor force, and his
underlying assumption is that in order to fully integrate those “floating elements” into the
nation, they need to settle down on land. Here, in spite of his sincere sympathy toward
the most oppressed class in society, he seems to take part of the state’s proclivity “to be
the enemy of ‘people who move around’” (Scott1998: 1), instead of exalting dialectical
relations between settlers and wanderers.
Thus, even though Yanagita vaguely conceived a notion of economic life in which
sedentary and moving elements interact each other in a complex way and jointly make
history, he failed to develop it into a full-fledged theoretical statement about social
progress. He was clearly fascinated by the fact that “barbarous” elements continued to
exist in the midst of civilization, but could not translate it into something more than an
interesting historical narrative. After all, he never doubted that it was the interest of
wandering people themselves to be assimilated into the mainstream society. However, his
foray into the history of wandering people was not totally inconsequential for his later
intellectual development. When wandering people was thrown off as a major subject in
his minzokugaku and when his attention shifted from the rift between flat lands and
mountains to the cleavage that was being developed within the mainstream Japanese
society, the act of wandering reemerged as a major component of his thought. When that
happens, however, wandering was no longer an act of Romantic rebellion against
unnatural and dehumanizing civilization but a method to produce historical knowledge
about civilization and to promote nation-building from below.
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Travel as a Method
As discussed in the preceding chapters, Yanagita’s minzokugaku can be interpreted
as a project to excavate a progressive history of jōmin by redefining the non-urban space
as a product of elaborate and accumulative human labor. Nevertheless, his
re-spatialization of global diversity leads to another problem. Now that global diversity is
redefined in spatial, rather than temporal, terms, anthropological space is occupied by a
variety of mutually exclusive political communities, and the universal class of jōmin,
when applied to concrete history, is broken up into particularistic groups with an insular
mindset. Tightly attached to a particular place, jōmin develop insular mentality and tend
to believe that theirs is the natural or standard way of human life. As a result, they not
only are incapable of self-examination, but also tend to interpret any deviation from their
own standards as a sign of inferiority. Although they share an objective commonality as
jōmin, their self-understanding is very particularistic. If we borrow Marx’s terminology,
jōmin is a class in itself but not a class for itself. Furthermore, the possibility of moving
from the former to the latter seems bleak, given the incommensurability between diverse
communities. Even if human history is the one of repeated migration and intercourse, that
history is largely forgotten and the memory of the past is fragmented into myths and
folktales. Each community claims that its history is unique and self-contained, and, as a
result, the progressive history of jōmin is no longer world history, but a collection of local
narratives of self-sufficient communities. For Yanagita, the cosmopolitan or nationalist
culture originating in urban life is a welcome countervailing force to this parochial
tendency of jōmin, but unfortunately cities are by no means a disinterested party. Rather,
he fears, abstract cosmopolitanism or nationalism is an active instrument to promote
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particular urban interests at the expense of jōmin. Moreover, most urban residents were
first-generation immigrants from the countryside and carried over their respective
parochial identities into urban life and formed region-based factions. As a result, “a city is
merely an agglomeration of dwellings and a container that can be filled with oil and
water” (Teihon 16: 188). Rather than representing national unity, Japanese cities are little
more than a agglomeration of parochial groups and individuals. In short, both jōmin and
the urban literate class are partial in both senses of the term and neither of them is
equipped with a right disposition to write an “objective” history of humanity.
In order to overcome this problem, Yanagita proposes travel as a method of
knowledge production. In essays contained in the volume Seinen to gakumon (The Youth
and Learning, 1928), he encourages jōmin’s younger generations to dissociate themselves
from their native places and temporarily exile themselves in unfamiliar lands and among
strange peoples. And the major purpose of travel, he contends, is to know hito (ヒト).
The Japanese word hito can simply mean a human being, but in this passage, he
emphasizes another meaning: hito as people other than one’s own:
We have called this vague thing [known as hito] seken (世間), or yo no naka (世の
中), [which literary signifies “in the entire world”], or, even more explicitly, tanin
no naka (他人の中) [among others]. … What is often expressed by those terms
strikes us particularly when we travel. Just as fishes in water or human beings in air
become accustomed to water and air and do not feel them, one, surrounded only by
familiar people [shūi no hito 周囲の人], takes them for granted. Only when one
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slips out of relationships or makes comparison between before and after does one
understand one’s relations with them. (“Seinen to gakumon.” Teihon 25: 123)
Here, it is suggested that the words hito, seken, or yo no naka already connote what a
neologism shakai (社会), the Japanese translation of the imported word society, stands
for—that is, an impersonal entity composed of diverse peoples and individuals unknown
to each other.66 Arguably, seken or yo no naka can be contrasted with other terms, such
as ie (household), mura (village) or kuni (country, hometown), which refer to personal or
communal groups of people with direct and concrete bonds. The fact that jōmin
distinguished seken and yononaka from ie, mura, or kuni indicates their consciousness
that familiar people do not necessarily represent the entire humanity and being “in this
world” is equal to being “among others.” Thus, travel (tabi 旅) can be understood as the
act of stepping out of one’s own ie, mura, or kuni to know a wider world.
In this context, he redefines wanderlust as an expression of natural curiosity about
the world one does not know, not Romantic world-wariness.
… I think that travel is a sort of the expansion of what children feel when they start
going to school for the first time or when uncles or aunts whom they have not seen
for long time finally visit them; after all, it is a human action caused by the same
feeling that makes you feel like reading a book when you learn how to read, or, if
there are many books, picking up what seems to be the most interesting. (“Seinen to
gakumon.” Teihon 25: 123)
66

The Japanese term shakai is the combination of two Chinese ideographs, sha and kai.
Sha stands for a local shrine and by extension a local community surrounding it. Kai
means a meeting or gathering. Therefore, the Japanese translator understood society as a
meeting or gathering of various communities.
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Therefore, now what has motivated people to travel, even though it was a quite painful
experience in the past, is the desire to acquire knowledge about hito understood as others.
For him, traveling is analogous with reading in the sense that it is motivated by the same
desire to know the world outside one’s own familiar space and time. Yet, knowledge
about other space and time feeds back into knowledge, or the lack of it, about oneself.
Self-reflection prompted by the encounter with others leads to a better understanding of
one’s place in the world and, through the study of unfamiliar others, one can grasp one’s
spatial and temporal existence as a particular expression of humanity. In other words, to
know hito is to understand humanity—i.e., both “us” and “them”—not as an abstract
construction but as a concrete and historical existence.
The kind of travel Yanagita proposes contains the similar demand for
self-effacement normally required for scientific works in the sense that a travelling
researcher is expected to be as objective and unbiased as possible by detaching herself
from her own historical community. However, this detachment is required precisely to
elicit natural sympathy (dōjō 同情) toward the suffering of the same human kind that is
suppressed by the parochial tendency of the civilized. For him, civilization actually
divides, not unites, humanity by objectifying historically contingent boundaries and
translating any difference into a sign of superiority or inferiority. Therefore, travelling
also means temporarily abandoning civilizational life and put oneself in the position o f
solitary wanderers. Solitary wanderers have the advantage of being keen and relatively
unbiased observers of jōmin’s life because, not belonging to any particular space, they
lack a standard model to serve as a point of reference in their comparison between what
they observe. Specifically, unlike the urbanite, they do not look down on jōmin, and
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unlike jōmin, they cannot afford to take their own customs and traditions for granted. The
disposition resulting from the lack of spatial affiliation allows some wanderers to play an
important role in the recording of historical facts. An example of this role is Sugae
Masumi (菅江真澄 1754-1829), a traveling naturalist during the late Edo period. He was
born in Mikawa (Aichi Prefecture today), but for an unknown reason he abandoned his
native place at age thirty and spent the rest of life far away from home. He traveled
around the northeast region (Tōhoku) of Japan and recorded the climate of the region and
the ordinary life of the people with texts and detailed drawings. Notably, Sugae paid
unusual attention to what the urban literate class pejoratively called denpu yajin [country
bumpkins and savages], the servant class, and children, and the collection of his surviving
journals, known as Masumi yūran ki (真澄遊覧記), are highly praised for unbiased and
detailed accounts of manners and customs of rural communities in Tōhoku. Yanagita also
extols the quality of Sugae’s travel writings and attributes its exceptional intellectual
achievement to his rare “fate of abandoning one’s hometown for almost fifty years and
having to bury that poetic mind in the solitude of the snowy country” (Teihon 2: 29). His
necessity and longing for human company elicited deep sympathy for rural folks, unusual
for a urban literate, and made it possible for him to observe and record their life with
detached but sympathetic eyes. As Yanagita abandons wandering people and embraces
solitary wanderers like Sugae, wandering is now fully incorporated into his progressive
historical narrative as a scientific method of knowledge production, rather than the
negation of civilization.
For Yanagita, travel produces not only topological but also historical knowledge. In
Yanagita’s conception, history is inscribed in space and traveling in space is traveling in
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time as well. In translating spatial differences into a temporal sequence, he is closely
following the steps of Enlightenment thinkers before him (Fabian 2002: 2-10), but his
minzokugaku introduces two consequential modifications into the unilinear model of
social progress. First, because of his non-linear notion of progress, temporal priority no
longer means superiority, because the new does not necessarily means the better. On the
contrary, what is new may be inferior to what is old and it is quite possible that the
“advanced” people can learn lessons from the “backward” people. The measurement of
progressiveness is not newness but the extent to which new things contribute to the
improvement of the long-term wellbeing of a community in question. The collective
ability of a community to decide what is good to itself, not uncritical embracement of
whatever is new, is what matters for progress. The correct understanding of the past that
has direct bearings on the present and future because in the absence of any preconceived
eternal principles, only past historical experiences provide exemplary models. Second,
Yanagita’s historical narrative implies the existence of more dense and complex cultural
diffusion among diverse societies than is presupposed in state-centric historiography and,
hence, the higher degree of crossbreeding, both biological and cultural, within and among
the existing nation-states. Thus, historical knowledge produced by a method of travel is
not a common temporal sequence in which each community develops independent from
each other, but the history of the spatial disperson and cultural differentiation of humanity,
which is partially checked by persistent cultural intercourse. For Yanagita, historical
knowledge the method of traveling produce is far more accurate and empirically solid
than the urban-biased conventional historiography, because it neither dissolves spatial
difference into an abstract commonality nor rejects outright a concrete historical
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commonality buried underneath the present spatial divisions. He believes that, given the
universality of jōmin, a solitary traveler, temporally putting herself in the wanderer’s
place, could discover this concrete commonality among various expressions of humanity.
In a broader theoretical context, the method of travelling is embedded on the
assumption that global diversity expressed in spatial difference is indispensable source of
information to excavate human history. By mapping commonalities and differences
among spatial units, one can reconstruct possible routes by which the human race spread
or a particular idea or practice was transmitted. In both cases, the existing spatial division
is relativized and dissolved into a common historical narrative.
Although Yanagita does not clearly distinguish, there seem two patterns of cultural
transmission, depending on who is the transmitter. First, he hypothesizes that if culture is
transmitted from the center to the periphery by wandering people, the oldest form of
cultural life is preserved in the place remotest from the center. He finds this pattern in the
case of neologisms. In Kagyū kō (蝸牛考 On Snails, 1927), he maps the distribution of
different regional names for snails and claims that there are consistent patterns in its
variation. First, each regional dialect contains variations within it, indicating that it is not
a uniform and self-contained language system. Even the languages used in two
neighboring communities can differ from each other. Second, two communities from
different regions sometimes share some common terminology. He extrapolates from this
discovery that the coexistence of intraretional variation and interregional commonality
results from the fact that each dialect zone has been much more open to external
influence, but at the same time each community within the same dialect zone
independently picked and chose what seemed best to it.
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Second, a culture may be transported from one place to another by migrants, and
they preserve it even when it is not suitable for new material conditions of life. An
example of this type of transmission is festivities related to rice cultivation. During his
journey throughout Japan, Yanagita noticed that many mountainous or coastal villages
with little flat terrain suitable to rice cultivation still took the trouble of tending small
paddy fields. Initially, he discarded the practice as economically irrational, but later came
to realize that rice thus produced was destined not for daily consumption but for religious
ceremonies, such as the celebration of New Year (shōgatsu 正月). For another example,
New Year was also called New Spring (sinshun 新春) and was celebrated with fake rice
planting in the middle of snowy winter in northeast Japan. He reasoned that, besides the
fact that the replacement of the old lunar calendar with the Gregorian calendar brought
forward the advent of New Year by about one month, New Year actually coincided with
the beginning of the preparation for rice planting in southwest Japan (Teihon 2: 12-14).
Thus, he interprets the ubiquity of the similar New Year custom throughout Japan as
proof that the common ancestors of the Japanese people first arrived at the southern tip of
the archipelago and went northward. A passage from “Yukiguni no haru” reads:
If they had invented [a custom] anew for their own sake, probably they would not
have accepted such unnaturalness and disharmony. The inhabitants of the periphery,
when they are severed from intercourse with the wider world [seken 世間], become
careless about their personal appearance, letting their beard grow as it pleases or
wearing [unseemly] leather cloths, and acquire an uncouth [araarashí 荒々しい]
look. Seeing that, people [outside of the region] sometimes forget that they are
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brothers who parted company in the past. However, even if no other evidence exists,
there is no cause for worry that those who are so loyal to the old faith and upon
knowing that spring has come in the other part of the country [tenka 天下], they
start preparing for another year of farming in the middle of winter, without paying
attention to the severe coldness in their place, are descended from a different
genealogical line. (“Yukiguni no haru.” Teihon 2: 13-14)
Although those practices seems irrational from the economic point of view, they serve to
preserve historical memory retrievable by minzokugaku researchers.
In Yanagita’s estimate, therefore, the Okinawa islands, where the ancestors of the
Japanese people supposedly landed first, preserve the oldest and most pristine Japanese
culture, uncontaminated from imported elements such as Buddhism. That was a quite
radical thesis, given that the Okinawans were often treated as inferior ethnic others by the
mainland Japanese. His thesis that the ancestors of the Japanese people came from the
south has never been widely accepted and is not supported by later archaeological
discoveries. Nevertheless, regardless of the validity of his thesis on a particular route in
which the Japanese people spread throughout the archipelago, the theoretical point he is
trying to make is still valid: That the existing boundaries that divide contemporary Japan
and, by extension, the world into discrete spatial units are actually pierced through by the
unrecorded history of mobile people.
Although the two kinds of history of cultural transmission, one by wandering
people and the other by migrants, demonstrate different aspects of the Japanese culture,
one dynamic and the other static, they together constitutes a common historical narrative
in which the Japanese people gradually conquered the natural environment they found at
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the arrival and nurtured a unique but not idiosyncratic culture. Yanagita believes that by
excavating such unrecorded history, the parochialism of jōmin would give way to
sympathy [dōjō] toward forgotten brothers and sisters sharing common history. As a
consequence, a class unconscious of itself could become a self-conscious class capable of
self-representation both politically and literally. Only then could a national space be
reclaimed by its legitimate owner, jōmin. However, as in the case of the entire history of
Japanese civilization, wanderers should play a crucial role in producing and
disseminating trans-communal culture and knowledge. Minzokugaku provides methods
that deliberately organize the efforts of temporal wanderers to produce and disseminate
such new culture. Thus, for him, travel constitutes not only a method of knowledge
production but also an important political practice to break away from parochialism
without being individualized and incorporated into an abstract space imposed by the
urban literate elite. In this context, it is worth emphasizing that the main target audience
of his writings and speeches are not scholars in academic institutions or the urban
intellectual class in general but the growing literate youth residing in the rural area,
especially schoolteachers67. He exhorts this particular class to think independently,
instead of passively absorbing given questions and answers through books, and to play a
leading role in the production and dissemination of local knowledge by travelling.

Particular Experience and Universal Knowledge
67

Yanagita was heard saying that whereas the hypothetical reader for Orikuchi Shinobu
(折口信夫 1887-1953), another founding figure in minzokugaku, is a Shintō priest, his is
an elementary shool teacher (NIshiwaki 1962: 74).
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In Yanagita’s minzokugaku, the producer of knowledge is still a solitary individual
who stands apart from the object in question, exercises reason to analyze and dissect it,
and transcribes what is observed in the most accurate and precise way. However, instead
of achieving neutrality merely by means of methodological asceticism, she is required to
gradually move from the personal to the local, from the local to the national, and from the
national to the global space. She starts with questions that directly affect her personal life,
but are gradually forced to expand her spatial and temporal horizons upon finding that it
cannot be explained fully without embedding it in wider spatial and temporal contexts.
Instead of applying her own received knowledge to unfamiliar lands and peoples and
reducing them to the silent objects of analysis, she is expected to be modest enough to try
to understand them in their own terms as much as possible and compare their
self-knowledge with her own. Diverse experiences at every level are counted as relevant
materials for the production of knowledge, and genuinely universal knowledge about
humanity must be constructed block by block from below, so to speak, until global
diversity is fully accounted for in such knowledge.
Yanagita’s writing style follows this pattern. Besides Meiji Taisho shi: Sesō hen
mentioned in the third chapter, his writings generally begin with mundane questions that
one encounters in the quotidian life, such as the shape of an object, the name of a place or
thing, or an oral tradition explaining the origin of a local shrine. In the course of inquiry,
however, those innocuous questions lead to a larger hypothesis about the migratory
history of the Japanese people, the cosmology of jōmin, or the political life of peasant
community. In other words, what seems a purely personal or local experience at first
glance reveals itself to be the tip of an iceberg of a long historical chain transcending the
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narrow confine of individual life. As Tsurumi Kazuko (1998: 82) and others point out,
many, if not all, of Yanagita’s major theses can be traced back to his personal experience
during his childhood and youth. For example, his hypothesis that the Japanese people
first arrived at the Okinawa islands and went northward is traceable to an experience he
had in his visit to Irako Cape, Aichi Prefecture, in 1898. He was strolling the seaside
when he found a few coconuts drifting ashore. Its flesh was still raw indicating a sea
route that connects one of the southern islands to the central part of the mainland
(“Yūkaitōki.” Teihon 2: 474). He incubated the idea for almost sixty years until fully
articulating it in Kaijō no michi.
In more general terms, it is arguable that his thought itself is motivated by his
personal experience. For example, the experience of his biological family seems one of
the primary materials for his subsequent effort to define the household as the linchpin of
social integration. Being part of but standing apart from an agricultural community, the
Matsuokas were eventually uprooted from their hometown and his parents died in a
foreign place they had never been able to get used to. All surviving children became
successful urban professionals, but the Romantic poems by young Yanagita indicate that
he seems to have felt adrift because of his uprootedness, especially after the death of his
parents. His decision to marry into the household of Yanagita was most likely motivated
by his desire to find a home. It is tempting to speculate that his analysis of the psychology
of the urbanite and the role of the household in social integration actually draw on his
own personal experience. Also, his experience in Europe had a profound impact upon his
thought. In Geneva, the former elite bureaucrat felt like a country bumpkin [aka getto 赤
毛布 or yamadashi 山出し] not least because of the lack of linguistic ability to express
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himself freely before his European colleagues in the Permanent Mandate Commission
(Teihon 3: 307-308). Instead of confining this experience to the personal sphere, he
connected it to the experience of the rural population in Japan and the native populations
in colonies.
Yanagita’s inductive methods, therefore, relies on the gradual expansion of one’s
own spatial horizon without abstracting oneself out of the world in which one’s self is
formed. Every step outward brings about important insights into not only others but also
the self, partly because the former serves as a mirror to reflect the image of the latter, and
partly because the comparison reveals historical connections between them. Diverse
experience in this sense is indispensable material for the production of universal
knowledge about humanity. These inductive methods are opposed to a deductive method
in which received theories and concepts are applied to sort out relevant information from
an opaque reality, often by arbitrarily carving out an abstract mental space. The
compartmentalization of the world into neatly demarcated abstract realms, such as
international/national, or political/economic/cultural, that cut across concrete spatial
orders has its own political consequences by reducing the actual agents of human
progress to the mere object of knowledge. Eventually, abstract spaces become the
standards according to which concrete human experience must be organized into. Instead
of descending from an abstract mental space to concrete spaces experienced from within,
a minzokugaku researcher starts with a concrete historical experience and ascends step by
step upward in discovering concrete historical connections between seemingly discrete
elements. That is why Yanagita firmly believes that anthropological knowledge is
indispensible for a genuinely universal and scientific conception of humanity.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

In light of the interpretation of Yanagita’s intellectual biography expounded in the
preceding chapters, his intellectual project can be revaluated as a critical engagement
with the modern spatiotemporal order that has systematically undercut the empirical
weight of global diversity in the production of theoretical knowledge. Instead of counting
diverse experiments by humankind as relevant material for universal knowledge and,
hence, necessary condition for social progress, modern social and human sciences tends
to resort to a preconceived spatial imaginary to draw a sharp line between who is the
subject and the object of knowledge. By translating spatial diversity into stages of
unilinear development, the producers of modern knowledge deny contemporaneity to the
experimentations of those who live outside spaces other than Western or Westernized
urban centers, on the ground that they belong to the past that is already overcome. The
experimentations by the latter, therefore, may have some aesthetic values and can be
valid material for literary or artistic works, but contain nothing new and add little to the
accumulation of knowledge. Yanagita’s critique is directed at this particular aspect of
modern knowledge, which incorporates all the population on earth under the common
rubric of humanity but at the cost of introducing moral and intellectual inequality in the
relations between different peoples on the basis of spatial affiliation.
For Yanagita, the question of diversity and knowledge production is not only
academic but also political one, because knowledge predicated on the modern
spatiotemporal order provides a justification for substituting democratic politics, centered
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on public debates, with the application of received knowledge by the knowledgeable few.
The political authority of the Japanese bureaucratic and intellectual elite depends
substantially on the idea that the West represents the destiny of entire humanity and
knowledge of and from the West can teaches its possessor not only where they are going
but also how to get there more efficiently. For the possessor of such knowledge,
democratic politics is not only unnecessary but also dangerous for social progress, at least
until the population become “mature” enough to be benefited from free discussions.
Because of this assumption, bureaucratic planning, not public discussion, has become the
central feature of modern Japanese politics. Young Yanagita’s emphasis on the internal
diversity of Japan is related to his criticism of a kind of politics that were emerging at the
turn of the twentieth century. Eventually, he comes to believe that the democratization of
politics requires the democratization of knowledge, and intellectual democratization
demands the recognition of diversity as a fundamental puzzle.
In spite of his dissatisfaction with modern knowledge and politics, Yanagita
remains committed to the idea of progress and the possibility of universal science. That is
not to say that it is impossible to consume Yanagita’s writings as an expression of
anti-Enlightenment Romanticism. Indeed, it is not difficult to detect deep-ingrained
skepticism toward modernity in Yanagita’s writings. However, one of the notable
characteristics of his intellectual career is repeated self-criticism and attempts to reconcile
various sets of two seemingly opposing elements—e.g., Romanticism and rationalism,
progress and tradition, reason and sentiment, scientific rigor and poetic imagination, the
Western and the Japanese, and the universal and the particular. If this almost Hegelian
dialectical thrust of his intellectual project is appreciated, it is possible to yield a more
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comprehensive understanding of his thought, which redefines him as an intellectual heir
to and an internal critic of the Enlightenment tradition, rather than an anti-Enlightenment
conservative, with all its merits and disadvantages. He interprets the historical and
particular expressions of humanity, not as antithetical to universal knowledge, but as a
rich reservoir of empirical evidence from which a universal history of humanity can be
inductively reconstructed. He also firmly believes that only by the discovery of genuinely
universal knowledge on the basis of historical experience can humanity get rid of
prejudices and parochialism and lift itself to a higher stage of human civilization. In this
sense, his minzokugaku can be said to be a legitimate heir and a necessary corrective to
“conjectural history,” pioneered by eighteen-centuries Enlightenment thinkers such as
Adam Smith and elaborated by Mill and Marx. Yanagita would argue that, while
conjectural history could fill a huge lacuna in human history, left by the lack of empirical
evidence, with the deductive application of certain principles, minzokugaku offers a more
scientific method to fill the gap and write a more comprehensive and accurate history of
human progress.
The method of minzokugaku is informed by an assumption about space and time
similar to the one held by Enlightenment thinkers: The past is accessible through
travelling in space and it is possible to translate spatial diversity into historical sequence.
However, whereas the Western and the Westernized observers find a flat and timeless
space in non-Western places, he sees the multiple layers of history waiting to be
excavated, just like geologic strata under the surface. Therefore, like the archaeologist
who excavates the relics or survivals of the past from the accumulated layers of ground,
the minzokugaku researcher can excavate the relics and survivals of the past from deeper

215

and subconscious layers of contemporary daily life. What those relics and survivals of the
past tells the contemporary is revealing for two reasons. First, the social history of jōmin
is that of continual, though gradual and not-so-visible, change, often stimulated by
external influence, but primarily driven by jōmin’s physical and psychological needs.
Second, the existing spatial divisions are much more penetrated by the movement of
people, goods, and information than conventionally supposed. Even though two spatial
units, be they the city and the region or different nations, seems to be completely separate
entities on the surface, the deeper one digs into the past, some connections can be found.
That is because, in Yanagita’s conception, civilization has so far tended to divide, rather
than unite, the human race and bury common humanity underneath an increasingly thick
layer of particular culture. In order to discover common humanity, therefore, one needs to
go back to the past, instead of conjecturing it from particular principles and projecting it
into an unrealized future. Thus, while many of his fellow-bureaucrat-intellectuals
travelled from the periphery to the center—that is, from their rural hometown to Tokyo
and from Japan to the West—to retrieve knowledge about universal civilization that was
yet to come, he decided to travel from the center to the periphery to retrieve knowledge
about universal humanity that have existed throughout history.
Such a reading of Yanagita’s texts casts light on an aspect of his thought that has
not received enough attention from either Japanese or international scholars. His
theoretical background is formed in a much more direct engagement with the Western
intellectual tradition than is conventionally thought, and, in fact, he can even be
characterized as a direct heir to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, along with such
thinkers as Mill and Marx. That his thought was influenced by Western ideas is hardly
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surprising given the fact that every modern Japanese social and political thinker must
engage, though to a varying degree of self-consciousness, with them. However, his
thought is directly comparable to Mill’s and Marx’s, not simply because it belongs to the
same discursive field, but also because, rather than accepting uncritically or rejecting
outright the Enlightenment tradition, he consciously tried to redeem its democratic
potential by revising its problematic aspects. The attempt leads him into a deeper layer of
the Western intellectual tradition—i.e., the question of space and time—that runs through
underneath superficial disciplinary or ideological divisions and, as a result, his critique of
the Enlightenment tradition acquires a transformative potential. When he describes
minzokugaku as “a science that organizes and synthesizes [increasingly fragmented and
partial knowledge] into a whole” (Teihon 25: 184) on the basis of not received canons but
the historical experience of the entire humanity, he is speaking the language of the
Enlightenment. Yet, his theory of the relationship between progress and political
community definitely calls certain aspects of the Enlightenment tradition into question.
Thus, Yanagita’s thought can now be said to suggest a path the Enlightenment
tradition could have taken but did not. In fact, the birth of modern anthropology and
geography is tightly connected with the notion that global diversity constitute a common
stock from which the seeker of universal knowledge could be greatly benefited and that
the existing mode of knowledge production was not up to the task of dealing with it.
Excitement about a possibility of a new science and dismay at the current state of
scientific arts are vividly expressed in one of Rousseau’s endnotes to his Discourse on the
Origin and the Foundation of Inequality among Men:
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Shall we never see reborn the happy times when Peoples did not pretend to
Philosophize, but the Platos, the Thales, and the Pythagorases, seized with an
ardent desire to know, undertook the greatest journeys merely in order to learn, and
went far off to shake the yoke of National prejudices, to get to know men by their
conformities and their differences, and to acquire that universal knowledge that is
not exclusively of one Century or one country but of all times and all places, and
thus is, so to speak, the common science of this wise? (Rousseau 1997: 210)
In the rhetorical question, Rousseau suggests that the current mode of knowledge
production is far from being ideal in comparison with his ideal state, which supposedly
existed in the ancient period. The inadequacy, according to him, is because existing
knowledge about humanity is systematically skewed by ethnocentrism and prejudices
against unfamiliar others:
Although the inhabitants of Europe have for the past three or four hundred years
overrun the other parts of the world and are constantly publishing new collections
of travels and reports, I am convinced that the only men we know are the
Europeans; what is more, it would seem that, judging by the ridiculous prejudices
that have not died out even among Men of Letters, very nearly all anyone does
under the pompous heading of the study of man is to study the men of his country.
Regardless of how much individuals may come and go, it would seem that
Philosophy does not travel, and indeed each People’s Philosophy is ill-suited for
another. (Rousseau 1997: 209)
One reason for Philosophy’s inability to travel, according to him, is that knowledge about
unfamiliar places and peoples mostly relies on observations by four classes of
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people—“Sailors, Merchants, Soldiers and Missionaries” (p. 209)—who are all
ill-prepared for objective observation. In order to overcome the problem, Rousseau
continues, travel should be recognized, not as an appendix to other businesses, but as an
intellectual activity in its own right.
Let us suppose a Montesquieu, a Buffon, a Diderot, a Duclos, a d’Alembert, a
Condillac, or men of that stamp, traveling with a view to instruct their compatriots,
observing and describing as they do so well, Turkey, Egypt, Barbary, the Empire of
Morocco, Guinea, […] and all the Wild regions, this being the most important
voyage of all and the one that should be undertaken with the greatest care; let us
suppose that on their return from these memorable travels, these new Hercules set
down at leisure the natural, moral and political history of what they had seen, then
we would ourselves see a new world issue from their pen, and would thus learn to
know our own. (Rousseau 1997: 211)
The passages quoted above could be a perfect statement of the spirit of Yanagita’s
minzokugaku, except that the latter expected the ordinary people to be a Montesquieu, a
Buffon, a Diderot, a Duclos, a d’Alembert, and a Condillac.68
For another example, no one other than Kant, during his precritical period,
considered anthropological and geographical knowledge as indispensable part of
philosophy and taught courses on anthropology and geography (Harvey 2000: 534).

68

There exists textual evidence indicating that Yanagita read Rousseau’s Second
Discourse and hence was familiar with the passages quoted above. In Nōseigaku, he
refers to Rousseau in passing in the discussion of land property. The passage reads: “If, as
Rousseau and others argue, there existed free and independent ancient men…” (Teihon
28: 218).
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Unfortunately, however, the promise of a new science was not fulfilled and anthropology
and geography were established as separate and narrowly defined disciplinary fields with
few connections with philosophy. In fact, Kant’s critical turn and abandonment of
Popular Philosophy (Popularphilosophie), vividly depicted by John Zamitto (2002),
seems illustrative of the course the Enlightenment tradition would ultimately take. What
was at stake in the debate between Popular Philosophy and School Philosophy
(Schulphilosophie) in mid-eighteenth century Germany was nothing less than the
meaning of the enlightenment and the status of knowledge in newly emerging social and
political conditions. The burgeoning bourgeois reading class demanded accessible and
practical knowledge and fiercely attacked what it considered the irrelevant esotericism of
university scholars, either theological or rationalist. Partly influenced by British and
French Enlightenment thinkers, including, of course, Rousseau among others, Kant
emerged as a leader of Popular Philosophy in the 1760s, and his interest in geography and
anthropology partly derived from his desire to make philosophy more accessible and
relevant to the new reading class. However, Kant finally returned to the notion of
philosophy as “rigorous science” and edified a philosophical system that was to shape the
subsequent understanding of the scientific. It is one of his best students, Johann Gottfried
Herder, who held on the torch of a new science Kant might have inaugurated but did not
(Zammito 2002: 15-41). Whereas there is no indication that Yanagita was familiar with
Herder’s writings, there is striking similarity between their views of world history, though,
not surprisingly, the former’s entirely lacks the latter’s theological language. The
similarity points to the possibility that although each of Rousseau, Kant/Herder, and
Yanagita’s discourses was intended to address a historically specific question, there exists
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a common structural problem in the mode of knowledge production and the
democratization of society that runs through all those cases. At any rate, Yanagita’s
minzokugaku is precisely a project to subject the validity of received knowledge to the
full weight of empirical diversity retrieved by the act of travelling. In this sense, it is an
attempt to reengage with the unfulfilled promise of the Enlightenment expressed by
Rousseau.
If Yanagita is a product and internal critic of the Enlightenment and his project is
understood as a direct extension of the Enlightenment tradition, his thought cannot
simply be an expression of Japanese cultural exceptionalism. The view that he is a
Burkean conservative is more on the mark, but it vastly underestimates the scope of the
dialectical thrust of his thought and, and, hence, its progressive side.69 The interpretation
offered in this study, if not totally off the mark, warrants a substantial revision of the
significance of his thought in intellectual history, both Japanese and international. At the
very least, the direct linkage between Yanagita and the Enlightenment tradition makes it
easier to connect his intellectual project, in spite of his apparently exclusive obsession
with Japanese indigenous traditions and customs, with contemporary debates on global
order. There are various ways to do this, but my immediate concern here is to sketch out

69

As far as I know, there is no evidence, either textual or otherwise, that shows Yanagita
actually read Burke’s texts and was directly influenced by them. Apparently, it is entirely
based on similarities between the way the two understood history and political
community. I do not deny that Burkean elements in Yanagita’s thought is substantial
enough to warrant the possibility that he was influenced, directly or indirectly, by Burke,
but want to emphasize the equally important influence of other thinkers, including
Rousseau, Adam Smith, Mill, and Marx, among others.
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the theoretical implications of his thought for the contents and methods of Political
Theory and International Relations.
At the most abstract level, Yanagita’s thought can be said to be political in the
sense that at the center of his thought is the question of human space and time. It reminds
us that there exists an intimate connection between the spatiality and temporality of
human existence and the meaning of the political, possibly constituting a defining
characteristic of politics as a universal problematic. Yanagita understood the mission of
modern science as addressing this universal problematic. On the one hand, being in time
means that change is inevitable and that death is a latent possibility for both individual
and collectivity. The search for elusive immortality in well ordered space requires the
constant revision of knowledge, questioning what is natural—i.e., what is not or should
not be amenable to human will—and what is not. Thus, global diversity and historical
knowledge retrievable from it—what kind of human experiment has produced what kind
of outcomes under given conditions—constitutes an indispensable resource for theory
building. Being in space, on the other, means that human existence is both empowered
and limited by the totality of what is given to a person or a group of persons at a given
time, either external nature or other human beings. In Yanagita’s conception, therefore,
the possibility of progress rests on not only the accumulation of time in a particular place
but also the reconfiguration of spatial order—that is, the internalization of the
externalized other. Thus, another function of the history of anthropological space
excavated by minzokugaku is to expand the spatial and temporal horizon of the individual
beyond his or her immediate space and time. In this quasi-Hegelian dialectics, the
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opposition of Fukuyamian universalism versus Huntingtonian particularism resolves into
a common historical narrative in which time and space interact each other.
At a less abstract level, his thought also has implications for questions concerning
an ideal global order in the midst of diversity, its institutional underpinning, and a means
to achieve it. Although Yanagita never directly addresses those questions, it is possible to
make an educated guess about his latent positions on various issues on the basis of his
unstated theory of human space and time. First, Yanagita understood the problematic of
the contemporary world order quite differently. For him, what was happening during his
time was the global expansion of the power of urban centers over rural peripheries. This
imaginary of global space is predicated on his grand historical narrative of human spatial
dispersion and cultural differentiation. The local saturation of rural space with excessive
labor forces gives impetus to the growth of urban industry and commerce to the point that
it is now cities that hold the upper hand over the rural population. Driven by insecurity,
either material or psychological, cities attempt to establish a hegemonic position vis-à-vis
the countryside by incorporating the latter as its hinterland and establishing hierarchical
relations with it. In Yanagita’s view, this is not necessarily a modern phenomenon, as it
has been repeated locally throughout human history. However, innovations in
communication technologies made it possible for the European metropolis to expand its
reach to every corner of the world and implant its lifestyle and ways of thinking. They
readily find eager audiences in non-Western urban elites, who, with the aid of the Western
metropolis, defeat their rivals and extend their control over the vanquished. In his opinion,
colonialism, either internal or international, Western or Japanese, is but an expression of

223

this urban aggressiveness. What has resulted from the advancement of the urban interest
is a global multilayered network of center-periphery relations.
Yanagita’s imaginary of the early-twentieth century global space is similar to what
John Agnew calls “hierarchical networks,” which he describes as follows:
The nodes here are city-regions. The spatial structure in which they are embedded is
a world economy of geographical cores, peripheries, and semiperipheries linked
together by flows of goods, people, and investment. Transactions based largely on
market exchange produce patterns of uneven development as flows move wealth
through networks of trade and communication producing regional concentrations of
relative wealth and poverty. At the local scale, particularly that of urban centers,
hinterlands are drawn into connection with a larger world that has become
progressively more planetary in geographical scope over the past 500 years.
Political power is a function of whereabouts in the hierarchy of sites from global
centers to rural peripheries a place is located. Time is that which is organized by the
geographical scope and temporal rhythm of financial and economic transaction. The
spatiality is that of spatial networks joining together a hierarchy of nodes and areas
that are connected by flows of people, goods, capital, and information. (Agnew
2003: 130)
Agnew contrasts this model with the conventional imaginary of an international system,
which he terms “field of forces” (Agnew 2003: 129-130). In comparison to the latter, the
“hierarchical networks” model is better at capturing the dynamics of capitalist
development that has its own spatial and temporal logic. To some extent, the formation of
the nation-state and capitalist development work in tandem, as both require the bringing
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down of internal barriers that divide society. However, if left unchecked, the space and
time of capitalist economy easily becomes out of line with those of the nation-state. And,
when that happens, the atomization of communities into individuals and the trivialization
of spatial differences have already made it difficult to defend the nation-state in the name
of the preservation of global diversity. The seed of what is called economic globalization
today was already sowed within the modern spatiotemporal order.
For Yanagita, the global expansion of hierarchical networks is ultimately
attributable to the problem of outgrown urbanism. As such, it cannot be uncritically
embraced as a sign of progress, because the prosperity of urban centers is being
purchased, at least partially, at the expense of spatial and temporal others. In theory, a
rational solution to the problem of local overpopulation and its consequences is the
redistribution of labor and capital, including land, at the global level in a way that could
ensure each household and each community as much self-sufficiency as possible.
However, this means some sort of global migration and resettlement policy, and he
readily admits that this is not a practical solution in the foreseeable future, given the
existing national boundaries, widespread ignorance and misunderstanding about common
humanity, and persistent danger of colonialism. As a more viable alternative, therefore, he
proposes nation-building from below, in which the jōmin of each particular space are
expected to break from an insular and parochial mentality and gradually expand their
spatial horizon from the local to the national, and then from the national to the global.
Instead of breaking up existing communities into atomized individuals, his strategy is to
build upon existing social institutions such as the household (ie) or village (mura), which
have historically countered individualizing forces, to create a nation. His hope is that
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national consciousness and democratic institutions would empower jōmin, the numerical
majority, as a major force in politics, who could, in turn, resist more effectively the
encroachment of the urban interests by consciously choosing what is best for themselves
without blindly following the imitative leadership of the urban elite. In this way, he hopes,
Japan could temporally break from the Malthusian trap, not by resorting to colonial
expansion, but by means of domestic agrarian reform and population control. In the long
run, however, he hopes that a more rational solution to the problem of overpopulation
would be acceptable internationally, when each society develops its own minzokugaku
and becomes conscious of its position in universal human history.
Yanagita’s view would yield a very different diagnosis of the contemporary world
order and possible remedy to it than Fukuyamian universalism and Huntingtonian
particularism. He would embrace international society consisting of politically,
economically, and culturally autonomous nations as an unfulfilled promise and an
alternative to the current global expansion of capitalist economy. Yet, the ideal of
international society he would embrace substantially differs from the one predicated on
the modern spatiotemporal order in several aspects. First, it does not classify societies
according to their positions in a uniform scale of political, economic, and cultural
development. Second, the territoriality of the modern state has been given an objective
foundation, as it is made contingent on the efficient use of economic resources. Those
states with relatively abundant economic opportunities would be obligated to accept
immigrants, but those immigrants would not be supposed to create an enclave or
constitutes a distinct class within the host nation. Third, the internal structure of the
nation-state would be politically, economically, and culturally far more decentralized than
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the modern nation-state. Instead of a few large urban centers exercising hegemonic power
over smaller cities and the countryside, it is imagined as a loose confederation of
economically self-sufficient and political autonomous regions, bonded together by a layer
of common but not totalizing culture. Fourth, the political and economic sovereignty of a
nation-state is also tempered by the awareness of its historical and spatial connections
with other nations. In fact, the nation-state would be but a transitory phase for the further
reunification of humanity that parted the way long time ago, because, as minzokugaku
reveals historical connections between different nations in a deeper layer of the past,
nation-building from below may transcend the existing national boundaries. However, the
reunification should not be carried out by the imposition of a totalizing culture by the
strong, but the spontaneous act of weaving the existing cultures into a common one. Fifth,
nationalism, understood as the expansion of spatial horizon from the local to the national
space, is redefined as a progressive force. However, nationalism needed for that purpose
is not a reactionary sort that reproduces the modern spatiotemporal order by objectifying
spatial differences established by it. Rather, it is nurtured by the desire to cross the
existing borders that divides a nation and, by extension, entire humanity. The methods of
Yanagita’s minzokugaku are designed to promote such a kind of open-ended nationalism,
which, by tracing back the history of human dispersion and differentiation, may
ultimately reach the common ancestry of entire humanity. Yanagita would claim that such
an international society is not perfect, but the best guarantee for the diverse
experimentations by humanity to run their respective courses toward progress, while the
possibility of a mutually enriching learning process would be kept open by continual
border crossing.

227

It is debatable whether Yanagita’s ideal international society is a realistic or
desirable alternative to other possibilities, but, at least, it recognizes the question of
cultural diversity as a fundamental puzzle for the construction of world order in the age
of globalization. A puzzle is hardly new for Political Theory and International Relations,
but it has been so far solved, or “deferred” in Inayatullah and Blaney’s (2004: 44)
terminology, by Todorov’s “double movement” (Todorov 1999: 50). Certainly, this
tendency is neither a new phenomenon nor proper to encounters between particular
cultural groups, but combined with the Western economic and military ascendancy since
the sixteenth century, it led to the worldwide diffusion of allegedly “universal”
knowledge that perpetuates the West at the center of the modern spatiotemporal order,
with the East and South trailing behind.
Knowledge thus produced has serious political ramifications because it precludes
the possibility of reciprocal communication between the West and the Rest by denying
the East and the South what anthropologist Johannes Fabian (2002) calls “coevalness.”
Because anthropology is the discipline that is specifically designed to produce knowledge
about the East and the South, his critique of anthropologists’ “persistent and systematic
tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than the present of the
producer of anthropological discourse” (Fabian 2002: 31) is illustrative of the use of
space and time in the modern production of knowledge. Fabian argues that the denial of
coevalness amounts to the denial of communication because,
To recognize Intersubjective Time would seem to preclude any sort of distancing
almost by definition. After all, phenomenologists tried to demonstrate with their
analyses that social interaction presupposes intersubjectivity, which in turn is
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inconceivable without assuming that the participants involved are coeval, i.e. share
the same Time. In fact, further conclusions can be drawn from this basic postulate
to the point of realizing that for human communication to occur, coevalness has to
be created. Communication is, ultimately, about creating shared Time. (Fabian
2002: 30-31)
According to Fabian, however, the possibility of ethnological field research, which places
the observer and the observed in coeval position as copartners of knowledge production,
is forfeited by temporal distancing of the latter in the process of translating their findings
into written manuscripts.
The denial of coevalness is not limited to the practice of anthropologists, but is
pervasive in other fields. Todorov (1999) contrasts the “ethnologist” and “comparatist”
attitudes toward cultural others as follows:
The comparatist puts certain objects, all of which are external to him, on the same
level, and he himself remains the sole subject. … it does not put the Other on the
same level as oneself, and does not call into question one’s own categories. The
ethnologist, on the other hand, contributes to the reciprocal illumination of one
culture by another, to “making us look into the other’s face,” according to the
splendid phrase already devised in the sixteenth century by Urbain Chauveton: we
know the other by the self, but also the self by the other. [italics in the original]
(Todorov 1999: 240)
What Todorov calls the “comparatist” stance is the dominant attitude in many other social
scientific modes of knowledge production. Indeed, in modern sciences, universality is
explicitly defined as the detachment from any particular space. As a result, the observer is
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required to suspend its own social identities and treat the subjects of analysis as data, not
as a communicative partner. A price for this stance, according to Todorov, is so many lost
opportunities to know the self through the other.
The effort by Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thinkers to incorporate global
diversity into theoretical knowledge is vitiated by this comparatist attitude, which had an
unintended consequence of impoverishing their understanding of the self, the other, and,
hence, humanity as a whole. Yanagita tried to correct this defect of the Enlightenment
tradition by adopting a more ethnological attitude toward the question of otherness in the
sense that he treated others as communicative partners rather than the mere object of
knowledge. For him, only knowledge produced by means of more dialogical or
conversational methods deserves the name of universal knowledge. This is also a
corollary of his application of Mill’s defense of diversity in a global scale, though in
Yanagita’s conception the subject in life experiments is no longer individuals but
democratic communities in which not the knowledgeable few but entire citizenry take
part in it. Today, when the entire world has undergone Westernization in various aspects
of life and there is less “freedom” and “a variety of situations” in collective experiments,
not only the West but also entire humanity suffer from the shortage of alternative views.
In this sense, modern political and international relations theories may have contributed
to the impoverishment of knowledge by narrowing down, rather than enlarging, political
possibilities. At the very least, Yanagita’s effort to revaluate the political significance of
seemingly apolitical aspects of Japanese civilization serves as a reminder of such danger.
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